AUSTRIAN TREATY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26630, 28 November 1947, Page 5

AUSTRIAN TREATY

FOREIGN MINISTERS’ AGENDA DISCUSSION BEFORE GERMAN QUESTION LONDON, Nov. 26. The Council of Foreign Ministers decided to-night to place the Austrian Treaty Commission’s report first on the agenda. This agreement came after weeks of disagreement between the deputies. It meant that Russia withdrew strong objections to dealing with Austria first. The Ministers did not discuss the report, but passed it on to the deputies who will examine the Austrian question in detail. The Big Four’s agenda is now:— 1. Austria. 2. The preparation of the German Peace Treaty, including procedure and frontiers. 3. Economic principles. 4. The form and scope of the provisional political organisation of Germany. 5. The implementation of decisions regarding demilitarisation. 6. The Byrnes treaty on disarmament and demilitarisation. Mr Molotov presided to-day. He opened the meeting by asking for comments on the agenda. There were none, so he put the Russian viewpoint in a half-hour speech, arguing the case for discussing Germany first. He said it was two years and a-half since the surrender, and- no progress had been made. The world would not understand postponement of the discussion on Germany or its relegation to any secondary position. Mr George Marshall, replying to Mr Molotov’s allegations of “imperialist designs ” and “ the creation of slave States,” said he was convinced that Mr Molotov did not really believe his own allegations. “Let us get down to our work instead of casting allegations

for propaganda purposes,” he said. “ We are used to being called warmongers and everything else,” said Mr Ernest Bevin. “The only one good saint in the world to-day is the Soviet Union. I suppose the rest of us are all going down below.” Mr Molotov, in his opening speech, said the vanquished countries had a right to develop their democratic systems and independence. Other countries were striving not for a democratic, but for an imperialistic peace, which meant the domination of certain Powers over others. An imperialistic peace would divide the nations into States who dominated and those who were dominated. In this were the seeds of conflict, even of war. The German Peace Treaty should be a democratic peace contributing to the economic reconstruction of Germany and its rehabilitation as a democratic State based on the decisions taken at Yalta and Potsdam. Attempts would be made to make use of Germany by the Powers who needed Germany as a base for war industry and who needed reactionary forces there against the democratic elements in European countries liberated from Fascism. This policy was a danger to democracy and peace.

Mr Marshall suggested, while tie agreed that the German treaty was of the greatest importance to European peace, that the conference should accept the Austrian treaty as the first item on the agenda and quickly pass it to deputies, so there would be only the briefest. delay starting discussion on the German treaty. After Mr Bevin had supported this suggestion, the conference approved it. Mr Marshall discussing said the cart would be in front of the horse if Germany were not established as a definite entity before the treaty procedure was decided. The American delegation, for the sake of resolving the stalemate, agreed to pass the Austrian question to Ihe deputies, but the Foreign Ministers must immediately begin discussing the economic and political unity of Germany. Mr Bevin said Britain’s attitude to the German peace treaty had not changed since it was defined at Moscow, although there had been some modifications as a result of later events.

The conference agreed with Mr Bevin’s suggestion that the agenda items should be taken in order, but that it should not be necessary to complete discussion of one item before passing to the next.

Mr Molotov secured agreement for his claim that the Russian amendments to the “ Byrnes treaty ” should be included for discussion with item 6. The Benelux countries—Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg—in a joint Note asked the Foreign Ministers’ Council to hear their views on Germany, and not to decide anything without previously consulting them. The Note endorsed the United States proposal for a 40-year German disarmament and demilitarisation treaty. The Note also summarised “ certain fundamental conceptions ” for Germany which Benelux had in common, such as economic unity, a federal constitution, and international control of the Ruhr. Any large-scale reduction in German economy would “seriously impair ” European economy.