RUSSIA AND THE NEUTRAL POWERS.

Oamaru Mail, Volume II, Issue 391, 30 July 1877, Page 3

RUSSIA AND THE NEUTRAL POWERS.

(>t. Pcfcrsjurj GazitU.) England is arming with feverish eagerness both inland ami si_a ; she is fortifying GibraiCir, ne_(oc;ating for a purchase oftiie Suez L'anal, threatening to occupy Egvpt, Crete, and Constantinople. keepiiig back Greece from an attach on Tnrkev, seeking" allies for the Pm'te in Asia. intimidating the iriends of Russia in Europe, helping the Turks with money, men, arms, annii'.niition, ainl advice, pieparinif for Europe ±Hotes A\ith menacing demands on lurkey, and drawing up for Turkey insulting lvp'ies to these -Notts. Til ere is no end to the open preparations f.-r war and the secret diplomatic intrigues of' England ; and t.-is is called neutrality and non-intervention . As to Austria, she is not hypocritical liKe England ; she declares that her neutraliiy must depend oil circumstances, and acknowledges that the Turcomania, which has of late been so forcibly manifested in Hungary, leavus her 110 alternative but to side with Hungary or with itussia. It is eu.leiit that Austria rejoices at being driven into a corner by Hungary ; sue is glad to be turced to do what she desiies to do. The neutrality of Austria-Hungary, in a word, is openly hostile, and aims at the total destruction of Russia . Italy, too, is not to be depended upon. Her statements stid adneie to i.:e policy of (Javour. They only wait ior Lj:e opportunity of profiting by tlie difficulties of others, and will ally tntmselves with the Power which offers them the greatest advantages, trance wiil remain lieunai. because she is powerless to act ; but her neutrality will not necessarily be favourable to Russia Germain alone lias as yet made no decla'atioii of neutralitv ; yet her silence is of greater value to itussia than all the formal manifestations of the other Powers. German} sympathises with Russia : her friendly policy is an antidote to the menacing neutrality of the four other States—the best guarantee for a localisation of t.ie war, and for our success it sucn a localisation should prove impracticable. (Post Berlin, May 11.) Up to the present Russia Juts not renewed, but, at the same time, she has not withdrawn, the promise she gave not to make any conquest. If England were to take premature possession of any portion of Turkish territory, even under the form of simple occupation, tiie step might furnish Russia witLi a pretext for throwing over her engagement. I he problem which the actual position of the situation imposes on all the Powers merely interested in the Eastern Question is hard to solve. But although the tiual result cannot be conjectured, it is hard, even at present, to consider the maintenance of tiie actual status quo probable after the war. Tiie more the struggle is prolonged, the more improbable such a maintenance will become, and it would be wtll, therefore, that We should familiarise ourselves with the idea, not of ameliorating the existi.ig sLttus quo. but of replacing it. 'l'ue principal difficulty in tiie way oi a solution of the Eastern Question does not lie in Russia's ambition for conquest, nor in the iiicompaii oility that existSjJ> between Muscovite and European interests, but in Austria's repugnance to assume the active role

- ! which is offered to and even imposed on r> ! her by the nature of things. People are J ' found reporting on every occasion that J the Danube should not be dominated at ij ' any point of its course by Unssia. Be it e so ; and for our part we ask for nothing - • better than to sec the entire region situ- - sited between the Black Sea and tiie t Adriatic placed eithev directly or ini directly under the supremacy of Austria. 1 But what we cannot do is to maintain the , : abominable Turkish regime ; and because ; the inertness of Austria is, in the eyes t of those parties in that State who - cannot succeed in uniting themselves together, the most convenient attitude—'i i what we cannot do is to desire the ) | continuance of that provisional state 1 ' of things which is inseparable from the t Ottoman rule—a state of tilings the perj manent danger of which compromises the t healthy development of Europe. Austria 2 apprehends the mixing of opposing ele--3 nients, but the State that shuts on itself L tiie door of its future, and because it . dreads the draught that will rush in ; through its opening, loses a share of its • rights to history. If Austria is willing . to soiz-J in opportune time what will fall r I to her by the nature of things, the other ' part of Turkey in Europe, that is to say. the region south of the Balkans, would naturally fall to the share of Greece. As for Kussia, tier statesmen must renounce all idea of Constantinople, and must restrain her action to Asia. Germany has no duty in the present crisis but to see that none of the vital interests of Austria are compromised ; but the maintenance of the Turkish Empire is not to be counted among those interests.