RUSSIAN DESIGNS, PAST AND PRESENT.

Oamaru Mail, Volume I, Issue 328, 12 May 1877, Page 2

RUSSIAN DESIGNS, PAST AND PRESENT.

From an able article in the current number of the Westminster Reviciv, wo extract the following interesting narrative ■ of facts, whicli shows the unchangeable nature of Russian aggression, and the causes of the utter want of faith which r British authorities and statesmen, from ! the Queen and her Ministers downwards, . have in the promises of Russia : ; The wretched condition of European ; Turkey, now, probably, little, if at all, . better than it was before the Crimean war, is, we believe, in a, great measure due to Russian intrigue, incessantly directed to , the destruction of Turkey, and to neglect , on the part of England to exercise over , the Turkish Government control which it was her right an 1 duty to exercise. Placed as Turkey has been, her regeneration would have been miraculous. The decadence whic'i lias steadily progressed was to be expected, and it has now to be determined whether the Crimean War is to prove so much blood and treasure ' wasted, and whether the object whicli France and England fought so hard to s ecure, is so be relinquished without even an effort to retain it. The history of Russian aggression ought to be an instructive one to every other Power. Going back no further the commencement of the present century, wo find her in 1804 pursuing in respect to Servia a course very similar to that which she has recently taken ; until in 180!) Turkey was regularly invaded. Relief came in 1812, in the shape of Napoleon's march to Moscow. During the six years following the Greek Revolution of 1821, Turkey was the scene of massacres and atrocities which led to English interference, and to an alliance in 182G with Russia against Turkey, entered into on the understanding that neither contracting Power should seek any exclusive territorial or commercial advantages. How this engagement was violated by Russia lias been well described in the last ' Edinburgh Review ' (page 561). By a convention extorted from Turkey in < >ctober, 1826, Russia gained the semi-independence of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia ; and op ning the Dardanelles to Russian merchants—changes which "secured to the commercial interests and i-eligious influence of Russia advantages as great as she could have obtained by war." Turkey suffered severely ; she lost Greece, and, for a considerable time, her military power in Asia, as well as in Eu.ope. A little later, after France had joined the alliance, and the Turkish fl. et had been destroyed at Navarino, Russia again invaded Turkey (April, 1828); was only prevented from marching on Constantinople by the threatened action of England ; and, even then, wrung from Turkey the disastrous Peace of Adrianople, which gave to Russia " complete command of the navigable mouths of the Danube," and "the whole eastern coast of tie Black Sea." Thus was Eng'and outwitted, at}d Russia aggrandsed. Such was the result of a close, con.ill, and disinterested alliance with Russia, in the interests of justice and hum mity. Nt xt cane the struggle in 1832 between Turkey *nd own subject, the Pasha of whose successes were cut short by Russia, who assumed the character of the protector of Turkey. This state of things came to an end in 1840, when the allies intervened, and effected the restoration of Syria to the Portj Little more than 10 years Later, Russia was again moving towards Turkey ; her action being this time denounced by all Europe. Lord Palmeraton thus described her proceedings: "The policy and practice of the Russian Government has always, been to push forward its encroachments as fast and far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go ; but-ai to stop and retire when it was <&i"«iv'\vf£h decided resistance, and then to wa'it for the next favour* able opportunity to make another spring

on the vicnm.' In furtherance of this policy, the Russian Government has always had two strings to its bow : moderate language and disinterested professions at St. Petersburg and London ; active agression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions 'succeeded locally, the St. Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait accompli, which it did not intend, but cannot in honour recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof of that the agents have overstepped their instructions." In the summer of 1853. the intention of Rnssia to attack Turkey was evident, and England determined to assist in rppelling the aggression—in defending, not Turkish misrule (then, as now, known to be excessive), but Turkish territory from Russian encroachment. " England acted," wrote the Prince Consort, "in the interests of the European Powers, and of civilisation." The Turks were to be preserved, not for their own value, but as a necessity imposed by the requirements of Europe and of civilisation—a necessity existing to-day perhaps irore Btrongly than it then existed. Then, as now, s'e disclaimed asgressive intentions, while her every act was one of aggression, direct or indirect. On the 25th September the Queen wrote : "It is evident that Russia has deceived us in pretending that she did not aim a* the establishment of any new rurht." Tie Rnssia Minister, N/asselrode. bad at last shown his hand. "He has," said the Prince Consort. " shown Ilia cloven foot, and let the cat out of the bag. . . But how to avoid a European war, for only with the most dishonourable cowardice on the part of the Powers could the demands b° conceded by them which are set up." The same came was played by Rnssia up to the last moment. Between the Vienna note and the Berlin memorandum there is no little similarity. Demands then made find their counterpart in those which were to be enforced had theSumarakoff mission succeeded. Even when the Pnith was crossed sill intention of war was disclaimed. Lord Clarendon wrote : "Thus the Court of St. Petersburg proceeds under the name of peace to obtain all the advantages of war"—an operation which lias again been witnessed during the last few months. In many resp; cts, indeed, history appears to be now repeating itself. Mr. Gladstone see*os now to have acted very much as Lord Aberdeen (with, perhaps, far yreater justification) ac-ed in 1853 action to whic'i the Prince Consort thus referred :—" Aberdeen is quite rig' t, and it is to be honored and applauded for maintaining, as he does, that we must deal with our enemies as honourable men, and deal honourably towards them ; but fiat is no reason why we should think that they are so in fact; t u at is what he does, and maintains that it is right to do so." All that is now known in respect to the extremely beneficial influence which Prince Albert exercised on important affairs of stat», points fo the probability that, had he lived, some of the questional e Liberal'l J-'u-eign policy of late years would hare been avoided. He clearly saw that a policy of selfish isolation is likely to recoil upon England, whatever may be h... insular advantages. Already the-existing state of Europe threatens embarrassment, and perhaps danger, to England, arising in a great measure from the refusal to act upon this principle.