THE BASELESS FEAR OF PAN-SLAVISM.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 4, Issue 8, 29 January 1915, Page 2 (Supplement)

THE BASELESS FEAR OF PAN-SLAVISM.

RUSSIA'S LOVE OF WESTERN CULTURE AM) IDEALS.

By SASHA KROPOTKIN. m London ''Daily Chronicle."

(Mrs. Sasha Kropotkin-Labedeff, the only child of Peter Kropotkin was born and educated in this country. Her husband, Boris Lebedeff, is a Russian exile, who for many years has been a London correspondent for certain Liberal papers in Petrograd and Moscow. Peter Kropotkin, one of the most widely known, and best loved of the Russian Revolutionists, is a Communist-Anarchist, and objects to tho uso of his title "Prince;')

Whether it is good or bad for one nation to admire or imitate another is a debatable point. There is, however, no doubt that no other people have tho same humble respect for the culture of other nations as have the Slavs. All Slavs are conscious of the lack of culture, and of the high proportion of illiterate in their own countries, and of tho necessity to remedy these conditions. Tho eagerness with which they (study and absorb Western culture, and the prido they take in their own universities and schools is well known. All the universities in Russia, and those in Belgrade and Sofia, are filled to overflowing. Nearly all over Europe at the great centres of learning the Slav—especially the Russian—element is predominant amongst the foreign students. In most countries a man may become famous, buy a title, or simply gain respect by subscribing a solid sum to party funds. In a Slav country the same man founds a school, a laboratory. or a number of scholarships. Tho Slav social and political deformers seek inspiration in the study of Western institutions. They sift and sort tho results obtained always with an fr/e to finding those which may be applicable to the evolution of their own countries. This attitude shows in some measure the general feelings of respect for the West felt by mest Slavs—perhaps most of all by Russians. PAN-GERMAN ATMS. The self-satisfied ideals and militant aims of Pan-Germanism have been the result of something deeper than political calculations; they have to a great extent reflected the complacency _ with which the Teuton contemplates his own achievements.

To fear the substitution of Pan-Slav-ism for Pan-Germanism, as many do, and to imagine that there is, or might be, a resemblance between thorn, is to show not only ignorance of the avowed aims and ideals of the two movements, but also a profound disregard of that which ultimately always proves the deceive factor in th>3 development of any great movement —that is national psychology. The fundamental aim of PanSlavism is the closer union < of Slayspeaking nationalities, a union not in any way desirous of interfering with the freedom of other nationalities. Opposed to tin's we have, the Pan-German ideal of the Germanisation of as much of the world as possible, and of Europe in any case. Hitherto the oppression of Poland by Russia has been the greatest obstacle to the logical development of Pan-Slavism; this has how happilybeen removed. Whatever fears of Pan-Slavism may have been felt in the past, they have nearly all bean au fond fear of Russia; of Pan-Russism into which Pan-Slav-ism, it was supposed, might evolve under the guidance of Russia—the largest and most powerful of the Slay countries.

Without plunging into an analytical enumeration of political events and currents long since forgotten. a rapid rsvicw of tlie more recent facts in Russia's foreign policy reveals nothing serious to uphold, or to justify in any way the exaggerated distrust of Russia which is so common.

THE FRAXCO-RTTSSIAX ALLIANCE.

Eor years the Russian people hav-a been struggling in the slowly weakening embrace of an autocratic and arbitrary regime. The barbarities perpetrated by this regime havo done not a little to popularise the idea of Russia as a savage and barbarous country. Yet, however aggressive the home policy of the Russian Government lias been, the same cannot be said of most of its foreign policy. The Franco-Russian alliance represents Russia's most important entrance for the last 40 years into tho direct sphere of European politics. The aim of this alliance is universally acknowledged to have been defensive. When in the seventies and eighties Germany was again prepared to attack France, it was Russian diplomatic influence which averted this disaster. De Blowitz, in his memoirs, reports an interview which he had with Alexander 11. in 1875. Referring to Germany's menacing attitude towards France, Alexander 11. used the following words: "Be calm. You shall not bo attacked. I promise you to prevent any such scheme. Europe will never sjo such a spectacle! " The value of the later developments of the Franco-Russian alliance and the loans made by France to Russia is being proved at the present moment. There is absolutely no doubt that the French loans made after the Russo-Japanese war were the wisest steps France could take in her preparations to nvset a future German attack. Those loans went to carry out reforms in the Russian Pray. Had the Russian army not been completely reorganised the chances are that a German flag would bo floating over Paris to-day. and German soldiers would bo tippl'ng in tho cafes of the Grands Boulevards. Wo know now that the rapid advance of the Russian army in Eastern Prussia played an important role in forcing the German armies to withdraw from their contemplated siege of Paris.

RUSSIAN' RULE IX PERSIA. The aggressiveness of Russia's policy in the Far East before the Russo-Jap-aneso War, while it cannot he denied, is explained by her crying need of a warm seaport, a noxl still unsatisfied, but the justice of which is daily being- more widely acknowledged. It will be remembered that Russia's first act of actual aggression in the Far East took place only after Germany had led the way by .seizing Kiaochau. Only then dul Russia seize the Kuantnng peninsula, with Port Arthur and Dalni. Underlying Russia's willingness to go to war at that time (though it was Japan who declared the hostilities finally) was the desire of the Russian Government to stav e off the possibility of- a revolution in Russ'a. That this eventuality was lying prepared for is known from the fact that von Plehve declared that ho would undertake to avert the coming revolution by means of a victorious war. There is no doubt that Russian " rule" in Persia is accompanied by preeiselv the same acts of hrutality which the Russian Government has always indulged in elsewhere. Rut f.hat is not the real point. Aoart from the actual application of a Russian regime

in Persia (and this, under another hom< Government, would b e quite different/ the responsibility for what has happen ed is shared also by England. Uotl countries having signed binding them to a mutual lUfocy, re mained in constant consultation'.. Evd

the idea of dismissing Mr. Schuster di not (so we wer© told in March 1913 b the " Times " correspondent) originat with the Russian Government. An without in any way approving of th policy of either country in Persia i must be said that this policy is attribn ed by many not only to the desire c avoiding hostilities between Englan and Russia, but also of preventing Gei many from gaining possession of tb Persian Gulf.

The Trans-Persian Railway, the prd ject of which was formed in Russia, an which has been called a possible dangi to India, is to bo, as far as is known, joint enterprise. England and Fran© as well as Russia, will play equally in portant parts in its construction. Eni lish in teres ts will, therefore, be ful. protected. Th' 3 above is, of course, the briefe summary of Russia's more reoent to eign policy, but even from this it ig o vious that that policy has not been u duly aggressive, either in itself, or mo especially as compared to that of Gk many. \Ve havo but to remember Q( many'a attitudo during the Boer W« the Bagdad Railway, and finally t Agadir incident. Nor have other SI countries shown any tendencies to i tcrfero with the greater European Po ers. Serbia's friction with Austria due, we know, to the arrogance of t latter, and to Serbia's legitimate desi for an outlet to the Adriatic Austri annexation of Bosnia and her general attitud< t Slav countries of the B "s, course, part of the Pau-G><Jpn "Dra nach Osten" policy. '^ A system of militarism such as t German, with tho ideals which it } evolved, is utterly incompatible w the Slav character. Such ideals coi never become incorporated in even 1 most ardent Pan-Slav movement, which the fundamental principle is tl of brotherhood. Pan-Germanism has ways meant to thrust German cultun with the aid of petrol sprinklers—

others. Should Pan-Slavism develop to a great movement, its first aim, i ultimate strength, will lie in the ■ velopment of Slav culture—at home