[All Rights Reserved.] INDIA.

Otago Witness, Issue 2808, 8 January 1908, Page 87

[All Rights Reserved.] INDIA.

INDIAN MILITAKY ADMINIS-

t TRATION.

BY THE RT. HON. SIR CHARLES W. DILKE, BART., M.P. PART 11. During a consideration of our Indian military policy a few years ago, Mr Balfour explained to the House of Commons, in a speech which he subsequently reprinted, what aione, in the opinion of the Defence Committee of his Cabinet, were the steps by which Russia could ever subjugate Afghanistan or threaten India. Theire was little element of suddenness about .this attack. But l6t us assume for the sake of argument- the hypothesis least unfavourable .to Lord Kitchener's costly plans. Let us admit — namely, that it might become necessary for India, having or not having obtained the consent of the Court of Kabul, to race Russia fo^ the possession of certain points of vantage in the inhospitable country occupied by the fierce Afghan race, or, indeed, north of the Hindu Kush in Afghan, Turkestan. The present principal garrisons- of India are either on the lines of railway or in. healthy places. The reports of the Mobilisation' Committee at' Simla, when Colonel " Nicholson was secretary, show the brief periods which would be consumed in the concentration of a field army as large as could be nourished in the heart of Afghanistan or conducted through the mountains north of the Kabul province. ~sy Lord Kitchener's mobilisation scheme a third, may have been added to the numbers jx> be moved. But the railways have increased their power in a still 1 greater, proportion ysince the date of the Simla report on mobilisation. DANGERS OF INDIAN CONCENTRATION.

. The difficulty of Indian concentration lias always been the liability to enteric fever and to cholera of large forces concentrated in such spots as Kandahar, Kabul, Qhaznee, the banks of the Helinund, Peshawar, or whatever may be the spot selected. - It is useless to pour troops forward in vast numbers to any of these places unless they are immediately to come into contact with the enemy, or at least to march forward in 1 rapid advance. Otherwise we <fo but increase the real, dangers . affecting . communication, supply, and hygiene, against which, far more than against a Russian enemy, the Indian army in the hypothesis would have to fight. ' In his , reprinted speech on Imperial Pefence, as published by Longman's Mr. Balfour took into account the new Russian strategic railways, but added, "An exaggerated importance may easily be attached to them/ and showed why. His argument involved the consideration that the Russians could not make an advance in force through Afghanistan without a railway. Their advance by Herat and Kandahar w<ral3' lead their army "far from it& base, with the Indus still to cross, .-with an impassable desert beyond the river, in a country where our railways give us the power of concentrating troops." It was, therefore, probable that any "invader of the future" -.would, "follow the example of his predecessors and hazard" the immense difficulties of a route •which leads direct to the heart of India. "• On "the Kabul lins of <advan.ee" /his "railway construction in time of war' ■would' encounter almost, insuperable diffi- , ctdties." -On tEe other hand, " making a railway from the Oxus is, a most tremendous Operation. . . . The Afghans are not likely to welcome railway makers. So such enterprise is likely, to be permit- . ted in time of peace or to be easily effected in time of war. . . . The Afghans ■woufcT become .very formidable opponents .indeed when .they had obtained, as. they certainly would obtain, the assistance of the- British in preserving their independence." * ' - THE QUESTION OP SUPPLIES. . _ -The-difficultles-of supply were shown By i infe BaJtfoox's speecE to be bo great that;

Lord Roberts, in 1880, had " the utmost difficulty in feeding 12,000 men. It is, therefore, quite inconceivable than any large bodies of men should come into collision at an 'early stage of a war between Russia and ourselves." Later in his speech Mr Balfour said "No surprise is possible in the case of India." These considerations, which have never been shaken, appear to negative Lord Kitchener's policy of "Redistribution" upon which so much Indian, money is being spent. They have been supported in admirable writings by the two highest authorities on the supply ■; of troops in Afghanistan : the Indian j geographer, Sir Thomas Holdich, and I Lieut. -general Sir Edwin CoUen. The • I latter wrote last year, Nt We may be quite 1 certain that in Afghanistan no very large ' army can be supplied without a railway. Fortunately for us, in this region railwaymaking would be a tremendous enter1 prise." Another high authority, Sir Lepel Griffin, expressed his agreement 1 with Sir ' Edwin Collen, and drew the moral that ' "we may well wait until the first step >is taken by a possible enemy] 1 ' The ; former Chief Commissioner of Baluchis- > tan concurred; and Sir Alfred Lyall, sum- » ming up a discussion at the Central Asian > Society, noted tnat " All agree that with- ; out railways in Afghanistan Russia could ' not advance." military Expenditure in India. It is difficult to see how recent ex- . penditure allotted to Lord Kitchener for his redistribution scheme can be defended. ; We hold India with a cheap and excellent ] native army, stiffened by a costly white , force of some 75,000 men. India pays the ! entire charge for her defence, and contri- \ butes a round sum towards the training in England (before they are borne and , paid on the Indian Budget) of the recruits , who form the drafts for India. At the , Colonial Conference of Mr Chamberlain, which preceded that of the present year, I tables were laid before it, and afterwards before Parliament, in which India was forgotten. A table of "British Empire, Naval andi Military Expenditure," which omitted the enormous contribution of

, I India towards our army, forms a singular : record of that neglect of Indian interests . which has, although rarely, sometimes ( occurred, and rankles in the Indian mind. , Until a few years ago the military ex- , penditure of India stood steadily aC about , 17 millions sterling. Since the production , in 1903 of Lord Kitchener's scheme it 1 has stood at nearly 22 millions sterling. -, The admitted military expenditure of 22 . millions sterling in the year 1904-5 has . been slightly reduced in subsequent years, , but needs addition to make it a full statement comparable with the defence Budget .of colonies and foreign powers. There , are the strategic railways, such as that < in the Kuram Valley, and that in the [ Kabul River gorge already named. There •_, are the military police of Assam and some . , other provinces, so far as they are assisted 1 from Indian imperial funds and perform ~ duties -of a military nature. It is a question whether we should not add to the ; account that part of the subsidy paid to 1 the Ameer of Afghanistan which takes , concrete shape in artillery, small arms, . and ammunition. THE VICEROY'S COUNCIL'S POSITION. ' There is an annual debate in the Viceroy's Council at Calcutta in which questions are asked as to the military ; expenditure of the Government ; but an- - swers are not vouchsafed from which any ■ satisfaction is to be obtained ; while in 1 the House of Commons we are too polite ' j towards the Government of India even to : ) press the necessary questions. No one "' knows what is- the extent or what is to be the end of Lord- Kitchener's redistribui tion. When the cantonment in the waterJ less Brahui district of Baluchistan was 1 1 abandoned, if indeed such a decision has been reached, neither the Viceroy's Council nor the Imperial' Parliament was informed whether the money that was to have been ! spent upon it was saved, or whether other costly proposals took its place. The sole 1 unofficial statement that I have seen con- ; sists in a denial that "Lord Kitchener's plan involves the addition of two ' mil-

lions sterling" to the annual military charges of India. The official statement in the course of the Budget debate of the pregent) yeajc at Calcutta was still more

vague, and contained a somewhat un- j generous reference by the Viceroy to the services of the predecessors of Lord Kitchener. The Council were assuredi that " the redistribution of garrisons is proceeding on the lines indicated by Lord Kitchener in 1904." It has, perhaps, been established in this article, mainly by quotations from the utterances of the most authorised of experts, that Lord Kitchener's " lines " had little relation to the facts of the problem to be solved. An examination of the Indian military problem shows that India is for the present skfe enough. Reform of civil administration, recognition of the place to be occupied by natives in the administration both of British India and of the native States, and removal of causes of friction, can proceedi without being hindered by fear of external complications inour time.