EUROPEAN TURKEY.

Oamaru Mail, Volume I, Issue 332, 17 May 1877, Page 4

EUROPEAN TURKEY.

With map in hand, the following abstract of a lecture, recently delivered at the Royal United Service Institution by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Howard Vincent, on "The Military Geography of European Turkey," will be found worthy of perusal and recollection, as much of the war, if not all of it, will be fought in the country described by Colonel Vincent. The lecture treats of the topographical considerations concerning the invader, and also affecting defence. The latest news advises us of the arrival of the Ilussian army at Dadia, in the vicinity of Giurgevo, on the Danube ; therefore, the route and means for reaching that point described by Captain Vincent must have been taken by the Russian generals. Lieutenant-Colonel Vincent said with respect to the invading army: —" Let us suppose that we have an army consisting of 274,600 infantry, 12,330 cavalry, and 245 guns. This is the actual strength of the army of Kisheneff. Although in n prolonged campaign the deficiency of officers in the Russian army —amounting to upwards of 7000—would be a serious matter, it may be taken for granted, despite all that has been said to the contrary, that of late years no finer army has been collected together, and what might in some cases be an important element for consideration—the object of the mobilisation—is here one of the principal elements of cohesion and strength. We must assume that Constantinople is the objective point. The approach thereto is mainly guarded—first, by the Danube ; and second, by 60 miles to the Bouth by the Balkan Range. Between the Russian head-quart era and the first barrier lies Roumania, a dependency of the Porte, but a state whose goodwill towards the Czar cannot for an instant be doubted. In times gone by, the passage of the Russian armies through Moldavia and Wallachia has been a matter of considerable difficulty. Ifow the railway uniting Kisheneff with Odessa passes onto Jassy, crossing thePrutli at Skuljane, and thence runs vid Galatz and Bucharest to Giurgevo on the Danube. The possession of this line of communication, wiiich, the friendly attitude of Roumania secured, cannot well be interfered with, even if other Powers besides the Turkish are brought into defensive action, materially alters the condition of things which formerly hampered, delayed, and impeded the plans of the Imperial commanders. Along this line will be rapidly moved the invading army ; by it our supplies "will be drawn, losses repaired, and wounded sent back. On the other hand, if the fortune of war prove adverse, none of the railway material used south of Jassy can be of any avail for pushing into holy Russia. Jassy, Galatz, and Bucharest, are all line towns, possessing great resources and much accommodation. Galatz is especially well situated on the Danube, and will all be no less serviceable for the establishment of depots than for the reception of those who are unable to proceed with the advancing armies. Added to this, few troops will have to be left for the guarding of the line. The Roumanian army of 60,000 men will perform that service, and it will be said that operations will begin only at the Danube. The points most favourable for crossing are Giurgevo, Olenitza, and Kalarash, and if the passage of the Danube at these three points be well preceded by artillery fire, and be simultaneously made, it can hardly fail to prove successful. The Turks have no means of establishing or maintaining communication between Rustchuk, Turtokai, and Silistria —no cavalry, no horses, not even a field telegraph. If or can they cut in between, for means of passage they have none. We may therefore consider it accomplished. One thing alone must always be present to the Russian officers —the maintenance of friendly relations with the Roumanian peasantry. We must not forget how much the Russians lost in 1828, when their generals exacted, at the minimum prices fixed by themselves, the provision from the miserable peasantry, of 250,000 measures of corn, 400,000 loads of hay, 50,000 barrels of brandy, and 23,000 oxen. These they paid for by bills, the acceptance of which history does not record. 16,000 peasants were further requisitioned to make hay in the Danubian valley. It is not impossible that the memory of this error may yet do them harm with their Bulgarian co-religion-ists." Having described how Schumla, the first point to be gained, might fall into the invader's hands or be invested, the lecturer said that " the passage of the Balkans, the great barrier of Turkey, had next to be effected. This formidable mountain range, separating Bulgaria from Roumelia, runs from west to east, gradually diminishing in height from 5000 to 3000 feet, until they abruptly terminate at Cape Emineh, between the valleys of the Kamtschik and Uadir. Von MoltL e says that the difficulty attending the passage of the Balkans lies far more in the paucity and bad state of the roads than upon their height or inaccessibility. The passes, with the single exception of Schibha (which the Sultan traversed in 1836 in a four-horse carriage), are impracticable, or nearly so, for wheels, and are little more than bridle paths. There are seven passages over the Balkans:— 1. Schumla to Karnabat, by Tjalikavak and Dobroil, called the Bogaz Pass, very difficult and narrow, easily defended, and combining fluvial with mountain impediments. 2. Pravadi, by Koprikoi and Jenikoi to Aidos, called the Chenga Pass ; difficult, but successfully used in 1829 by General Rudiger, with the 7th Russian Corps, in nine days. 3. The coast road from Varna to Burgas, taken in 1829 by General Roth, with the 6th Corps. 4. Tinova to Kasinik—commonly called the Schibka Pass—perhaps now the most practicable of all, a road having been made in 1836, and in any case not very difficult or steep, and easy to be forced. 5. Tirnova to Slivno or Islamji—called j the Iron Gate (Demir Kapu) Pass—rery

steep, difficult, and almost unexplored. 6. Tirnova, or Osman Bazar to Kasan, anc' thence to Kama bat; very difficult. 7. Th< Lovatz Pass to Tartar Bazardjik, "which i: almost impassable. We see, therefore, that three of these passes may be utilisec by an invading force. What has beer done before may well be done again, anc I -would bring to your recollection hov different is the Russian army of to-day t( that of 1829. It was then decimated b] disease. Although the burning sun o: noon and the damp cold of midnight wil again work havoc, medical science is in finitely better able to cope with it. Thei there were no mountain batteries. Nov there will be many, and admirably served and mitrailleuses too. Then Moscow was so to speak, the base of operation. Nov it will be the prosperous capital of Ron mania. What the soldiers of Roth anc Rudiger accomplished, in forage cap, linei vest and trousers, greatcoat rolled on righ shoulder, and 10 clays' rations on the left the men of the Grand Duke Nichola: Nicholaievitch ought to accomplish nearly 50 years later. "Having passed the Balkans, thre< roads are open to the invader : —l. Fron Karnabat by Bujuk Derbencl, or the Grand Passage, to Adrianople, and thence !to Tchatal Burgas. 2. Aidos to Kirl Kilissia, and thence also to Tchatal. 3 The coast road. Between these there ii ample means of communication. TJit coast is undefended, and such supplies ai the country does not afford should be obtained from the fleet. The only seriouf obstacle is the defile of Bujuk Derbend, the passage of which is dangerous anc dfficult to a degree, unless, as in 1522, i 1 jbe wholly neglected. In this road musl the main advance be made, and if successful, Adrianople is not likely to offer anj resistance. Thence there is the railwaj to Tc'natal Burgas, where the i unction should be effected with the Aidos corps, and that, I assume, will be the same as is disembarked at Varna and moves on Pravacli. The Burgas corps should, by this time, have reached Micliah, and establish itself firmly across the wooded hills of' the Lesser Balkan. Now the hope of centuries, the claj'-dream of all Muscovy, is well nigh in tight. Now it wi.l either fall or be safe for years. Islam will fight foi very existence—other nations, too, it may be. What the result will be, none can say." With regard to the topographical considerations affecting the defenders, tiie lecturer said that no one could tell what was the strength of the bulk of the Tur- | kish armies which had been moved from the Servian frontier to the Danubian line. " The Seraskier i;as no idea of the number of men on which lie, at any given time or place, can count, what their weapons may be, or any particulars about them. The Commander-in-Chief can form a more proximate, but, at best, only I a rough idea. The same state of blissful ignorance and indifference reigns in the minds of the great majority of the officers. The battalions and almost all the companies are indiscriminately informed. The Turk is a glorious soldier in the hour of danger. His courage is heroic, his discipline perfect, but no Turk lias the faintest notion of organisation. I had some cause in IST-") to think that the utmost resources of the Sublime Porte consisted of 300,000 men. Not less than 25,000 must have been either killed or lost to service by exposure and the incredible hardships to which they had been exposed. Fifty thousand must be scattered in the various garrisons of the empire. Twenty thousand must be about the Montenegrin and Servian frontiers. Fifty thousand have probably not responded to the call to arms, or have been detained at home by sickness. Thirty thousand or more are, I believe, in Asia Minor. Altogether, deducting the extraordinary demands upon the military resources of the Sultan, nothing leads to the belief that there are more than 100,000 Turkish troop.} on the whole Danubian line, including Schumla and Varna, or at the most liberal estimate, about half the number that the Russians will be able to bring to bear. From the Danube to Constantinople, from Nish to Burgas, nothing is ready. The fortresses are tailing daily into greater ruin. They are unimproved with any modern improvement, they are well-nii-h bare of heavy ordnance, and where there is ordnance there is neither shot nor shell. One regiment is armed with this rifle, another with that. Both are unserviceable ; for neither are there cartridges. Provisions are wanting, clothing is lacking, transport there is none. Add to this the terrible state which the troops are in. Egyptians, Ethiopians, natives of Bagdad, fig-pressers of SmjTna, have throughout an unusually severe winter felt the frost and seen the snow, to them unknown before, unprovided, too, with that clothing and nourishment which alone coulcl protect them from the wintry blast, ajicl leave them fit for the coming struggle." Col. Vincent then considered the policy which ought to be pursued, expressing the opinion that " while securing the safety of half their forces in Roumelia, the Turks must oppose the Russians inch by inch, partly to gain time for the artificial defence of the passes and defiles of the capital, partly to enable allies to appear on the scene, partly to exhaust the Russian Treasury, ancl partly to expose the hostile army to the clangers of the variable climate. As to the defence of Constantinople, three plans have been prepared : one by a Royal Engineer of unequalled authority, another by the Englishman, and the third by a German in the service of the Sultan. These three plans all amount to much the same thing —the defence of the line, 25 miles in length, extending from Derkos ancl Buyuk Checknicdji. As Sir John Burgoyne said, months of labour might render this position impregnable by land. As yet, though, not a shovelfull of earth has been turned. If made, it will be vigorously supported by sea, but with what chance of success 1 nobody can gay."