AIR WARFARE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 24412, 25 September 1940, Page 7

AIR WARFARE

MASTERY WITH BRITAIN NAZI TACTICS CHANGED BOMBING" ATTACKS AT NIGHT (British Official Wireless) (United Press Association). (By Electric Telegraph—Copyright) RUGBY, Sept. 23. (Received Sept. 24, at 7 p.m.) Air Marshal Joubert, broadcasting to the United States, discussed the changes ~of policy forced on the Luftwaffe and the attacks by the R.A.F. on objectives in enemy and occupied countries. "Early in August the Luftwaffe attempted to invade this country in daylight and by sheer force of numbers beat down our defences. That effort cost them dear. _ The enemy then sent over individual bombers, using also covers to attack vital objectives. The loss of many of these lone raiders made him change again and his third scheme was to send occasional strong forces to bomb our airfields and communications. One of these attacks lost 20 per cent, of its numbers. Then he tried escorting small numbers of bombers with powerful fighter forces to get through to our vital points. In this fighting our losses became heavier, but we still took greater toll of the German air force, in particular its fighters. A Hopeful Sign "So Hitler comes to night bombing—a form of attack hard to parry. There is, however, one distinctly hopeful sign. We are beginning to take reasonable toll of these night birds ar/d we are getting on well with night interception. I hope to see during the next few weeks figures steadily mounting until the proportion of German casualties by night approaches that by day. In night fighting once the casualties become severe the moral effect is larger than by day. Setting off together in laree formations in daylight bombers and fighters give each other courage, but at night a single, pilot and crew have no outside source from which to draw additional stores of courage." R.A.F. Offensive

Turning to the R.A.F, offensive, Air Marshal Joubert emphasised that physical disadvantages were suffered owing to the fact that, whereas the German bomber force had only a short 20 minutes' flight to reach England. R.A.F bombers must fly four or five times that distance to reach Germany " Naturally we are loth to bomb targets in France. Certain of these we have to attack, such es Channel oorts and fields on which the German Air Force is disDOsed. Against these we can develop the full effect of our bombers' strength but we are reluctant to carry the war any further . into France, even into the occupied portion of the country. We would much sooner be hittinp the Germans in Germany and it is this we shall go on doing. Berlin Stettin. Leipzig. Bremen and Hamburg—all these towns regularly feel the weight of our bomber attacks and even if we have to make a long and hard journey to get at them, the effort is worth while. This is not retaliation No good soldier, seaman or airman believes in retaliation by itself The only way to bring an enemy down is to hit those things which contribute to the maintenance and development of his armed forces. Our inflexible aim is to oursue this course." Invasion Preparations Discussing the German preparations for invasion. Air Marshal Joubert said: "For the Germans to use successfully the weapon they have forged they must have air superiority over the south-east of England. With this power in their hands it would be possible for the Germans to seize a harbour with airborne troops, and after establishing such a bridgehead to use small steamshiDs to bring over reinforcements and thus develop a powerful offensive on land We are Drepared for this. I do not believe that the Germans will be able to obtain air suoeriority, and our land and sea defences are strong. I think most of

us feel that we would like the matter put to the test and we are awaiting with impatience the German decision to make their earribler's throw."