PANAMA CANAL IN WAR TIME.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 3, Issue 160, 9 January 1914, Page 4

PANAMA CANAL IN WAR TIME.

Strategic Considerations.

Great Britain's Position.

LONDON, November 21.

Dr Vaughan Cornish, author of "Trie Panama Canal and its Makers,", lectured last Wednesday at the Koyal United Service Institute oa "The Strategic Aspect of the Panama Canal." Dr Cornish paid visit 9 to Panama in 1908, 1910 and 1912, and was afforded by the United States Government facilities for study on the spot. Hi? lecture was illustrated by a series of lantern slides. He first gave a description of the canal as it exists to-day. It is calculated that 48 vessels can be passed through the locks in twentyfour hours, and that the time of passage of the canal will be twelve hours. Ths locks at Gatun and Miraflores are within gunshot of the Atlantic and Pacific respectively. Both entrances to the canal are being strongly fortified against attack from the eea. Tne armament consists of twenty-eight 12-Inch mortars, ten 14-inch guns, twelve 6inch guns, one 16-inch gun and twenty 4.7-inch howitzers. The forts wiil be manned by 1200 men of tre Coast Artillery, and at. both entrances there will be a mine field behind the forts. Permanent barracks are to be e.ectsd on the line of the Panama railroad for the accommodation of a mobile force of about 7000 men, infantry and artillery, which is intended to engage'the sailors and marines who may be landed to attack the locks and other structures. The canal can be put temporarily cut of working by wrecking the gates of any pair of locks, but more lasting damage can be caused by blowing; up the wall in the Gatun dam, and thus letting tne water out of the canal. The country for five tnilss on either side of the canal has been made a military reservation. All private ownership has been extinguished; no settlement will be permitted, and the jungle will be allowed to cover all paths and trails so as to form an entanglement through which a passage cannot be forced, and which must be cleared step by step. At Balboa, on the Pacific side, there will be repair shops and a dry dock capable of accommodating the largest ships. Basins are being provided for the storage of coal, the amuuiit of which will not be allowed to fall below 10 000 tons; and tanks are to be erected for the storage of fuel oil. There is a large ccld storage plant, fiom which ships using the canal will ordinarily be supplied, and there will thus be facilities for victualling the garrison in emergency. A "wireless" station is being erected, which is expected to have a radius of 3000 miles, and no wirehss stations except those directly controlled by the United States Government will be permitced in the Republic of Panama.

THE CANAL AND THE U.S. NAVY. The canst, said Dr Cornish, should ensuie a proper distritut'on of the American navy on the eve of the outbreak of war. If the war be on the Atlantic, and the fleet be already concentrated there, the canal could be of no further use during the war, since the naval power of the United Stales is based upen the Atlantic ports. It wouM rot, theretore, be the principal object of attack. But in the case of war upon the Pacific it would be the vulnerable part of the line of communication. In case of war with Japan it 3 best protection is its remoteness, Panama being 7700 miles from Yokohama. There are few islands in the eastern part of th<? Pacific, and ttiey are too far from present Japanese possessions to be suitable for permanent naval bases for that Power, but the Pearl Islands, io miles from Panama, are quite suitable for a temporary naval base to be used in an attack upon the canal. The strategic purpose ot the canal, however, is not only tor the support of the Monroe policy, the deience ol the Pacific States and of the Philippine?. It is also to enable the United States to have a voice in all that relates to the future of China, and for this her navy must be present in force on. the Asiatic side of the Pacific.

EFFECT ON BRITISH STRATEGY. It is an obligation of t!:c United States under the Hay-Faurceforte Treaty, as well as their msnifest interest, to keep the canal open during a war to wh.ch she is not a party, on the same conditions as those, under which the Suez Canal is operated during hostilities. But, Dr Ccrnish points out, it is co part of the duty of the United States, even if it were within her power, to protect the routes to the canal, and it is therefore important that Great Britain should at once make every provision in this respect. Thus whereas Guantanomo guards the windward passage for American vessels, it does not for British, and the defences and harbours of Jamaica must now resume much ot their old importance for England. Moreover, there must be another position of defence and supplies at the eastern end of the Caribbean, e.g., at St. Lucia or Trinidad. During war with a European Power the canal will chiefly be of importance to the Old Country as a route for wheat-carrying ships from Pacific ports, tut if there were trouble between us and the Yellow Race at some future time the canal would be the route tor the reinforcement of Great Britain's Pacific fleet.