THE NAVAL FACTOR IN THE WAR.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 4, Issue 20, 12 March 1915, Page 4 (Supplement)

THE NAVAL FACTOR IN THE WAR.

ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ'S STATEMENT—AND HIS PROBABLE INTENTIONS.

By JOHN LEYLAND in London

"Graphic."

The recent statement made by Grand Admiral von Tirptiz to an American interviewer created a considerable stir. It should not be taken at its face value. Strategists and responsible administrators of naval or military forces do u)t, especially in war lime, wear their hearts' on their sleeves. They are not accustomed to forecast the measures they intend to take, and sometimes such public utterances as that of the Grand Admiial may be made with the intention t.o deceive. Thus, though von Tirpitz gave the impression that the High Sea Fleet will not come forth to fight it must not be assumed that the reaT intention is that it shall continue in hiding. It is true that the State Secretary for the German Navy merely said what was in a sense obvious. He asked if it was t« be expected that the German Fleet would seizo an opportunity unfavourable in the military sense to challenge the British Fleet to fight ? It will come out and fight if the British give the opportunity—in other words, if we commit some strategical ineptitude! Battles in the past have not been brought about in that way. A mere calculation of nicely balanced chanced has not determined the action. It has usually been brought about by the necessity of'some object to be attained. Hawke ran enormous risks at Quiberon Bay. When De Grasse had certain objects in view he ran risks to attain them, and so was brought about his engagement with Radnev. • Soldiers always like to have big battalions on their side, and seamen big squadrons. But St. Vincent and Nelson did not win their battles bv counting ships and guns'. They wei* quite prepared to engage the enemy even if he were found in considerably superior force. Napoleon reproached his Admirals for thinking battles could be fought without running risks. German diplomacy has never been timid. Germans in' land warfare have often run risks, and Frederick was victorious at Rossbach and elsewhere with inferior strength. When, therefore, Admiral von Tirpitz suggests that risks will not be runtn this war by the fleeet he has created he must not necessarily be understood to be expressing his whole mind, or expounding the instructions which have been given to Admiral von Ingenohl. STARVING US BY SUBMARINE. When Admiral von Tirpitz turned to the question of the submarine, he said some interesting things. He has not lost faith in big ships. Having built so many of them and projected so manv more, it would have been surprising to find him recanting. Yet he has greater confidence in the submarine than in the Zeppelin. It is credibly believed, nevertheless, that his faith in the submarine is comparatively new—that he long resisted the building of such craft, but at last was overborne by the insistence of the Admiralstab. It is certain that it he is building forty submarines of 800 or 900 tons a large sum will be absorbeu that might have been devoted to his Dreadnoughts.'. Large submarines are valuable because of their great range, their independence of action and increased storage of torpedoes. But increase of size means increase of visiouity. The bigger the object, even it submerged, the more eaoslly will it be discovered. It was not a big submarine that traversed the Turkish minefield in the Dardanelles. A big submarine is likely to foul obstructions of that; class. But the advantages outweigh the disadvantages provided the large submarine belongs to the Navy of tho , stronger Power. Germany is not tho stronger naval Power, and that is why the scheme outlined by Admiral von Tirpitz would fail. He desires to bottle us up, torpedo ships as they approach our ports, and so cut off our supplies. Famine is to follow. To have any chance even of partial success large numbers of submarines and phenomenal luck must be pro-supposed. Flotillas of them must get north round about Scotland, or run the gauntlet through the Downs, or brave our minefields.' and then plv their trade in waters which arc or would be patrolled by our destroyers and light cruisers, lhe will to destroy may inspire the scheme, but success, except in a case here and there, will noE follow. If the Germans had seriously planned anything of the kin«l thev would surclv have attempted it against our transports leaving or arriving at port. We have taken ample precautions against such risks, and shall continue to do so. GERMAN ARMY AND GERMAN FLEET. There is evidence of a counsel of despair in this suggestion. The war of attrition against our Fleet has failed, effort i against our floating commerce have rooiit their force. The shelling ol Scarborough, Whitby and Hartlepool has not bad the most remote influence to our disadvantage, nor brought Germany any nearer to success. On the contrary, it has had a tonic effect upon our' recruiting. We shall practise no "frightfulm-;,." but our own lads arc now toasting "The Day." Ihe droppin" of bombs is unavailing, and Dover amfsi.oerness have laughed. Not by any such means can our position be assailed. If the Germans wish to defeat us thev must secure command of the sea, either to invade our country or cut'our communications with the Continent and the distant parts of tho Empire. Only in this way is it possible to injure us, and this is a reason for thinking that sooner or later tho High Sea Fleet Will take some risk swid venture a battle. If the land campaigns went well for Germany that might be unnecessary, but if she is hemmed in on every side,'and finds Tier position threatening, the fleet may be compelled to move, it has been described as a wing of the German Armv, and that wing may yet bo ordered to'act. There must be some strategists in Germany who recognise the futility of bombardments and shells dropped from the sky. These might ho the accompaniments of success, but thev cannot be the panacea for failure, for that reason, if for no other, Admiral von Tirnitz mns] not be taken at his word. "Forco majeure" may driv* the Fleet to sea, and conceivably that is the reason why lie describes it as unequal In the encounter. In this' way Ins expressions may be regarded as, bv anticipation, an "apologia" for its failure.