THE OTAGO DAILY TIMES WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 1919. AN ECHO OF THE WAR.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17684, 23 July 1919, Page 4

THE OTAGO DAILY TIMES WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 1919. AN ECHO OF THE WAR.

There has been a great conflict of opinion with respect to tho wisdom of tho publication, before the Peace Treaty with Germany had been signed, of Viscount French's account of the military events in tho early part of the war when he was Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force. While those who have had the opportunity of reading the eighteen chapters of " 1914," as published in the Daily Telegraph, have found them of absorbing interest, they must have been saddened by the reflection, forced upon them by Lord French's disclosures, that the glorious army of "Old Contemptibles" was exposed to needlessly heavy sacrifices simply through the lack of prevision on the part of the War Office authorities and their lack of full appreciation of the requirements of an army in modern warfare. Lord French himself had, prior to the outbreak of the war, been urging upon the Government the • need for remedying deficiencies in the supplies of guns and munitions. During the two years prior to April, 1914, in which he occupied the position of Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he pressed the view that the army was under-gunned and that the guns were under-shelled for the work they would have to do. In'particular,, he was persuaded of the vital need of supplying high explosive shell to the artillery, for he had realised that there were serious limitations to the efficiency of shrapnel in its use against entrenched positions. He received, he says, " very little support." Even such as was given to him was -'lukewarm iu the extreme." The effect of the War Office apathy became evident early in the war. " From tho beginning t of the battle of the Aisne up to the close of the battle of Loos, at the end of 1915, the scanty supply of munitions of war .paralysed," Lord French writes, "all our power of initiative and, at critical times, menaced our defence with irretrievable disaster." Tragic .as was the failure of the Government, as the result, it is suggested, of opposition by the Finance Department and the Treasury, to secure that the army should be furnished with such supplies of guns and shells as would adequately equip it for active service in the event of war, hardly less tragic was the apparent indifference with which Lord French's appeals for munitions and more munitions were met when the war was actually in progress. "As early as the middle of September, 1914, the British Army in France was subjected to heavy bombardment from German Bin howitzers to which it was quite unable to reply." At the same time the daily expenditure of artillery ammunition became far in excess of the receipts from England, and the army was unable to maintain stocks on the lines of communication up to anything like the proper war establishment. Lord French details the steps which he took to direct the attention of the authorities to this state of affairs which was gravely hampering the army, in its operations and was certainly calculated also to impair seriously the morale of the forces. He communicated personally by letter and telegram with the Secretary of State for War and he made official representations to the War Office. In particular, he laid down, in a communication to the War Office on December 31, a table setting out the minimum requirements of the army if it was to carry on the war with any prospect of success. The requirements specified in this table ranged from 50 rounds per gun a day for 13-pounders to 12 rounds for 9.2 in howitzers, including from 50 to 100 per cent, of bigh explosive shells, according to the class of gun. "It was explained that this output was necessary for a period of active operations and should be continued even during a lull till a reserve of three or four times the amount required in war establishments had been accumulated." To this communication Lord French received no reply at all until January 19. The War Office then declined to work up to more than 20 rounds a day and refused a request for 50 per cent, of high explosives. It furnished Lord French with an estimate—far below his requirements—of the receipts on which he might rely up to and including the month of May. The actual supply in that month, however, proved to be less than one-half of the War Office estimate. During the winter of 1914-15 it was hoped to accumulate some small reserve of ammunition, but this hope was disappointed and the number of rounds per 18-pounder gun throughout this period fell, to less than five per day. As a rasult, the army was deprived of the opportunity of exploiting the success it secured at Neuve Chapelle early in March when a small reserve of ammunition had been built up. "Had proper steps been taken to increase the supply," Lord French says, "when 1117 first strong appeals were sent in during September, 1914, the offensive operations commenced so successfully at Neuve Chapelle might have been further developed and, indeed, possibly have led to great and important results. But the battle had to be broken off after three days' fighting because we were brought to a standstill through want of ammunition." The renewed representations which after this disagreeable proof of the terrible' effect of a scarcity of munitions, Lord French made to the Government were met by an official injunction to exercise the utmost economy and by a suggestion, in a letter, received by his Chief of Staff, which was supposed to have been dictated by Lord Kitchener, that the army was wasting ammunition! About this time Lord French, discouraged by the official imperturbability, ht>d resort' to such publicity as was available to him to make known the great anxiety he felt respecting the shortage of heavy guns and ammunition. He gave interviews to the press, he urged public men who v: sited him to dwell emphatically on the need of an increased supply of munitions, and he warned the Secretary of State for War that the danger would be fatal if instant action were not taken to supply the needs of the army. It was shortly after this that Mr Asquith, then Prime Minister, made a famous

spocch at Newcastle in wliich lie said that the army had all the ammunition it required. " When I read this speech," Lord French writes, "after all my public and private appeals, I lost any hope that I had entertained of receiving help from the Government as then constituted." And when he could see, at the battle of Festuberb early in the following month, that the absence of artillery support was doubling and trebling tho British losses in men, he " determined on taking the most drastic measures to destroy the apathy of a Government which had brought the Empire to the brink of disaster"—a determination that was strengthened by the receipt by him on that same day of instructions from the War Office that 20 per cent, of his scanty reserve supply of ammunition was to be shipped to the Dardanelles. The measures which, he employed were to supply evidence to Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of The Times, that tho lack of high explosive shells had been a fatal bar to success at Festubert and to send copies of all his correspondence with the War Office on the question of the supply of ammunition to Mr Lloyd George, Mr Bonar Law, and Mr Balfour. The outcome was the downfall of the Asquith Government, the formation of a Coalition Government (still under Mr Asquith) and the creation of a Munitions Department under the active control of Mr Lloyd George, through whose energy tho production of munitions was undertaken on a scale which eventually assured to the army such a supply as admitted of an even prodigal expenditure of shells. .