The Telephone WITH WHICH IS IN CORPORTAD THE POVERTY BAY STANDARD. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. GISBORNE, THURSDAY, AUGUST 14.

Poverty Bay Standard, Volume I, Issue 209, 14 August 1884, Page 2

The Telephone WITH WHICH IS IN CORPORTAD THE POVERTY BAY STANDARD. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. GISBORNE, THURSDAY, AUGUST 14.

According to information received from Wellington, one of the first acts of the new Government will be to place the railways of the colony under the management of a non-political,Board, and Mr. E. Richardson, who has received a portfolio, will resign his office in order to take the presidency of such ’ Board. Whether the present Government will exist long enough to do any business at all appears at the present i time open to misgivings. The combination does not apparently give satisfaction in any quarter, and we have grave doubts about their making any progress beyond an initial stage. The matter of placing the railways under a Board as suggested has been very fully argued in Christchurch, where the success or otherwise of the railways is a matter of great importance. From that quarter we learn that nothing whatever is to be gained by the appointment of a Board which would not be entirely free from political influence, and the point to be settled is how is it possible to create a Board which, while free from such control, would still be in some way amenable to the wishes of the people as expressed through their ' representatives in Parliament. The '■ large amount of attention which is being given to this matter shows that the public are anxious to see a change of some kind effected. The case of Victoria is generally quoted to prove that it is possible to call into existence a Board having extensive powers, and yet sufficiently under control to retain in the hands of the people's representatives that authority which they would not be justified in parting with. But the reasons which induced the people of Victoria to hand over their railways to a Board, and the causes which have led the public of New Zealand to demand a similar change are quite different. In Victoria the crying evil with which public men had to deal was political patronage. The Education and Railway Departments especially were being flooded with the nominees of members, to the great injury of the public. Members made it their business to receive applications regularly from their constituencies for appointments in the Civil Service, and a large portion of the time of Ministers was taken up with the task of disposing of such applications. A Civil Service Reform Bill was introduced and passed, and a measure to place the railways under a Board also received the

sanction of the Legislature. The primary object of passing the latter was to free the Government from the pressure brought to bear upon them for employment in the railway department. The members of the Board hold their appointment for a fixed period, and cannot be removed from their office by the Ministry of the day. In order to terminate their engagement a resolution to that effect must be passed by both branches of the Legislature, or by the Lower House in two successive sessions. The object of this is, of course, to remove them as much as possible from political influence, and yet to retain in the hands of Parliament the final control of the railways belonging to the State. The Act under which the Board are appointed enables the members to make by-laws, regulations, and so forth, touching a great variety of matters, including, of course, the rates to be charged for the conveyance of passengers and goods over the lines. But no such change can be effected until it has been approved by the Governor in Council, or in other words by the Ministry of the day. The Government, in fact, become responsible to the House for every change which is effected by the Board, and can consequently be called to account for what they have approved.

We cannot believe that the representatives of the people would be justified in parting with all c0.n.0l over the railways. We do not mean to say that a non-political Board—that is to say, a Board free from all political influences —would not be able, perhaps, to manage those railways better than a Minister can. If the members were judiciously chosen, and were placed in such a position as to be enabled to resist local pressure of every kind, they might produce better results than a political head can. But that means giving the Board powers which no Parliament would dream of granting to them. They would be responsible to no one, and yet would have the control of Slate property amounting to many millions sterling in value. They would have to be empowered to fix their own tariff rates, make their own arrangements as to the cost of management, and generally to do what they considered best in the public interest. In New Zealand the annual expenditure of the railway department in working expenses and repairs amounts to a very large sum, and the gross amount derived from the traffic on the lines is about a million sterling per annum. How is it possible for the highest authority in the land—the General Assembly— to part with a control over such a very important department of the public service. A change of policy on the part of the Board might any day seriously affect the Colonial Treasurer’s balance-sheet. In order to prevent any tricks being played with the finances, the Board’s estimates would require to be reviewed by the House of Represen-

tatives, and the Government would have to undertake to get the estimates passed—in other words, to become responsible for them, or the Board itself would have to answer for their plans, which would mean the creation of another Executive department of the State apart from the Ministry. Speakers have been careful, no doubt, not to commiit themselves too far on the matter; but they generally imply that what they mean by a non-political Board is a body entirely free from political control, and entrusted with full powers to make such regulations as to traffic rates and so forth as they consider expedient. As long as the railway revenue continues to form part of the consolidated fund, those who are elected to protect the public purse must surely maintain control of some kind over the rates and charges. If the people wish the railways to be administered on certain recognised principles they will elect men prepared to put their views into practice, and in such circumstances a Board would not be required. If at any time the public are not prepared to have the railways managed upon sound business principles, any Board which stood in the way „of their wishes would be speedily swept away. Although ’ toe conduct of the railways does not affect the people of this distict in a direct manner just now, there is no saying how soon it may do so, and, in view of the local bills to be brought before Parliament, it is well to keep posted up in matters of this kind.