[All Rights Reserved.] INDIA.

Otago Witness, Issue 2811, 29 January 1908, Page 88

[All Rights Reserved.] INDIA.

THE BRITISH AND NATIVE ARMY IN INDIA. By Lieut.- General Sir Edttin H. H. Coixen, 0.c.i.E., c.b. ■ Before we enquire how far the army in India is an efficient instrument to defend , the country and to maintain peace, we must form some idea of its strength. And , when we speak of the Army we must include the whole of the armed forces, and not merely the regular troops. It is convenient to divide these into two lines. The first line is composed of the British troops, cavalry, artillery and infantry, , about 74,000 strong, and of the Native ' | Army, cavalry, artillery, sappers and. j miners, and infantry, 138,000 in all, giv- t ing a total of 212,000 men. If we add the j reserve of the regular Native army 28,000 ( — eventually to be increased to 50,000 — ' ! and the Imperial service troops, 18,000, j iwe have a total of 258,000. Then in the , second line we - have British volunteers , 35,000, the military police Battalions . I -18,000 and the Frontier Militia and levies ! 14,500, giving a total for this line of >- 67,500. I The Imperial Service troops may be classed with the regular forces, although they belong to certain of the Chiefs of Native States, because they are intended for service with the regular army in case | of war. In the second line, the British j volunteers are to help to maintain the peace of the counirj-, the military police, chiefly in Assam and Burma, are for local work, and the militia on the Northwest Frontier are to preserve the peace of the border. So that we have 258,000 soldiers, British and Native, permanently embodied and in reserve, •with a second^ liae of 67,500 men for garrison and local work. This gives a grand total of 325,000 men. THE POWER OF THE AEMY. ■We cannot say that all these belong to the regular army, because the military police- and militia are under the civil authorities, but practically they are all soldiers. Behind this military force we have a civil police of 145,000 men,' with an "armed reserve" at the headquarters of each district, whose equipment consists of S.B. muskets or carbines, a few only carrying rifles. This- is a- very small police force for this enormous country, %ut> besides organised body, every village has its "watchman," or local policeman. Of these there are 700,000. No one can doubt that the Indian army is sufficient to effectively undertake what -we. may call local external defence. The real point is can India itself supply • an army of sufficient power, to defend the ; country from the advance of a military power? The reply to that question is not- entirely in the negative. It is true that we cannot supply sufficient British tropps ! from the army in India, and must depend on large reinforcements from home and ! the colonies, but we can supply an adequate force ( of native soldiers. A very large army, or series of armies, would be required, although not at the outbreak ' of war, for two things must be remembered, first, that if ■we had to help to , defend Afghanistan, we should do so with the Afghan army fighting in line with us, i backed hy many thousand guerillas j and, secondly, that until railways have been carried into the Amir's dominions, there is no possibility of feeding enormous masses of men and animals. We come then to the conclusion- that the ultimate defence of India from external enemies, lies in the power of this country to send large reinforcements, and in the strength to which India can, on emergency, raise the native army. The one is in the hands of this country, the other in India, but even in this last, while India can and should make arrangements for expansion, England must be in a position to "furnish a -large number of officers, and it is- in this respect that our system is still specially deficient at the present time. THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF INDIA. If we turn now to the question of the army and the second- line, in .their relation to' the internal security of India, ,w© must first inquire into the conditions which we have to meet. And here we are confronted by a problem of great dimensions. The population of India is some- 300 millions. It ie spread over an immense area, _aiid what that area is must be fixed solidly into the minds of the people at home by the realisation of the statement that it is larger than the whole of Europe without Eus6ia, and that it is considerably more than 14 times the size of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The physical characi teristics are wonderfully diversified. j Mountainous, or hilly in some parts, in others monotonously flat, with great rivers flowing through the land, fed by i innumerable smaller streams, wide-spread ! and highly cultivated plains in one province, far stretching forests in another ; there is no country in the world which | i presents such differences in physical and I climatic conditions. The vast population, the main portion livine by their tillage of the soil, reflects all their differences, and in lansniage, eclour, religion, physical, and intellectual qualities, presents extraordinary contrasts. There is no "Indian nation," and, strictly - speaking, there are no nationalities. The population springs from many different stocks, the products of successive invasions of India, and those who are supposed to bo indigenous inhabitants still exist m the wilder districts. The great distinctions are, religious, racial, territorial, and

tribal. It will be easily understood, therefore, that our government of all these races must Test upon something more than mere force. Military strength there moat be in full evidence, but there must also, b©

lation of- India, it is believed that the majority have no desire for change. Stall, there are numberless forces working against us, and the agitators have organised a mission of sedition^ which requires constant watchfulness and continuous repression. DISTBIBUTION OF THE BRITISH TROOPS. The British army in India consists of 9 regiments of cavalry, 70 batteries of horse, field, mountain, and heavy artillery, with 408 mobile guns, and 22 garrison companies ; and 52 infantry battalions. , Many of these men are quite young soldiers, the climate, of India is trying to me constitution of the European, and j confidence among the masses in the justice of our rule. And taking the whole poputhere is a heavy sick Jist,. so that we cannot Teckon upon the whole of the British ■ force being ready to take the field. The {''units are relieved in their turn after some- . what long periods, but the individual sol1 dier does not pass more than five to six S years in India on the" average, and in ' many cases serves for a far shorter period, j j With certain additions and changes due to • service in the East, the organisation of the British unit is much the same as at home, but they are maintained at a higher , strength, and may be reckoned as attaining a remarkable pitch of military efficiency. The distribution of British troops was I for a great many years mainly based upon the necessity for occupying vital centres and garrisons, and guarding the great ■ lines of railway, while a not inconsideri able portion of the British force has always been located on the slopes of the Himalayas, and in other healthy positions. That has been the policy in, the part, rather than one which expresses itself in a special military organisation for the purpose of war beyond the frontier. This question is too large a one to be discussed in this place, but whether^ we ' approve of this later policy or not, it is sufrely evident even to those without the slightest personal knowledge of India, that it would be in the highest degree dangerous to reduce the British force as a permanent measure. The whole cost of the British troops serving in India, and of their recruitment and training, as well as their pensions or "non-effective" charges, is " borne by the Indian taxpayers. We cannot increase this force, however desirable such a step might be, because the revenues of India could not bear the large additional expenditure which would ; be involved. - ,And -there- is eveij, a stronger Teason against such an increase, in "that England is unable to supply more men tinder the present military system conditions, , for the greatest difficulty -is 'experienced, • even now, in finding the 'annual drafts, -which are required. We cannot increase "the force permanently, but it would be a fatal policy, especially at this juncture^ to reduce the strength of the White garrison. SOURCES OF THE NATIVE ARMY. The native army of to-day k drawn front many sources, from the Punjab and beyond the border, from Nepal which furnisheß the Gurkha*, from Hindustan, and in fewer numbers from Western and Southern India. . , - Since the Mutiny of 1857, the normal policy has been the adoption of * varied system in the constitution of the army. Some regiments are homogenous, or of one class, as in the case of the Gurkhas, and about one-third of the army is organised on the class system. The remainder is organised on the "Class Squadron" or "Class Company." system. Thus, four companies of a regiment may consist of Sikhs, two of Mohammedans from the Punjab, and two of Pathans, also Mohammedans, from beyond the N.W. frontier. With pay and pension assured, the army is a favourite service with the agricultural class, and in the cavalry, having an admirable system of it« own, under "which the Sowar or trooper has a pecuniary interest in his horse and equipment, men of good family are to be found in the ranks. - Except some mountain batteries the' Native 1 " army .possesses no, artillery. - But its training, discipline, and equipment are based in a great measure on the syßJ em of the- British army, with such modifications as are rendered necessary by the .conditions .of liulia, or have been suggested by long experience. - - The British, officers of Native regiments make their caTeer in. India, and as a rule, are in strong sympathy f with their men, between whom and themselves the best possible feeling prevails. The British officers of the Indian army are an extremely hard-working; body of soldiers, whose military qualities equal, if they do not surpass, those of the officers of any army in the world. # SO-CALLED REFORMS. Taken as a whole the Indian army is a wonderful military instrument, when we consider' that it is composed of materials drawn from the races we have conquered. And we may fairly say that the personnel of the army is staunch, and would act under its British leaders in the repression jof disturbance in any part of India. That ! is not a condition which has been obtained during the last few yeara by so-called reforms. It is a grqnd heritage which haa come down to us since the time of the great revolt, the heritage of a great system which has been built up by years of labour and effort, by a succession of soldiers and statesmen. But no one can venture to affirm that the effect of con1 tinuous agitation may not seriously affect a portion- of that army, or that constant changes and unsympathetic measures, con- , ceived in the spirit of western militarism I may not undermine its contentment. . ! The Eastern soldier cannot be dealt with as if he were "sprung from the West. ' Strength and sympathy form the- keynote j ' to the just rule of Asiatics, and without j i these we may as well give up the game. I I The tendency of the present military

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! policy in India is to amalgamate aL I the elements o£ the Native army, and to get rid of racial and territorial distinctions, dealing \rith the troops In all the higher matters of administration, from a far difi-

tani centre. The tremendous evil of ove^ centralisation and concentration is a gravg political danger. The statesmen and! soldiers of a, few years back were keenly, aliv* to this r but their experience is nowi disregardedj and the idea is to make the; army a military machine to be use<J againsb foreign invasion — a remote con-, tingency — without any consideration of the perils attendant on such a course,, when unaccompanied by a recognition o£ the paramount importance of suiting out Indian military organisation to the con* ditions of the country and of the races we govern. Recent events in India should lead us to beware of attempts to tamper with a system which is based upon experience, and upon the essential conditions of our rule in that great Dependency.. ,

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