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THE KAISER AS NAVAL SPY.

HOW THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY SCORED IN GAME OF ESPIONAGE.

(By ARNOLD WHITE in "Sunday

Pictorial.'

Mr. Arnold White is one of the most influential and popular of British publicists. An ardent patriot, he persistently warned the public of the German menace before the war. No one has dealt more thoroughly with the scientific system of German espionage, which has been carried on so long in England.

Twice lately have I attended divine service in St. George's Chapel, Windsor. Overhead hung the banners of two German naval spies. At the close of the service, meekly bending on my knees, I listened to the praver offered up to the Most High God for the Knights of the Most Noble Order of the Garter. Some are noble : two are naval spies.

Kaiser A\ilhelm has combined espionage with treachery; also Prince Henry. Pretending to be a friend of England, the Kaiser frequently boarded British ships of war in his capacity of Admiral of the British Fleet. The last time lie boarded a British battleship was at Kiel, a few weeks before the war. He asked many questions. He always received ilie same reply frcun officers: "I do not know, your Majesty." Bluejackets, when interrogated by the Imperial spy, bluffly replied: "Don't know, your Majesty." British counterespionage was at work—successfully.

NAVAL DIPLOMATISTS

Our naval officers arc judges of chare actor. Therefore tlioy arc diplomatists. Naval men never confuse violent language will) firm a< lion. Kaiser Williclm, since 190-">, lias never personally obtained any information of value about tlie British Fleet. Tliat was withheld by authority. Had lie succeeded it would liave Keen imnossible that the German High Seas Fleet would have found itself interned in the Kiel Canal merely because the Germans failed ii understand the meaning of the British big-bore gun. Drunk with pride, the ''Admiral of the Atlantic" and his t-py brother, the charming Prince Henry or Prussia, grossly exaggerated the skill and foresight of Von Tirpitz in the matter of gunnery, and absurdly undervalued the brains and skill of our Sea Lords and our Directors of Naval Ordnance.

The German naval spy system has been vaunted, advertised and extolled. The Intelligence Department of our Admiralty has been decried and derided until one would imagine that every German is a. Sherlock Holmes and every Briton a blockhead. That is where our Admiralty scores. Ii does not advertise. The German Marineamt screams at the top of its voice. Yet our Admiralty's knowledge of the secrets of the German Navy is greater—far greater—than anv knowledge possessed by the Marineamt of our Admiralty's secrets. I wish 1 could say how 1 know. It is understood that the German system of espionage in England is borrowed from the Russians. The Russian system is excellent. I betray no confidence in saying that much of our knowledge of the state of Germany at the present time is largely obtained from our Russian Allies.

In considering the British system oi naval espionage we must remember that the first line of defence of the British Empire is not the Navy, but Knowledge. In vain we might possess an overwhelming Meet, unless we knew before hand the intention of the enemy. Our system of naval intelligence has been wellnigh perfected during the last few years. The idea of a sudden raid —at all events, since the end of 1903 —would have been possible only in the event of treachery or inebriety on the part of the Lords of our Admiralty and of the Commanders-in-Chief of our Ueets.

ALWAYS READY

It may lie admitted some students ol naval affairs have been apprehensive — the writer among the number —that the Admiralty were relying merely on positive information as to movements of a possible enemy. The only safe plan in time of peace was to establish a system by which British agents of the Admiralty on the Frisian coast should communicate regularly twice in the twentyfour hours with \\hitehall through the medium of other agents posted at various places in friendly or nc utral countries. and then, if the Admiralty heard nothing for twenty-four hours from any one of their agents, to assume that the worst had happened. The presumption wa,s that our agents had been arrested by Germany and that automatic movement of British squadrons to their proper place would take place without waiting for an order. That this system, or something like it, v.as adopted there is good reason to believe. At all events, for the last ten years lew people who knew the facts i'clt apprehension as to the landing o! I.ord ilaldane's seventy thousand Germans. The real danger was that the British Naval Intelligence Department rtas so conspicuously efficient that Ministers have been tempted to stint the Navy, trusting to luck to make good it, deficiencies after war broke out.

CONFIDENT OF VICTORY

Why was it Sir Doveton Sturdee'.s •r.uadron reached the Falkland Islands without detection hv the Marineamt? The Admiral must have threaded the zones of many German or proGerman wireless installations. The Admiral inu->t have coaled, ciled or watered his ships on the way out. But no news was tapped hv the Spy Department of Germany. How w.ts it that the designs of tlv British all-round tire, biy-bore swift Dreadnoughts and super-Dreid-noiifilits were successfully conceided from the German? while the British knew exactly ivltat the Germans were doim r and encouraged them to stereo tNik' their mistakes?

In no department of naval intelligence in this war is accurate knowledge more important than in relation to mine-field:! and the defences of. and channels leadin:: to, enemy ports. True to the traditions of the Great Silent Navy, the Admiralty is dumh as an egg. Xaval officers responsible for keepim; open the war channel on tile Fast Coast which is th'< jutrtilar vein of Britain —are in ■l'od snirits. The irood f-j>irit-s of the Admiralty are risinr. (,)uiet consciousness of comtpe vietorv animates tit" quarter of a million men and hoys born< on the pay roll of th > Wavy. If we sedentary folk sleep quietly in our hods; if our daughters and sist-*• rn are safe from the kisses of intoxicated Huns —the reason is that our Xaval Intelligence Department has beaten the German spy svst-em.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/PWT19150618.2.25.24

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 4, Issue 47, 18 June 1915, Page 6

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,039

THE KAISER AS NAVAL SPY. Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 4, Issue 47, 18 June 1915, Page 6

THE KAISER AS NAVAL SPY. Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 4, Issue 47, 18 June 1915, Page 6

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