THE NAVY LEAGUE AND MR STEAD'S PROGRAMME

Otago Witness, Issue 2815, 26 February 1908, Page 15

THE NAVY LEAGUE AND MR STEAD'S PROGRAMME

The Navy League Journal, in its January issue, discussed the British naval programme in the following terms: — The time bas come for the Na.vy League to consider very seriously what action shall 'be taken in England when the new German Navy Bill becomes law. That it will be passed by the Reichstag in its present form may now be taken as practically certain, for the chief criticism in Germany of the new measure has been on account of its inadequacy, not on account of its enormous cost. There is a strong party in aGrmany which would like to see the navy even more rapidly expanded, and a fleet .provided with the extremest speed, capable of challenging Britain's position. The German navy is a most popular force in Germany, and the German people are prepared to make any sacrifice to increase it. These are things which, with ell our wishes to live on the best of terms ■with Germany, we in this country cannot overlook. Every Navy Leaguer has therefore to reflect on the duty which rests with him. If the British fleet is correspondingly strengthened and expanded, peace will be preserved. If it is not expanded, there will be a double temptation to war and a double risk of war — first on Ger- j many's 4>art, where there has always existed a strong Chauvinistic party, which has so fax been restrained by the knowledge that the German fleet has been distinctly inferior in force to the British ; eeeondly, on England's part, where as the Forces ot the two navies move, tho German force up and the British force down, there may be risk of ending an intolerably dangerous situation by an appeal to arms before the Biitish na^y has become too weak to fight. Thus we have reached a point where not only a large, but also a very large, naval programme for this country is vital in the interests o£ peace; where every Englishman who is not against his own country must hope and pray that the British Admiralty and Government will deal firmly and wisely with the emergency that has arisen, and where hopes and prayers must he hacked by action if the Government does not respond adequately. The Navy League must fight for a strong British navy as never before in all its history. It is the true Peace Society, and it must confront this crisis in a manner worthy of its lofty aims. THE GERMAN PROPOSALS. And first, to restate the facts as to the new. German programme, for though statistics are arid things, they are necessary as the foundation of action in this country. The following- are the German programmes for the next few years under the new bill: — Total estimates. 1908 .. 8 Dreadnoughts improved .£16,600,000 1 Invincible improved 2 protected cruisers 12 destroyers 1909 .. 3 Dreadnoughts improved 1 Invincfbl© improved. 2 protected cruisers 12 destroyers 1910 .. 4 Dreadnoughts improved £23,000,000 2 protected cruisers 12 destroyers 1911 .. 2 Dreadnoughts improved £23,000,000 1 Invincible 2 small cruisers 12 destroyers TPith submarines, mining and repair chips in addition. In 1910, however, yet another Navy Bill may or will be introduced by the German Government, further expanding the navy and increasing the programme. Such a measure has been foreshadowed by Admiral \on Tirpitz's .statements in the Reichstag and by semi-official announcements which have appeared in the German press. The really important fads which have to be considered are thte programmes for the next three years, which have risen to four large armoured chips annually (all to be of about 20,000 tons), and the immense increase in th* expenditure, which, between 1907 and 1911 will advance by about £10,000,000. Over and abdve this outlay the sum of £10,000,000 will be v expended on the widening of the Kiel Canal, and will be provided for by special vote 6 outside the estimates. At the same time, while Germany is building Dreadnoughts fast, she is making provision for their accommodation in hor ports on a scale which England has not attempted to approach. Eighty docks capable of containing a German Dreadnought are either completed, building, or projected on the North Stea. RAPID* GERMAN CONSTRUCTION. The new German ships are clearly to be much more rapidly built than in the past. This can be 6een from the large votes for the vessels to be laid down in 1908, which, indeed,- seem to foreshadow the completion of the unite then laid down in two vcars, or even less, thus justifying- Admiral yon Tirpitz's statement in the Reichstag that Germany builds as fast as Engjaiid. We give the votes for the new ships in 1907 end 1908 by way of a contrast :— 1907 1908 No. -Vote. No. Vote. New ba-ttleskipi 2 £273,000 S £479,000 Is ew amnoured cruisers .. 1 249,000 1 400,000 It is a suggestive fact that the first vote for the British Dreadnought, which was completed in 12 months, was only £429 000, or less than that for each of the new German battleships in 1903. It is also a suggestive fact that tho first votes for the three British battleships which were to be laid down this year, but not one of which had been actually bsgun at tho date of writing, totalled between the three just £500,000, or only £170,000 apiece. In view of these facts we have to choose between two alternatives — either the new German chips are gome to be of unpreocA'nted s .>o. •which is not probable, or they are <;oing to be built with unprecedented rapidity. NOT A PAPER PROGRAMME. Some surprise and disappointment will have been felt at the attitude assumed by British service journals, which are known to be in close connection with the Admiralty, towards the new German Bill. Thejr have taken up the position that the German proposals are only "paper" one?, that the new battleships are mere fictions, that Berlin "is prone to indulge in extravagant promises of ship* she never manages to build," and they have contended that there is no need for the Admiratly to reply to the unprecedented efforts which Germany is making. Such an attitude to us appears neither vrise nor patriotic ; it overlooks the essential fact t£*t the money will be voted for

cruisers

the ships in question, and that, oven if it be not spent within the teim fixed, it remains at the ser> lee of the German authorities for the purpose of accelerating construction in future y-eai«, and is not, as in England, used for paying off the national debt. It overlooks the fact that every single German vessel in the pio grammes of 1900-05 was Lud down at the appointed date, and that the delays of 19C6 were due entirely to the redesigning of the ships of that year, in order to produce much more powerful units. It overlooks the largeness of the -votes for the new German ships to be begun next >ear. It minimises the immerse increase in the German expendituie. And when it asserts that Germany, because she has adopted the big- single-calibre bnifleship, will have to spend largely on her na-\<d ports, it forgers that Eugand must do the same. THE PROBLEM OF DOCKS. With the exception of one pruate docl> at Newcastle, there is not one single. British, dock on the North Sea accessible to tho new types of big ships, and the provision of one dock at Ros^th will not go far to remedy our weaknesses in this d rection At the best, in the distant future, the [ British navy will have but two docks for Dreadnoughts in the North Sea, when the German navy will have eight. A large vote for dock accommodation is as vital as a large vote for new battleships. England has here to make up much leeway and to undo the consequences of four yeaFS' neglect of Rosyth, four jeara of accumulation of liabilities and responsibilities. MR STEAD'S COUNSEL. In the December number of the Review t of Reviews Mr Stead has written: — j " There is no question as to what John . Hull will reply to the German programme, be it little or big. He will say that he is sorry ; but if it must be so, he cannot help himself. Without any unfriendly feeling he accepts in all courtesy this challenge which is offered him. He wishes for nothing more than the maintenance of the status quo. "He has no army to speak of ; his only defence is his navy. The maintenance of its unquestioned superiority is for him a matter of life and death. His readiness to secure that supremacy is the condition of the existence of the British Empire. . . . When the Kaiser lays down one keel we lay down two. That is the fornnila of safety. We shall no more discuss it than a swimmer discusses the necessity of keeping his head above water." To lay down two Dreadnoughts or Invinoibles for each German one, that is the sine qua non ; that is the principle for which the Navy League must fight. it involves a programme in the coming yeaT of Six Dreadnoughts of 20.000 tons Two Invincibles of 20,000 tons. This is "the formula of safety"; this is the formula which will maintain the two-Power standard, as the present Government has repeatedly pledged itself to maintain it. From it the Navy League rnuet not bo beaten back by quibbles, nor talk of "dictating to experts," for the experts are agreed that the command of the sea depends firat and foremost on large armoured chips and destroyers. In calling for it the Navy League -will only be supporting the experts if these do their duty ; it wilF only be discharging the grave responsibility to the nation which lests with those who have studied naval affairs. Nothing less will do. and in view of the rapidity with which the new German vessels are to be built, we must seek a definite assurance that the two British keels will go down on the stocks the moment the cor- , responding German vessel has been begun, and will be built as fast. We must prepare to face estimates of £40,000,000, with over and above large estimates for building two British dooks to each German one. To adapt Mr Stead, " we need no more discuss this proposal than a swimmer discuses keeping hie head above water." UNPATRIOTIC DEMANDS FOR REDUCTIONS. But as facts have to be faced, and as this article is an appeal to Navy Leaguers to face them in their reality, we cannot overlook the demand put forward, since the new German proposals were known, by 136 British members of Parliament for further reductions in the Navy Estimates. We leave Mr Stead to answer this craven and foolish demand. But we have to remember that it has been made, and to be on watch accordingly. Let Navy Leasruers throughout the country and Empire keep their eyes steadily fixed on the naval programme for 1908, and if it does not come up to Mr Stead's minimum, prepare to exert themselves to the utmost. The league itself should accept no surrendei on this head. If the Admiralty experts do not obtain the " Stead programme " it mutt move public opinion. If it fails, that means the end of the British Empire a-s we lia- c | known it; if it succeeds with its small re- j sources, in the fare cf the frowrvs of authority, it will have the consciousness that it has rendered vet another service to the nation, comparable with that which it achieved when, in 1898, it demanded and secured a special British programme in reply to the Russian extraordinary programme of that year. The watchdog must bark when real danger ar ses, else it is ' more dangeious than the bitterest and most

perfidious enemy,