PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9796, 20 October 1917, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The casualty lists are very large. It is the aftermath of battle. Details coming in day after day show how they wore incurred. . The last of these, published this morning, shows the gallantry of the New Zealanders at the attack of the Bellevue Hill and redoubt, on the outskirts of Passchendaelc. It shows also their terrible losses. Moreover, it shows clearly the absolute hopelessness of the task entrusted to them. The last is the main point. Its strength lies in the fact that the defences were untouched, and in the almost impassible heaviness of the ground to he covered, a morass aggravated by heavy rain. Now, at this stage of the campaign, which has developed now tactics of attack, the mention of untouched defences in front of aittaefcing infantry is significant. In the beginning the theory was that nothing should be loft undestroyod, to say nothing of untouched. The theory was, in fact, that without that condition, infantry attack was not war but murder. At Nenve Ohapello the theory was tested, for where the defences were destroyed the infantry triumphed, and where the defences remained solid the infantry underwent massacre. In the great battle of Loos the test was more complete, for most of the defences remained solid, and most of the infantry attacks failed. The result was that nothing was again attempted against the enemy’s lines until our artillery power had been many times multiplied.

When, aftor this multiplication, tho Somme drive opened, tho theory was again tested. On the left the defences stood, and the British attack there was disastrous; whereas on the centre and right the defences were destroyed and the attack succeeded. Further practice, right through the Soinmo, guided by this experience, brought the attack nearer perfection. Arras and Bulleoourt and Lens further improved it, and Massines witnessed absolute

perfection, the enemy not able to stand a day, and forced to take a long breath before he countered, only, however, to be knocked out. quickly. 'The other thrusts worward went well in this perfection, and it seemed as if nothing could disturb again the combined operation of a groat attack. The enemy endorsed that view by changing his defence tactics several times, and he did so without any appreciate of foot. Taeroforc, when a great attach is launched against untouched defences of concrete redoubt and barbed wire, the account of it startles every rcadoi It brings into prominence the tact that a.n attack has been made under the old conditions forbidden _by theory und gradually made impossible by practice , that the attack fared as badly as if Ncuvo Ohapclle and Loos had never been and the Somme, Arras, Lens, and Mossmos had been mere dreams.

How was this? Let us grant the imperative need for immediate assault —a concession unnecessary considering the nature of the system of attack developing during the year of war, a system deliberate, patiently taking its time, regardless of speed, beat on eventual success by steady, repeated blows aiming at small objectives. But let us grant the urgency of speed on this occasion, say the urgency of acquiring the ridge before the weather made ""the task impossible—let u« do so for argument’s sake. Even then tho conditions of attack must bo favourable. for mere urgency will not enable any troops to take untouched defences. There was a great bombardment before the infantry attack. There were mists and clouds. Probably these prevented observation. Lf so, the commanders had no knowledge of the effects of the bombardment.

There was a barrage—the artillery side of the artillery and infantry cooperation system improved during the Somme campaign, improved in the Arras battles, and was found perfect at Messines and the subsequent advances on Eonnobeke and Langemarck, and in a measure good at Gravenstafel. Why did it fail before Passchendaele ? Because the morass underfoot made impossible tho co-operation of the infantry with the artillery barrage. _ The barrage is mechanical, moving like a machine which, once started, must go on at the pace set. So long as tho ground is good the infantry can keep pace with tho moving barrage, and, keeping up with it, is ready, as noon as the barrage leaps over the trenchline, to leap into it. When the ground is heavy the infantry cannot keep pace, and, being loft by the barrage as it passes the trenches, finds itself unprotected against heavy fire of ma-chine-guns and rifles, to say nothing of artillery.

Ji the defences are intact, when this severance leaves the infantry in the open, unprotected, the situation is hopeless.

Now, the commander of the assault knew that the ground was terribly heavy. By this time the experiences of this region ought to have enabled him to gauge tli« difficulty of tho infantry in keeping pace with the barrage. At the same time, he did not know—we assume he did not for lack of effective observance ‘by the mist, low clouds, and the pelting rain—that the defences were destroyed. He did not know, therefore, whether the essential condition of successful infantry attack had been secured. The position, them, is that he ought to have been doubtful of the t w o essentials, the infantry and artillery co-operation, and the destruction of tho enemy’s defences. Clearly the extreme hazard of launching an attack under such circumstances; must have been apparent to him. Wo do not refer to the commander of this .particular section of the assault—we refer to the general commanding the whole line of assault, whose business it is to know the conditions before each section of it. And we assume that he was informed of ail the conditions as far as information was possible.

Tile question really, then, is, did he know these conditions? If he did, he ought to have deferred the whole attack. If he did not, the staff work must have been bad, upon which he depended. It is quite clear that the attack ought not 'to have been made, that, in fact,, somewhere there was sufficient knowledge to have made its postponement imperative- The responsibility for its appalling failure rests between the commanding general and the staff. In view of the obvious conditions and the unfortunate result, it may bo regarded as certain that the question of responsibility will be closely investigated, and the investigation followed shortly by drastic decision. The governing consideration is that never again should troops be sent forward under conditions which commonsense had shown to be impossible two years ago, and skilful experiment has in the interval discovered can be avoided.

The gallantry of the troops under the conditions they had to face is simply amazing. Quo feels that their persistence in maintaining the assault against such odds was almost humau. Our pride rises to enthusiasm. We cannot cease our great wonder at that great, heroic, hopelessly pathetic struggle before the uncut wire and the concrete protected machine-guns. But those feelings cannot change our opin. ion that a groat blunder has been committed, and that a recurrence should be made impossible.

The report of Sir Douglas Haig is of vigorous artillery on both sides. It is just like the reports that preceded the opening of this third battle of Ypres. On that occasion it turned out that both sides were prepared to attack and did attack. Then the British General got his blow in, and made it overwhelming notwithstanding that the enemy had actually launched his assault. If He repeats that performance after these artdlloryings it will not bo surprising.