NAVAL AGREEMENT.

Putaruru Press, Volume VII, Issue 320, 24 December 1929, Page 6

NAVAL AGREEMENT.

BRITAIN AND U.S.A.

A Long Story,

After more than a century of intermittent controversy on the subject of naval affairs between Britain and the United States, the goal of an ultimate solution is in sight. The time is opportune to glance briefly over the whole story. The controversy had its origin in the Napoleonic wars over the question as to whether the British Navy should have the right tb "visit and search American vessels and to “ impress ” men to man the ships in order to maintain the blockade of Europe. Britain at the time regarded herself as fighting on behalf of human freedom in general and claimed the Tight under internatiorfal law to interrupt neutral trade within the area* under the Control of Napoleon. The United States held that Britain had •violated the rights of neutrals, and the controversy culminated in the war of 1812. A curious reversal took place during the American Civil War. The United States imposed a blockade upon the Confederacy, justifying it on the ground that she was blockading a port of her own territory. Bitain did not agree at all to this, but the argument went no further than words. On the outbreak of the Great War, > the .Napoleonic situation recurred. I Again Britain was convinced that she was fighting for the good of humanity and again she used her navy to the I utmost of her power to interrupt j neutral trade with the enemy, and again the United States took up the 1 cudgels on behalf of the rights oi neutrals and protested against any violation of them. One outstanding difference in the situation was, however, that while on the former occasion Britain had been incomparatively more powerful than the young country across the Atlantic, now the United States was the richer of the two, •although, because of her isolation from the rest of the world, her navy was not nearly so powerful. The naval never led to an open rupture, but American resentment at Britain’s interference was so great that in 1916 President Wilson •obtained authority from the Congress to build a new navy of sixteen superjflreadsaughts for the stated purpose .of making it impossible in future wars for any country to interfere with the shipping of America. This programme was entered upon but was not completed because America came into , the war in 1917. Near the close of the > war, President Wilson bought forward 1 his famous fourteen points, one of I which proposed that in war and in . peace the seas should be free except • when they were closed by internation- J al law for the enforcement of an ’n- | temational convenant. Britain’s at- | titude was that British public opinion j was not ready even to discuss Such , a proposal. President Wilson, there- j fore, on his return to America, re- j commended the completion of the six-teen-battleship programme which had been suspended. During 1920, it became increasingly clear that there was in existence a considerable amount of naval competition amongst the nations who had been allies during the war. Britain, in order to keep her place, was forced to build four battle- j ships and Japan inaugurated its pro- j gramme for eight battleships in eight years. This was the situation which lead to the summoning of the Washington Conference of 1921-22. At that agreement was reached on all the • questions save one. The foasSs|ffats that British and American battieptip fleets were in future to be equal, but no agreement could be effected as to the limitation of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, except that it was agreed that cruisers should hot exceed 10,000 tons nor carry guns of greater calibre than eight inches. , J

After the conference the atmosphere of competitive suspicion continued. Britain began to replace old cruisers by those of the new type, and other Powers began to build according to their needs. In 1927 President Coolidge called another naval conference at Geneva to stem the rising tide of competition. France and

Italy declined Ijtp attend, and only Great Britain, the United States, and Japan were represented. The conference lasted a month and broke up without any agreement having been reached. It is commonly recognised now that the Geneva conference failed because there was not sufficient political preparation for it, so that each party went forward knowing very little of the nefeds and aspirations of the others. The discussions in consequence were apt to be heated at times, and when, a year later, Britain, with the best of intentions, tried to pave the way for larger agreement by settling some of the preliminary difficulties between herself and France, the situation, far from being mended, was made worse. In the meantime the

Kellogg Pact had been accepted very widely. It created a broad basis upon which larger discussions could take place, for its slogan was the absolute renunciation of war. It is obvious that while war is lawful disarmament is absurd. The Kellogg Pa t thus reached ' down to the fundamental preliminary | to any kind of world-wide discussions of disarmament. Then it happened that two men of similar ideals—President Hoover and Mr Ramsay MacDonald—came into power in the two great countries almost simultaneously, so that the way was open once more for a fresh start. The personal intercourse which has recently taken place between these two iften should have gone a long way toward clearing up misunderstandings and doubtful issues, and, although the final details will probably not be known until the naval conference that is to include Japan, France, and Italy, as well as Great Britain and the United States, meets in January, the outlines are already becoming clear. Both Britain and America are prepared to accept the principle of parity. Britain is tp bring down her cruiser requirements from seventy ships, totalling over 500,000 tons, to fifty ships of about 340,000 tons. The American figures • have not yet been completed, the dif- | fieulty being to find a formula wherei by the large 8-inch-gun ships which ' meet American requirements can be : balanced against the smaller 6-inch- | gun ships which are more suitable to Great Britain. It is pointed out that on the one hand the 8-inch-gun ship can destroy 6-inch-gun ships before the lattet’s guns come within range, while, on the other hand, large numbers of smaller ships operating from naval bases all over the world have the greater power to destroy commerce. The solution is worked on common-sense lines. The United States is to have a larger number of the more powerful vessels, but not so great as to give her unquestioned battle supremacy.' Britain is to have a larger total tonnage, but of smaller ships armed with smaller guns. A naval agreement, however, can be regarded only as a beginning. It does not solve the long-standing question of the freedom of the seas. It is therefore the more interesting to notice that President Hoover’s recent message indicates his intention to broaden the basis of the discussion at the Five Powers Conference in January so as to include this question. Of course, there are difficulties to surmount, and in advancing the merits of this subject it may result in the breakdown of negotiation for restricting naval armaments.