FOCH ON VICTORY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17688, 28 July 1919, Page 6

FOCH ON VICTORY

—«> AN HISTORIC INTERVIEW. TRIBUTE TO 'THE BRITISH. Mr G. Ward Price, tho noted war correspondent, contributed to tho London Daily Mail a report of an interview ho had with Marshal Foch, tho Supremo General of tho Allied Armies. It gives an intimate sketch of tho great General, and contains some exceedingly intenosting matter. Simplicity is tho foundation of tho character of this man, whoso works havo placed him among tho groat figures of history (writes Mr Ward Price). Ho is simple in his surroundings, simple in his person, simple in hiss thought, but it is the simplicity of genius, tho genius of simplicity. Meeting Marshal Foch is liko drawing near to a Dario templo. Tho impression he gives is of groat strength, combined with_ an absence of ornament deliborato in its severity. Even to Franco Foch is something of a mystery. Ho showed himself but little among his troops. Hie duty did not lie there, and he seeks no popularity. Tho simplicity of tho man gives no hold to public imagination. His fierce modesty cuts him off from all intorconrss outsido his work. e FINAL VICTORY. When did you first know that you had won the final victory," I asked after the marshal had talked a little while. "After General Rawlinson and General JJebeney had made their joint attack on August 8," he replied. "Consequently at the end of August I did' not know then when the Germane would give in, but I knew that our advance would not stop until thfiv wore finally defeated. Our offensivo had become general. It began on I?? 2*° n the Mama. Terrible fighting SJie/T , Ge ™ ll,s used "P there 55 of the 180 or 190 divisions that they had. Their reserves were exhausted. That had gone well. Then came the attack in the Amiens sector on August 8. That was well too. Ihe moment had .arrived. I ordered boneral Humbert to attaok in his turn. No reserves! . No matter. Allez! (Get on with it.) I told Marshal Haig to attack too. Hes short of men aleo. Attack all the same! There we are. advancing evsry-

where—the whole line! En avant! . I know nothing could baulk me of victory once the Germans had accepted the final battle where they did. One thing only could have delayed defeat for them! -Lnat was to get all their forces from everywhere back behind the Meuse. That would have been a formidable position. If they had done that—well, we might have been there yet, But they couldn't do it. Why? iSecause it would havo been an open confession of defeat, and they dared not face the moral effect of that at home." IF -THEY HAD NOT YIELDED. The Marshal went on to talk about the armistice. "When the Germans came to me to ask for an armistice, I said- "I am going on to the Rhine. If you oppose nle > s° much the worse for you but whether you sign an armistice or not, I do not stop until I reach the Rhino v™?*\Fi demd . to the result *i, We amve ? °, n more quickly tha?! we phould otherwise have

«°ra. mam thin& was to # et there" What would have happened if the armistice had not been signed when it was? "I should have attacked on November 14 with 20 divisions in Lorraine. I should have taken Metz. Tho Germans would have evacuated it, in fact. But they had behind them the line of the Saar, where we should have had to pause again. To haveiaunched that attack would have meant one victory the more, but that is all, and we got by the armistice everything- we could have gamed by the battle." "Would you have captured large masses of the enemy if the Germans had not given m when they did?" The marshal took up his pencil again, and sketched a rough chart of the battle-line. When you are advancing on the whole of a 250-mile front, as we were," he said, great encircling movements are impossible As your adversary falls back he blows up bridges here, here, and here. He blocks this road, and this, and this. He covers every track and line of pursuit with the litter of the material he abandons. The advance of tho pursuing army becomes more and more difficult. You cannot get on fast enough to catch him. At the cost of great sacrifice of material he gets away. That is what modem war is like. HOW TO WIN BATTLES. . Foch. never entered, by the way, into details of the fighting he cccisclled. Ho chose capable helpers, and left aE thas to them, keeping himself free from the distraction of smaller things, so that he might tho better deal with, great Before a battle he would visit the general who was going to bo responsible, and by a few abrupt questions satisfy himself that various contingencies had been, provided for, but that was aIL "Tho stroko of genius that turns the fate of a battle?" he says. "I don't believe in it. A battle is a complicated operation that you prepare laboriously. If tho enemy does this, you say to yourself I shall do that. If such and. such happens, these are the steps I shall take to meet it. You think out every possible development, and decide on the way to deal with the situation created. One of these developments occurs; you put in operation your prearranged plan, and everyone says: ' What genius to have thought of that at the critical moment!' whereas tho credit is really duo to tho labour of Dreparation done beforehand." THE BRITISH SOLDIER. One of the subjects of whiph the marshal talked a great deal to-day was tho British army. "Ah, I know them well," he said. "I have lived in very pleasant intimacy with them. There were three stages during the war in the development of the British army. There was first the old regular force—a most excellent army, but very small. They suffered most heavily and fought most magnificently in the battle of Ypres. Then came Kitchener's army and the dominion troops. They were very gallant, and like all young troops, were confident, but inexperienced. They thought that bravery by itself was a match for bullets. They bought their experience dear on the Sommo; 1917 was a year lost bv both sides. 'Then came the third stage, in 1918 The Gorman attack besun badly for the British. General Byng's army pulled itself together quickly The British lost 150,000 men. Things were going ill with them. Tho fighting round y,ulers-Btretoiineux was most terrible. Amiens and Abbeyvillo were tho crucial points for us. My first step when I was made Commanderrin-Chief of tho Allied armies was to knit tho British and French together. Otherwise they would have been forced apart. Tho British would have fallen back on to, thoix bases on the coast and tho French, would havo fallen baok on tho Seine. Tho Germans would have been through. This is what had to bo done," cried tho marshal, dropping his pipo and matchbox and clasping the fingers of both bands together. They needed to bo joined liko that. Once that was done it didn't matter how hard the Germans stnsok. Tho line was solid. "I helped the British as much as I conld," he went on. "I made them work very hard. 'Dig trenches 1 If you have four lines, di£ six. If you have six lines, dig eight! So that you -will always have positions to fall back upon.' In this way, thanks to tho fact that the Germans left us alone in May and Juno, wo were a-blo to reorganise, and by the time I started my offensive in July the British were as fresh and as full of fighting spirit as ever. The whole lino thrusting, elbowing its wav forward! No stop! No rest! That was the supreme tost of tho British Army, and they came through it splendidly. "No attack in the history of the world was better carried out than the one made on tho Hindonburg lino near St. Quentin and Catnbrai by your"—the marshal spoke slowly and reflectively—"Fourth, Third, and First Armies on September 20. The enemy positions wore most formidable, but nothing could stop tho British. They swerjt right over them. It was a glorious day for British arms." VIEW OF HINDENBURG. "What ie your opinion of your adversaries, tho Gorman lcsodera?" I asked tho marshal. "Oil, to judgo them it would bo neceaeary to know every thing that went on" in tho house across tho road," ho answered. "Still," I ventured to suggest, "I suppose- that toy constantly trying to divine their intentions it was possible to form an idea of their mentality." "Tho Germans lioverr produced in this war a, general of the capacity of the first von Moitko of tho war of 1870," replied Marshal Foch. "Tkero wero three Chiefs of Staff, who oaoh hod well-defined methods. Tho von Moitko who was Chiof of Staff in 1914 was dovotcd to the idea of outflanking. It was liis stock manoeuvre. It led him to infringe the neutrality of Belgium so as tc> outflank tho French army from tho north. Ho t/ried it again on the Marne. Then started the race to the sea with battles at wliich his aim was constantly to turn our flank, bub in all of whioh ho failed. So Moltke disappeared and FnJkonhayn succeeded him. Falkonhayn's method was to crush all tb& smaller Allies first.

1 utting on ono sade TLthkl*. where his eoocess was not decisive, he started his campaign ag-ainst Serbia, but though ho overran tho country it led to nothing. Tho big Allied armies still remained intact. Rumania declared -war. Folkenhayn docidod to crash Rumania. Ho did so, but was no further advanced. "His Government at last replaced him by LudondoriF and Hiiidoiibui-g. Ludendorff's sohonio was to ■got rid of Russia and then throw himself with all his strength upon tho western Allies. Ho choso as his means to destroy Russia, revolution. But though you know where revolution, starts, ( you can never tell whore it is going to ( end. 'And the revolution Ludendorff : started to undermine Russia ended in Geri many and helped to her undoing. He , used extremist measures recklessly, and ! they turned against him "It was the same with the submarine , campaign. "1 will destroy -the Allies' mercantile, marine and starvo them out," ho said. "But what about the danger of bringing , America into tho war?" , "She won't come in." ''But if Eho does?" , "Sho will never bt, able* to get her troops t to Europe:" ; "That was Ludendorff'B reasoning, and it was through believing ihat ruthlessness alono, mitigated by no other considerations whatsoever, was going to win them the war, that tho Germans lost They were over-reckless and over-confident. They 1 were great organisers. In this war they had no men of insight or genius. M ; WILL WAR, CEASE? i Tho marshal is not of those who believe . that wars have ceased upon earth. Nor ; does ho think that new mechanical inven- , tions will greatly change their fundamental . nature. "Tho rules and principles of war are al- ■ ways the same," he said. "It matters no- ' thing whether your soldier is on his feet ■ in _ the open or shut up inside a tank. The , principles on which he must fight are uni alterable. The development of the art of war is like that of the art of architecture. The materials you use' for your buildings may change. They may be wood, stone, steel. But the statio principles on which your house must be built axe permanent." A figure of impressive simplicity. To him one feels that the Romans would surely have applied the word of praise whosa exact meaning is untranslatable m native i English—"a virtuous man." He has no ambition now but to return to his country house in Brittany and plant trees. "Glory?" he said to an officer who is ; also one of his friends. "Never use that word to me. I have done my work aa a soldier, but I deserve no more glory for it 1 than if I had been a civilian and done my work as a civilian well."