GERMAN NAVAL INACTION.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 4, Issue 96, 15 October 1915, Page 2 (Supplement)

GERMAN NAVAL INACTION.

WHY THE HIGH SEAS FLEET STAYS AT HOME.

By JOHN LEYLAND In The "Daily Graphic."

We have entered upon a second year of war, but have no clearer indication of what the German .\avy proposes to do, or is likely to do, than we possessed at the beginning. Then, indeed, it seemed possible that sooner or later the High Seas Fleet would appear on the high seas and challenge a decision. Even now it is hard to believe that the Fleet which has cost so many milr lions will remain permanently inactive. The launching of another battle-cruis-er, the Tindenburg, at Wilhelmshaven —almost certainly the ship built under the designation of Ersatz Hertha, and delayed, perhaps in order that she might receive heavier armament than was originally intended —has suggested that the battle-cruiser squadron may yet attempt an enterprise, perhaps in the North Sea, or perhaps, if fortune favour it, in some distant ocean, against one or other of our possessions. For it must be remembered that if Germany can build swift battle-crui6ers she can bu'ld also swift coal, oil, and ammunition boats to accompany them. Such an enterprise, boldly conducted, might cause us a good deal of inconvenience; but it could not give freedom to German commerce nor change in any degree the internal situation of Germany. This is a reason for surmising that it will not be undertaken, ?nd

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the reason seems further strengtheno 1 when we consider that the departure of the battle-cruisers would leave the High Seas Fleet deprived of its most valuable elements. ARGUMENTS AND REALITD S. What then, will the German Fleet do? Early in the war we believed thai our sea-power would soon exert such (impression upon Germany and create such a serious situation internally, that the High Seas Fleet would be driven to come out in an effort to break the bonds. But we are now able to see that nothing of the kind is occurring. There was at the time every visible ground for our belief that the German fleet would move. The semiofficial "Nauticus" of last year, published, a couple of months before the outbreak of war, had insisted most forcibly, and with a wealtk of figures and statistics, that the economic prosperity and even the life of Germany many depended upon foreign cimmerce. One-third of the national requirements in foodstuffs came from abroad, and a proportionate part of the population depended upon foreign commerce, thirds if which came by sea. "Although," we were told, "Anglo-Ger-man relations had improved because of the increase of the German fleet, the fact remained that foreign trade was not only the strength but the Achilles' heel of the new German Empire." It was a favourite idea set forth by the Germans a " riskogedanke" (a threat)—that a strong German fleet wuld hold our assumed aggressive purposes in check. But "Nauticus" said that if the German coasts were blockaded the "life-6tream" of the people would be constricted, and though '• sudden death would not result, a condition of misery would follow. The notion of famine resulting from naval compression persisted. It was at least the real or ostensible reason for the institution of the "submarine blockade." The time was near, we were told, when Germany would no longer have food for her people. Might not England, asked "Nauticus," so influence neutral countries that supplies from them would almost be denied to Germany? Rightly, were economic i|uestions set forth in the propaganda of the Navy Law, but the semi-official volume insisted that the Fleet could not be measured merely by such considerations. It was in itself a highly important political force, and, in ita kind, "a military instrument at sea as the army was on land." THE ANOMALY. The conclusion of this argument was that Germany must depend upon herself. She could not trust to other.* where her very life was concerned. Her fleet was neither a luxury nor a 'sport,," but a vital necessity—a "Lobensnotwendigkeit"—and, as the Emperor had said, the future of the country "lay upon the water," and "bitter was the need of a strong German fleet.'' But now we are confronted with the anomaly that the foreign commerce which was vital has disappeared, and yet that the fleet whose power or influence was so bitterly necessary remains inactive. Mr. Harold Cox hi.', however, clearly shown in the " D»."'=y Graphic" that the Genua v. by foesight and economy of means and resources, have now created for themselves economic advantages which go a long way towards neutralising the immense advantage which the British Navy gives to the United Kingdom. They have falsified the prognostications which have figured so largely in all the arguments for German naval expansion. A whole literature seems to be belied by the situation they have created. How will this situation react upon the Navy? Is it intending to strike a blow, and actually preparing to become a military instrument at sea as the army is on land? Although a definite answer cannot be given to this question, there are certain considerations which seem to suggest how the situation may be influenced or may develop.

A GERMAN PROBLEM. It lias been said that the German fleet is no more than the right wing of the German army against us, and that it will issue if or when the German Army Staff may desire. Be this as it may, there is inherent probability in the idea that the major part of it is now doubtless acting as the left wing of the German army operating against Russia, and holding the Russian main fleet. However the war may end, it would certainly be a valuable point in the game of diplomacy if German had her fleet intact. If she hopes to secure success on land, as her offer to Russia seems to suggest, the fleet wiH probably remain inactive. If there should be danger of scarcity of supplies, and naval constriction should be. come too severe to be borne, the fleet will certainly issue forth to try conclusions with us. It would not issue for any other purpose. A mere promenade would be useless. But on the "whole, and so long as Germany can maintain her internal security and ward off distress, there seems no real reason for the immediate or proximate action of teh fleet. It is not cowardice but calculation that keeps the Germans out of the North Sea. Only some possibility of catching us at a disadvantage is likely to tempt them forth. This, at least, is the line of naval policy suggested by the present situation.