THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18808, 10 March 1923, Page 8

THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS.

THE NAVY AND THE WAR. GERMAN PACIFIC FLEET. ADMIRAL CRADOOK’3 DEFEAT. (Published under Special Arrangement.) XIII.-CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS. Suddenly, on October 27, there arrived a telegram from Admiral Cradock which threw me into perplexity: •’ Good Hope, October 26, 7 p.m. At sea. With reference to Admiralty telegram received October 7 and to orders to search for enemy and our groat desire for early ’ fth'ccess, 1 consider that it is impossible to ■ ffpd and destroy enemy's squadron owing ,-td slow speed of Canopus. . '. 'Have therefore ordered Defence to join ’ me after calling for orders at Montevideo. Shall employ Canopus on necessary work ■ Shf convoying colliers. "The Admiralty telegram to which Admiral Cradook here referred was as follows : > Oct. s.—You must bo prepared to meet J Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Dresden in , 'company. Canopus should accompany Glasgow, Monmouth, and Otranto, and should search and protect trade in combination. We were then in the throes of the change In the office of First Sea Lord, and I was gravely preoccupied with the circumstances and oppositions attending the appointment of Lord Fisher. But for this fact lam sure I should have reacted much more violently against the ominous sentence; “Shall employ Oauopua on necessary work of convoying colliers.” As it was I minuted to the Naval Secretary (Admiral Oliver) as follows : -. “This telegram is very obscure, and I do not understand what Admiral Cradock intends and wishes.” I was reassured by his reply on October 29:Tho situation on the West Coiist seems safe. If Gneisenau and Scharnhorst have . gone north they will meet eventually Id : zumo, Newcastle, and Hizen moving south, and will be forced south on Glasgow and Monmouth, who have good speed and can keep touch and draw them south on to Good Hope and Canopus, who should keep within supporting distance of each other. The half-fear which hud begun to grow in my mind that perhaps the Admiral would go and fight without the Canopus, which I thought was so improbable that I did not put it on paper, was allayed. It would, of course, be possible for him to manoeuvre 40 or 50 miles ahead of the Canopus und still close on her before fighting. To send the Defence to join Admiral Cwdock would have left Admiral Stoddart) in a hopeless inferiority. 'The Admiralty staff had, however, already replied in accordance with all our decisions (Sent Oct. 28, 1914, 6.45 p.m.) There ia no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity. Defence is to remain on east coast under orders of Stoddart. .This will leave sufficient force on eoch -’side in case the hostile cruisers appear there on the trade routes. Japanese battleship Hizen shortly expected on North American coast; she will join with Newcastle und Japanese _;iazumo and move south towards Galapages. But neither this nor any further message reached Admiral Oradock. He had taken Ibis own decision. Without waiting for the Defence, even if we had been able to send her, and leaving the Canopus behind to guard the colliers, he was already steaming up the Chilean coast. But though he h©r, and leaving the Canopus behind to cause she was too slow, he took with him thi© helpless armed merchant cruiser Otranto, which was scarcely any faster. He was thus ill-fitted either to fight or run. He telegraphed to us from off Vallenar at 4vp.m. on October 27 (received November j. 4.33 a.m.): Your telegram 105 received. Have seized. , German mails. Monmouth, Good Hope, y . and Otranto at Vallenar coaling. Glasgow patrolling vicinity of Coronel to intercept German shipping, rejoining flag later on. After coaling, 1 intend to proceed northward secretly with squadron ’and to keep out of sight of land. u , Until further notice continue telograph- - ing to Montevideo. / And at noon on October 29 (received November 1, 7.40 a.m.): — Mails for Rear-Admiral Cradock; Good Hope, Canopus, Monmouth, Glasgow. Otrgnto, should, until further notice, be forwarded to Valparaiso. \ The inclusion of the Canopus in the middle of the later message seemed to indicate the Aurnirai’s intention to work in combination with the Canopus, even if not actually concentrated. These were the last messages received from him. On October 30 Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord. As soon as ho entered the Admiralty I took him to the war room and ■went over with him on the great map the positions and tasks of every vessel in our immense organisation. It took more than iwo hours. The critical point was clearly in South American waters. Speaking of Admiral Cradqek’s position, I said, “You don’t suppose he would try to fight them without Uie Canopus?” He did not give any decided reply. Early on November 3 we got our first certain news of tho Germans. .-Consul- General, Valparaiso, to Admiralty. (Sent 5.20 p.m., November 2. Received % 3.10 a.m., November 3.) Master of Chilean merchant vessel re- “ ports that on November 1, 1 p.m., five miles off Cape Carranza, about 62 miles - north of Talcahuano, he was stopped by Numbcrg. Officers remained on board 45 minutes. Two other German/cruisers lay west about five and 10 miles-respectively. Master believes one of these was Scharnhbrst. On October 26, 1 p.m.. Leipzig cation at Mas-a-Tuera, having crew 456 and 10 guns, 18 days out frem Galapagos. ~ Shs was accompanied by another cruiser name unknown. They loft same day, having nought oxen. An unknown warship was on October 29 seen in lai. 33 south, long. 74 west, steaming towards Coquimbo. Here at last was the vital message for which the Admiralty Staff had waited so long. Admiral von Spee’s squadron was definitely located on the West Coast of South America. He had not slipped past Admiral Oradock round the Horn, as had neon possioio. For tho moment Admiral Stoddart was perfectly safe. With the long •peninsula of South America between him aiid the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. there was no longer any need for him to keep the Defence. She could join Cradock for what We must hope would be an early battle. After surveying the new situation wo telegraphed to Admiral Stoddart as follows: (Sent 6.3 b p.m., November 3.) Defence to proceed to join Admiral Cradock on West Coast of America with all ■ possible despatch. Acknowledge. ;• This telegram was initialled by Admiral Stiirdee, Lord Fisher, and myself. We also telegraphed to Admiral Cradock once more teiterat-ing the instructions about the Canopus:— (Sent 6.55 p.m., November 3.) Defence has been ordered with all despatch to join your flag. Glasgow should find or keep in touch with the enemy. You should keep touch with Glasgow concentrating the rest of your squadron in- • eluding Canopus. It is important you -dshoulct effect your junction with Defence at earliest possible moment subject to Beeping touch with Glasgow and enemy. ■ ’ Enemy supposes you at Corcovndos Bay. Acknowledge. ' ■But we were already talking to [ho void. ■■" When T opened my boxes at 7 o’clock on the.morning of November 4 I read the following telegram : 'Maclean. Valparaiso, to’ Admiralty. (Sent November 3, 1914, 6.10 p.m.) Chilean Admiral has just informed mb that German Admiral states that on Sunday at sunset, in thick and wicked -,weather, his ships met Good Hope, Glas’{row,- Monmouth, and Otranto. Action -.vivas joined, and Monmouth turned over And sank after about an hour’s fighting. 'Good Hope, Glasgow, and Otranto drew ■’ off into darkness. - Good Hope was on firo,_ an explosion ' TS.a.ri heard, and she is believed to have ■ slink. ’ • ; Gneisenau, Scha-rnhorst, and Nurnberg ■ were among tho German ships engtutad.

Tho story of what had happened, so far as it ever can bo known, is now familiar, it is fully set out in tho official history, and need only b© summarised here. Arrived on Urn Chilean coast, having refuelled at a lonely island, and hearing that tho British light-cruiser Glasgow was at Covonol, Admiral von Spee determined to make tin attempt to out her off. and with tills intention steamed southward on November 1 with hia whole squadron. J3y good fortune the Glasgow left harbour before it was too late. Almost at tho same moment Admiral Cradook began his sweep northward, hoping to catch th© Leipzig, whose wireless had been heard repeatedly by the Glasgow. He was rejoined by tho Glasgow at half-past 2, and tho whole squadron proceeded northward abreast about 15 miles apart. At about half-past 4 the smoke of several vessels was seen to the northward, and in, another quarter of an hour, the Glasgow was able to identify the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and a German light cruiser. The Canopus was nearly 500 miles away. Was there still time to refuse action Undoubtedly there was. The Good Hope and Monmouth had normal speeds of 23 knots and 22.4 respectively, and could certainly steam 21 knots in company that day. The Glasgow could steam over 25. The Schurnhorst and Gneisenau had nominal speeds of 23.2 and 23.5, but they had been long in southern seas and out of dock. On the knowledge he possessed at that moment Admiral Cradook would have been liberal in allowing them 22 knots. Pvough weather would reduce speeds equally on both sides. Had ho turned at once, and by standing out to sea offered a stern chase to the enemy, ho could only bo overhauled one knot each hour. When the enemy was sighted by the Glasgow at 4.45, the nearest armoured ships were about 20 miles apart. There wore scarcely two hours to sundown and less than three to darkness. But the Otranto was a possible complication. She could only steam 18 knots, and against the head sea during the action she did, in fact, only steam 15 knots. As thi- weak, slow ship had been for some unexplained reason sent on ahead with the Glasgow she was at tho moment of sighting the enemy only 17 miles distant. Assuming that Admiral Von Snce could steam 22, knots, less three for tfie head sea —i. 0., 19—he would overhaul -the Otranto foui knots an hour. On- this ho might have brought her under long-range fire as-dark-ness closed in. To that extent she reduced the speed of the British squadron , aiid diminished their chances of skfety. -this may have weighed with Admiral Oradock. We now know, of course, that in spit© of our being cumbered with the Otranto he could as it happened easily and certainly have declined action hud he attempted to do so. At the moment of being sighted Admiral von Spee had only steam for 14 knots, and had to light two more boilers to realise the full speed. Moreover, hia ships wore dispersed. To concentrate and gain speed took an hour and a-half off the brief daylight, during 'which tho British ships would actually have been increasing their distance. Moreover, in the chase and battle of the Falklands tho greatest speed ever developed by the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did not exceed 20 knots in favourable weather. There is therefore no doubt ho could have ror, away untouched. But nothing was farther from the mind of Admiral Grndock. Ho instantly decided to attack. As soon as the Glasgow had sighted tho enemy, she had-turned back towards tho flagship, preceded by the Monmouth and the Otranto, all returning at full speed. But Admiral Cradook at 5.10 ordered the squardon to concentrate not on his flagship the Good Hope, the furthest from the enemy, but on the Glasgow, which, though retreating rapidly, was still the nearest. At 6,18 he signalled to the distant Canopus: “1 am now going to attack enemy.” Tho decision to light sealed his fate, and, more than that, the fate of the squadron. To quote the log of tho Glasgow: “The British squadron turned to' port four points together towards the enemy with a view ro closing them and forcing them to action before sunset, which if successful would hjive put them at a great disadvantage owing to the British squadron being between the enemy and the aim.” The German Admiral easily evaded this manoeuvre by turning away towards the land and keeping at a range of at least. 18,000 yards Both squadrons were now steaming southward on slightly Qotuorging courses—tho British to seaward with tho behind them, and the Germans nearer the land. And now began the saddest naval action in the war. Of the officers and men in both the squadrons that faced each other in these stormy seas so far from home nine out of ten wore doomed to perish. Tho British were to die that night; the Gormans a month later. At 7 o’clock the sun " sank beneath the horizon, and the German Admiral, no longer dazzled by its rays, opened fire. The British’ shins were silhouetted against the afterglow, while the Germans wore hardly visible against the dark background of the Chilean coast. A complete reversal of advantage had taken place. The sea was high;’ and tho main deck 6in guns both of the Monmouth and of the Good Hope must have been much affected by the dashing spray. Tin? Gorman batteries, all mounted in modern fashion on the upper deck, suffered no corresponding disadvantage from the rough weather. The unequal contest lasted less than an hour. One of the earliest German salvoes probably disabled ihe'Good Hope’s forward 9.2 in gun, which .was not fired throughout tho action. Both she and the Monmouth wore soon on fire. Darkness came on and the sea increased in violence, till tho Good Hone, after a great explosion, became only a glowing speck, which was presently extinguished; and the Monmouth, absolutely helpless, but refusing to surrender, was destroyed by the Nurnborg. and foundered, like her consort, with her. flag still flying. The Otranto, an unar mouved merchantman, quite incapable of taking part in tho action, rightly held her distance and disappeared into the gloom. Only the little Glasgow, which miraculously escaped fatal* damage among the heavy salvoes, continued tho action until she was loft alone in darkness on the sloi-my seas. There were no survivors from the two British ships; all perished, from Admiral to seaman. The 'Gormans had no loss of life. Quoth the Glasgow (Midnight, November 16):- . . Throughout the engagements the conduct of officers and men was entirely admirable. Perfect, discipline and coolness prevailed under trying circumstances of receiving considerable volume of fire without being able to make adequate return. The men behaved exactly as though at buttle practice; there were no signs of wild fire, and when the target was invisible the gun-layers ceased tiring of their own accord. Spirit of officers and ship’s company of Glasgow is entirely unimpaired bv serious reverse in which they took part,, and that tho ship may be quickly restored to a condition in which she can take part in further operations against the same enemy is the unanimous wish of us all. This as it happened they wore not to be denied. ■