MY EXPERIENCES AS A SPY.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 4, Issue 16, 26 February 1915, Page 2 (Supplement)

MY EXPERIENCES AS A SPY.

HOW " B'.P.'' SAYED ENGLAND FROM INVASION.

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR R. S. S. BADEN-

POWELL, K.C.8., Tells, in "Pearson's Weekly," how. in the course of his work as a Spy, lie discovered an ingenious and plausible plan for the invasion of England, commercial" spying. In addition to the various branches of spying which I have mentioned, the Germans have also practised commercial espionage on systematic lines. Young Germans have served in British business houses without salary in order to " learn the language"; they took car e to leani a good deal more than tlio language, and picked up many other things about trade methods and secrets which were promptly utilised in their own country. The importance of commercial spying is that commercial war is all the time at the bottom of Germany's preparations for military war.

Carl Lodv. a German ex-officer, was recently tried in London by court martial and shot for "war treason" —that is, for sending information regarding our Navy to Germany during hostilities. (" War treason" i s secret work outside the /-one of operations. When carried on within the zone of operations it is called spying or "espionage.") Carl Lodv's moves were watched and his correspondence opened by the counterspy police in London, and thus all his investigations and information were known to the War Office long before he was arrested. INTERNATIONAL SPIES. The enormous sums paid by Germany for many years past have brought about a sort of international spy exchange, generally formed of American-Germans, with their headquarters in Belgium, and good prices were given for information acquired by them. For instance, if the plans of a new fort, or the dimensions of a new ship, or the power of a new gun were needed, one merely had to apply and sta'te a 'price to this bureau to receive fairly good information on the subject before much time had elapsed. At the sam e time, by pretending to lie an American, one was able to get a good deal of minor and useful information without the expenditure of a cent. On getting into touch with these gentry, I discovered one of the alternative plans by which the Germans proposed to invade our country, and incidentally it throws some light on their present methods of dealing with the inhabitants as apart from the actual tactical movements of th e troops. The German idea then —soime six years ago—wa s that they could, by means of mines and submarines, at any time block the traffic in the British Channel in the spac e of a few hours, thus holding our home fleets in their stations at Spithead and Portland. With the Straits of Dover so blocked, they could then rush a fleet of trans-

ports across the North Sea from Ger-

many, to th e East Coast of England, either East Anglia or, as in this plan, to Yorkshire. They had in Germany nine embarking stations, with piers anil platforms, all ready made, and steel lighter s for disembarkation purposes or fdr actual traversing of the ocean in case of fine weather. The v had taken th e average of the weather for years past, and hacWomo to the conclusion that July 13th is. on an average, the finest day in the year; but their attempt would be timed, if possible, to fall on a Bank Holiday, when communications were temporarily disorganised. Therefore the, nearest Bank Holiday to July 13th would probably be that at the beginning of August ; it was a coincidence that the present war broke out on that day.

The spies stationed in England were* to out all telephone and telegraph wires, and where possible, to blow down important bridges and tunnels, and thus to interrupt communications and create, confusion. Their idea of landing on the coast of Yorkshire was 'based on the following reasons:—■

They do 31 n't look upon London as strategically the capital of England, but rather upon the great industrial centres of the north Midlands, where, instead of six millions, there are mo're like fourteen millions of people assembled in the numerous cities and towns, which now almost adja'n each other across that part of the country. Their theory was that if they could rush an army of even 'JO,(XX) men into Leeds, Sheffield, Halifax, Manchester, and Liverpool without encountering great opposition in the first few hours, they could there establish themselves in such strength that it would require a powerful army to drive them out again. Bringing a week's provisions with them, and seizing all th? local provisions, they would have enough to sustain them for a considerable time, and the first step of their operation would' l>e to expel every inhabitant —man. woman, and child—from the neighbourhood and destroy the towns. Thus, within a. few hours, fonie fourteen niil--1 lions of people would l>e starving, and wandering without ishel'tfir over tho face of the country —a disaster which would need a large force to deal with, and would cause entire disruption of our food supplies and of business in the country. Tho East Coa>t of Yorkshire between the Humber and Scarborough lends itself to such an adventure, by providing a good open beach for miles, with open country in front of it, which, in its turn, is protected by a semicircle of worlds, which could b e easily held by tho Gorman covering force. Its lett would lie protected by the Humber and the right by tho Tec.;', so that the landing could be carried out without interruption. That was their plan —based on careful investigation by a small army of ■spies—some five or six years ago. before our naval bases had lieen established in the north. If they had declared war then, they might have had 110 serious interference from our Navy during the pa-sago of their transports, which, of nour.se, 'would Ibo protected °n ithafe flank bv their entire fleet of worships.

At first glance, it seem s too fanciful a plan to commend itself to belief, but in talking it, over with German officers. I found they fully believed in it as a practical proposition. They themselves enlarged 011 the idea of the use that they would thus make of ihe civil population, and foreshadowed their present brutality by explaining that when war I came, it would not lie made with kid | gloves. The meaning of 'their commands would be brought hom e t-o the people by shooting down civilians if necessary, in order to prove that, they were in earnest, and to force the inhabitants through terror to comply with their 0"e----quirements. Further investigations on the Inject proved that the •embarkation arrangements were all planned nnd prepared for. At any time in the ordinary way of commerce there wero numerous large mail steamers always available in their ports to transport numbers even largely in excess of those that would b e assembled for such nil expedition. Troops could be mobilised in

the neighbourhood of the ports, ostensibly for manoeuvres, without suspicion being aroused.

It is Ja'd down in German strategical textbooks that the tim<> for making war is not when you hav e a political caut** for it, hut when your troops are ready, and the enemy is unready; and that 'to stnko the first blow is the best way to declare war.

I recounted all this at thettiem e in a private lecture to officers, illustrated with lantern slides and maps, as a military problem which would bo interesting to work out on the actual ground, and it was not 'rea-lly until the report of this leaked into the papers that I realised how nearly I lmd "touched the spot. ' For, apart, from the various indignant questions with which the Secretary of State for War was badgered in the House of Commons on niv account, I was as-sailed with letters from Germany of most violent abuse from various quarters, high and low, which showcd mo that * liad gone nearer the tiruth than T had even suspected. " on are a brown-paper general," .'aid one. "and if you think that by your foolish talk you are to frighten us from coming you are not right." FIELD SPTES. It is difficult to say where. exactly n. spy's work ends in war, and that of » scout begins, except that, as a rule, tlie first is carried out in disguise. The scout is looked up to as a brave man, and his expedients for gaining information are thought wonderfully clever, so long as lie remains hi uniform. If he goes a bit further, nnd find s that lie can get bis information better by adopting a disguise—even at the greater risk to himself through the tainty of being shot if he is found oiuS —then ho is looked down upon as av "despicagle spy." 1 don't see the justice of it, myself. A good spy —no matter which country li<> serves—is of necessity a brave and valuable fellow.

In our Army we do not. fake a very w:de use of field spies on service, though their palrtial us? at manoeuvres has shown what tliey can do.