SINGAPORE NAVAL RASE.

Putaruru Press, Volume II, Issue 28, 24 April 1924, Page 2

SINGAPORE NAVAL RASE.

ECONOMIC FACTORS. Underlying’ any problems ox naval and military strategy there are always some economic considerations,' writes a contributor to the Marlborough Express. These basic economic factors seem in danger of being obscured by the heat of a political controversy. Therefore it seems that setting them forth quite baldly mig-ht make for clearer thinking. Generally it is agreed nowadays that the economic aspect decides all great national and international questions. What then is the economic factor underlying the question of the Singapore base? Briefly it is this: The consumers in most civilised countries to-day have not the purchasing power to make use of the “ goods ” —foods and services—that are available. This present “ under-consump-tion ” is the inevitable result of the unemployment and reduction in wages that have followed the world war. Hence the merchants of Britain, America, France, Japan and Germany are markets for goods which cannot be consumed in these producing countries. In addition there is, particularly in America and Great Britain, a surplus of capital which is seeking an outlet abroad where investments are more profitable.

Of the available markets of the world both for goods and capital Russia and China offer by far the largest fields for operations. Both are countries with large populations and both are in a backward state of economic development. Russia is still a somewhat uncertain region in which to invest capital. Hence it is obvious that in the struggle for markets, railroad right, and financial concessions the attention of rival financial groups is turned on China.

How then do the investors and traders of the Great Powers stand in this matter of footing in China? Japanese finance and commerce is well established in Korea and North China; Great Britain is settled in Wei-hai-wei, Hongkong and Upper and Guam; and France is in IndoBurma; America is in the Philippines wells, and factories in the larger centhese nations hold concessions in railways, coal and iron fields, oil China. In addition., investors from all tres of China. Add to these the fertile nature of the agricultural land, and the teeming millions of unorganised docile workers who in the absence of restrictive legislation make very profitable factory hands. Consider, too, her enormous natural resources, and one begins to realise that the competition between different financial groups for the rewards resulting from opening up China is likely to be keen, to the point of bitter rivalry. ox* even of .open conflict in war with some other national gx*oup of financiers.

This bald statement of the position does not, of course, mean that any one nation delibei'ately plans a wai* in order that its financial group may obtain an advantage. However, we ought to realise the presence of this factor in the problem of the East to-day. If the commercial interests in the more enlightened and progressive counti’ies are to continue in pi'ospei'ity and to secui*e inci-eased returns for their investments, they must secure a footing in China. Rivali'y and jealousy between national groups of investors inevitably followed. So far the various Governments have been pi-epai-ed to extend the protection of their navies and armies to capital invested abroad. Doubtless, then, it is because of these economic considerations that the question of strengthening the naval base at Singapore has been raised in Great Bi-itain. The exact natui*e of the naval base and the problem of how best to defend Australasia are both technical questions of naval and military strategy. Unfortunately for clear thinking on the Singapore problem, the technical details of these two sti*ategic questions have been confused with the more fundamental political and economic one. That is, how far is the nation prepared to go in the expenditure of men and money for the protection of capital invested in Clima?