The Patea Mail. (Published Wednesdays and Saturdays.) SATURDAY, AUGUST 30, 1879.

Patea Mail, Volume V, Issue 454, 30 August 1879, Page 2

The Patea Mail. (Published Wednesdays and Saturdays.) SATURDAY, AUGUST 30, 1879.

JSToi least among the great measures .that will be debated in the new Parliament will bo the Triennial Bill. All three of the gentlemen whom we have had the pleasure of hearing on the hustings have professed willingness to support it. We hope that the member for Egmont, when elected, will bo given clearly to understand thathis constituents expect him to support it. The Bill has been spoken of as one involving no particular principle, and as of small importance to the country. It is natural for some of our loading men in political

matters to take this view ; for they feel themselves to he so identified with Parliament, and so necessary to the success ami wisdom of its measures, that not to ho elected is out of the question, “ Why then,” they ask themselves, “ should we ho put to the trouble and expense of being elected so often ? As far as wo are concerned we would rather bo elected once for all, and have done with it.” It is equally natural, on the other hand, for men who have no very firm hold upon their seats, to wish, when they are once in Parliament, to remain there as longas possible, without the risk , of another election. It. therefore, becomes necessary that the constituencies should express their opinion clearly, lest between the strong and the weak members of the House, the Bill should come to the ground. We hope to show in what follows, that the Triennial Bill involves such great principles, and is of such vast promise to the country, that a. distinct pledge to support it should bo exacted from every candidate. Formerly, in England, the duration of Parliaments was limited solely on the will of the Sovereign. Charles 11. prolonged one of his Parliaments to the period of seventeen years. In the reign of William 111., a Triennial Bill excited great interest, and after being once vetoed by the King, and once rejected by the Commons, it at length passed into law in 1604. This BUI continued in force for about twenty years, when it was replaced by the Septennial Bill, permitting the Crown to prolong a Parliament to the period of seven years. Although this law has continued to the present time in the United Kingdom, it was not introduced from any disagreement with the principle of Triennial Parliaments, but arose from local and temporary causes. In 1716 there had been a rebellion in the northern parts of the country in favor of the Pretender, and the whole country was greatly excited. It happened that immediately after the extinction of the rebellion, a general election was due; it was considered dangerous to hold it in the then state of the public mind, so that the Septennial Bill was passed, and has been allowed to continue in force to tbe present. In New Zealand, as our readers are aware, we have Qnintcnnial Parliaments, or Parliaments which may exist tor any period less than five years, but which, if not dissolved sooner, die a natural death on the fifth anniversary of their first meeting. The grounds upon which we would urge the importance of short Parliaments in this young country, where it is desired to foster popular Government, are neither new nor far fetched. Almost every argument that coukl be adduced can be illustrated by the present contest, and without crossing the bounds of the Electoral District to which we belong. In order to prevent our democracy from sinking into mobocracy, it is obvious that the diffusion of political knowledge is necessary. Previous to the passing of the Triennial Bill in England, the mass of electors knew nothing of what was done in Parliament. Elections, in those days, were not contests between parties, bat contests between families. It was not who did most good in the House of Commons—for the people knew nothing about that—but it was who could spend most money. When, however, Parliaments become shorter it soon became necessary to let the electors know what was done at Westminster. Thus elections became cheaper and more rational, and the Commons, who had shfiken off the control of the Crown, fell under the control of the people. That general interest in politics, of which Sir ,W. Fox spoke on Monday evening, cannot exist except side by side with general political knowledge. This being granted, we ask, ivhat is more educational in a political point of view than a General Election ? Can it be doubted that many persons in onr midst have learned more about politics in the last four weeks than they did in four years previously ? As political interest and knowledge become general, so will tbe results of the elections express the will of the whole country. In the Egmont District it is probable that not two-thirds of those who are qualified to vote will be able to do so, owing either to their own indifference, or to tbe culpable negligence of officials. Those who within the last year or two have become qualified have not been in haste to register, thinking there was plenty of time. Now, of course, they regret their indifference; but if they may reasonably expect five years to elapse before another election, they will put the matter off, and be surprised again. If, however, another contest seemed close at hand, they would prepare to take part in it. It is probable, also, that frequent elections would give birth to societies for securing the registration of those qualified. Short Parliaments would also prevent officials from delay on their part in registering electors. No doubt in tbe present instance many of them have been caught napping. They, ns well as many qualified voters, have procrastinated and have been surprised. These inconvenient and expensive surprises to the country will certainly become less frequent under Triennial Parliaments. Almost every election will establish a Government, that will be able to hold together for three years, so that troubles like the present will not occur. The objects that are urged against the Bill are worthy of consideration, and of an answer. In the first place, it is urged that Parliaments rarely last the full term of five years. Now, that is a clear reason in the Bill’s favor. Parliaments cease to be healthy after about three years, and have to be dissolved sometime

between their third and their fifth year* The result is the surprise to the country and the disfranchisement of electors that we have deprecated. In the second place, it is urged that the occasional elections that take place, to the number of about eight or ten a year, in consequence of the death or resignation of members, servo to keep Parliament in accord with the country. This would be very forcible if the country bad the selecting of those who should die, or resign, or be promoted to the Upper House. But as the country has no guarantee that the right man will die, or resign, or be promoted, we cannot see much force in it. In the third place it is urged that Triennial Elections would impair the efficiency of Parliament—for in his first year the new member would be useless, being nnac quainted with the forms of the House; and in his third year lie would be talking and acting in view of the coining election, so that only in his second year he would be efficient and independent. This is a very singular objection, ami is one of the most complete arguments in favor of the Bill that could bo adduced. In tho first placo.it assumes that there will be new members. Very likely; but only in those cases where the old member has ceased to bo trusted. Should the old member, then, continue to represent the people two years after he has lost their confidence,? Again, it is assumed that only in the last year of Parliament do members talk and act as in the sight of their constituents. It is one of the great objects of the Triennial Bill to make members feel, not only every third year, but every year, that they are under the eye of the electors.