THE GERMANS AND CALAIS

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 4, Issue 69, 13 August 1915, Page 2 (Supplement)

THE GERMANS AND CALAIS

THE " DRANG NACH WESTENY' By A NAVAL CORRESPONDENT. When the Germans mounted a heavy na\al gun, probably a 12in. f weighing, perhaps, some 50 tons, in a position iu the rear of Dixmude, a rango of twentythree and three-quarter miles, in order to rjombard Dunkirk, thev exhibited the premonitory symptom of their now outburst of energy, which takes the form of a struggle for the possession of the coast. The situation is developing very rapidly, and every indication, both in the pouring of troops into Western Belgium, and the persistence of the attack, fchows that this new advance is no mere feint, but another attempt to reach Calais.

There are many people who think that Calais is a sort of will o' the wisp, which is leading on the Germans to do foolish things, by incurring enormous losses for a possible fruitless gain. This is not an accurate view of the situation. It is true that a German army at Calais would be impotent to strike a blow against England—just as impotent as was Napoleon's army at Boulogne —until command of the sea had been Ejuned. Nevertheless, the occupation of the port would be of enormous importance to Germany. It would present advantages which we must not un-der-rate—advantages l>oth moral and material. A\e shall not go far wrong if we say that, from the very beginning of the war, tho Germans havo had two principal objects in view in their strategy in the est. One was to reach Paris, the other, less determinate, to attack England. It was anticipated that we might enter into the quarrel, and the main advance was therefore made through Belgium as a precautionary measure, and when it was known that we were actually allied with Franco, tho advance was carried far to the west. It passed through Brussels to Ghent, and brought the Germans to the hard-fought battle-ground of Western Flanders. The march mi Paris failed, and that part of the campaign lost it-s importance to the enemy, whose whole mind was turned thenceforth to the possession of the coast.

THE BIG GUN THREAT. The moral and political effect ct reaching Calais would be very great, not only in Germany, where it would inspire the people with the fullest confidence in the ultimate success of their arms, -but, throughout Europe. Ik would probably determine the action of the Balkan States, for it would be folly to ignore the fact that theso countries are not yet convinced that wo are going to win. They desire to hunt with the hounds, and by no means to run with the hare. Therefore, on moral and political grounds alone, the tremendous energy which the Germans are putting into their attack is fully explained. We do not expect them to succeed, for they are still a long way from Calais, and the Allies are ready and confident of the result, but their action is explained and must bo understood.

The object in view is not, however, merely moral and political. If attained it would have practical results. If big guns can be mounted behind, in tho rear of Dixmude, they could be mounted also behind the dunes near Oailais. There is no real difficulty in bringing up big guns to the front. We frequently conduct greater operations of this kind, when our newest big guns, such as thoso of the Queen Elizabeth, which weigh something like 100 tons, are brought from the North of England to the dockyards 011 the Channel. The Germans have doubtless been making preparations throughout the winter. Essen has been working full blast. We know what big howitzers—lGJ inches —have been used in the attack on the Belgian fortresses. At least one big gun reached Dixmude, and others are certainly ready for Calais.

OUR SERIOUS TASK. It is, of course, obvious that if big guns can be mounted in hidden positions, behind the dunes near Calais, Dover will not be secure. We are not accustomed to think of extreme ranges. Naval officers think of extremo effective ranges, the target being a ship or, perhaps, some sort of battery on shore. But Dover is a large target, and could certa-nlv be hit. There is no reason why big shells should not be thrown to a distance of 2o miles, or even more. It may be said that we could reply, which is true, but we should have no object in bombarding Calais. Our object would be to destroy the enemy's guns, which might not be easy if they were well concealed, doubtless with overhead armoured protection. Moreover, it would bo possible to mount guns of smaller calibre concealed along the sea front at Calais, which could shell shipping passing through the Straits, and this would create another difficulty. In short, a situation might arise somewhat analogous to that which exist at the Narrows of the Dardanelles.

There is nothing alarmist in these suggestions. They arc very obvious to the Germans, who are doubtless hoping to give effect to them. Now, if it should ever happen that Dover and the Straits are brought under fire from the opposite shore, other consequences might follow, which the Germans also have in view. They do not know where our Grand Fleet is, but they must by this time have formed a conception of its strategy. They know that it is quite ready and very willing to give battle to the High Sea Fleet, but Grand Admiral von Tirpitz has himself said that tlie latter would not be so foolish as to bo drawn into action at a disadvantage. Ho hopes that it may be possible to divide the Grand Fleet. When divided Irs fl.'et off Brest in 1805, Napoleon charaetertised the action as an " insigne betise " —a piece of mere stupidity—though in fact it was justified and made necessary by the circumstances. The Germans know that we could not allow Dover to be bombarded with impunity. Whatever action we took it would be rapid and severe. There would be no German fleet near Dover to attack. The High Sea Fleet would be ready for a-ction somewhere in the. of Heligoland.

The hope would be that some part of our Grand Fleet would come south into the narrow waters between the Dutch coast and our own, where the powerful submarines which the Germans are multiplying so rapidly would seek their opportunity. At the same time the High Sea Fleet might be emboldened to take its chances of action with the other part of the British Fleet. These are the bold imaginings ot the Germans, now inspiring them to a very serious purpose, which they are pursuing with tremendous energy aad formidable preparation. By understanding their objects we shall the tetter realise the seriousness of the task before us. and the strenuous will and unconquerable resistance which must bar the roail t:> Calais and the coast of France.