PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9793, 17 October 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The invasion of Osel Island, in the Gulf of Riga, continues without decision. Tito Russians claim that they command tho entrance to tho Gulf <tf Riga with the long-range guns they have on the island. Tho enemy claim-, that they have occupied tho southern coast and driven the Russians towards tho south-east corner, towards a mole connecting with an island, and imply that they may bo overtaken heloro they can get over. The naval references disclose no fleet action. Ihe Russians merely state that they Have maintained their command of the strait between Osel and Dago Islands. Their reference makes no mention ot tho larger units of their Baltic 1 loot, and its terms seem only to include light craft. The enemy confines Ins reference to shipping to the statement that it silenced the land batteries, but ho does not deny that tho Russians havo kept command of the northern strait. That implies either that the water is not deep enough for his big ships (tho Dreadnoughts, reported yesterday), or that his naval force does not comprise the Dreadnoughts, which could have driven off the Russian patrol vessels. This introduces an clement of mystery which is deepened by the Russian claim of the ascendancy of their large guns. About the initial consideration—the command of the sea—to which we referred yesterday, wo have loss light to-day instead of more, as we expected, except that doubts now arise about the presence of tho Russian first-class ships. There is a statement to-day that the enemy intends to threaten a landing in the Aland Islands, near the Gulf of Finland, but it does not wear the appearance of anything but a rumour, a disease which these seas have been very much subject to during the whole war.

The latest message from Petrograd shows that tho Baltic Fleet of tom has not yet appeared. on the sceneThe message only says that the flee is recovering from its insubmdlnarion quicker than the army; but does not go further than the opamon that at mav fight.” In tho meantime, the German ships, whatever they may be, are engaged with the Russian patrol squadron. Tho message lifts the veil fully from the mutiny, which was located by the messages at Kronstadt, shortly after the outbreak of the Revolution. The dot-ails are startling, tolling of wholesale murders of admirals and various officers. Tho smaller ships were icebound, and the agitators had a free hand. The mutiny was ostensibly in revenge for the courtmartial after the Japanese war, whack by punishing officers who were deter:mined, to end the scandals of nap management, had put an end to the hopes of tho navy that reform would come in consequence of the revelations of inefficiency at the battle of TsusJuma. The fleet recovered from tins entry of blood —'the revelation is made to-day to a world taught to believe that the Kronstadt affair was harmless, and had been easily suppressed and took part in the'repulse of an attempt by ships of the High Sea Fleet to get into Riga Bay by the Irben channel. This is the only channel into the bay, and lies between the Swords Promontory of Osel Island and the North Cape of the Riga coast. The upshot of to-day's story is that the fleet’s loyalty is doubtful.

Osel Island is large. 45 miles by about 30, and commodious. It has a papulation of aibout 60,000, of which 4000 comprise the population of Arensburg. on the south-east coast, which the Russians admit to be in the hands of tho enemy. The climate is described as appreciably warmer than the climate of the mainland of Livonia. Considering that a campaign in Livonia against Petrograd is most difficult in the winter, and the fact that the immediate prosecution of such a campaign would he better served by landing troops in Riga or bringing them up by land from the south, tho movement being based on Riga, which the enemy hold with its railway facilities,_ and bearing in mind the assertion in the Finland rumour, the German objective In the Osel campaign must be regarded as in all probability merely intended to secure a footing for operations in the spring. Whatever might bo the ultimate intention with regard to a land campaign in Livonia, against Petrograd, based on a port of the mainland yet to be acquired, the possession of Osel would certainly give the enemy an advantage in the command of tho upper Baltic, when the navigation clears after the winter. With Gael in their hands, and the Aland Islands (if the above rumour has any foundation) the enemy would hold naval bases on each side of tho entrance to the Gulf of Finland.

The advantage could only be of use to him in view of the probabilities of next spring, which are against the possibility of a German advance by Livonia against Petrograd—for the purpose of cooping up tho Russian Fleet in the Gulf of Finland. That, however, would bo subject to several contingencies. The Russian Baltic Fleet might elect to fight its way out, and it might be possible by that time for the British and American Fleets to co-operate at the other end of the Baltic, either by sending a strong squadron forward, or by limiting the strength the enemy could oppose to the operations of the Russian. Fleet.

For the present, however, the main advantage of the capture of Osel Island, if completed, will be political—a success being an asset at all times, and more particularly at a moment when the enemy is anxious to get a peace negotiation started, or to influence agitation in that direction.

Some further details of the mutiny in his fleet are to hand, which show that the long inaction to which it has been, with one exception, condemned for three years, has wrought tho mischief that, always attends inaction in forces kept ready for fighting which do nothing. The British Fleet, on tho other hand, has been healthy the whole of this time by the activities of its blockade work, which observers have described as exceptionally ardu-

ous. The enemy, on the contrary, spent most of his time at his moorings behind i.is minefields and under his guns. The one exception for him was the battle of Jutland, and this, according to the account wo hav© today from Amsterdam, filled the men with a desperate dcuire to have a decisive battle, or, failing that, peace. Idleness brought discontent, and political propaganda, encouraged, no doubt, by a feeling of contempt for the authorities, who kept up an incessant brag, but never attempted anything. In the midst of this came shortage of food and inferiority in its quality, and on top of that the Russian Revolution, which put the match to tho powder. Tho mutiny failed, chiefly bv tho stupidity of the mutineers in throwing their ammunition overboard, depriving themselves of tho power of resistance. The mention of the harsh discipline and bad food records the groat mutiny of the British Fleet at tho Xorc during tho critical year 1797, which was unquestionably due to these causes. But there was uo revolutionary propaganda in tho ships as in this German case. Moreover, there was a fresh tradition of great victories at sea, which showed, at all events, that the Fleet authorities .preferred fighting to boasting, and i lever lost any opportunity for fighting, jfhe conditions of the British, Fleet v'hich mutinied at the Noro were therof< ire very different from those of tho G trman ships which mutinied at Wilhe imshaven, and had evidently sympathisers all through the Fleet. In tho British instance the Fleet ended by fighting magnificently, and behaving wit It the most trustworthy loyalty. In the German instance tho possibility of suclt an end to the mutinecriug will hav,t to bo discounted by the difference in the conditions, of which tho worst is tije Revolutionary propaganda. Tho men may, according to that precedent, fight* again all right, but that can only be dittemiined when they get tho order to ci mie out. That matter rests with tho High Command.

The' West front sends no word of m-o-vemient, tells only of tho artillery which growls before great events, and is growling along both the British front linom tho sea to Dio Lys, the French cm the Aisne, Champagne and Vordun .sectors. Tho keynote to tbo campaign is sounded by Lord Northcliffo in a statement at Washington, who, spanking as British Commissioner —an offiber of very high authority likely to know something of things behind Die scenes—has informed an interviewer that Sir Douglas Haig’s smashing blows will -continue, no Matter what the weather nvay be, giving the enoniv no rest. HiMtce we have these artillery growls hilling in time all along the fighting lino until the weather clears and the ground dries. The enemy knows whaß is before him, and therefore keeps battering hard at the French fromt, in- the hope of crippling tho French power before he has to give way before l>he smashing blows to the north. His attentions to the French line are the Iceynote of his strategy. Ho wants by budding the French line to secure for Ii is own northern line an unhampered retreat. When that lino retreats to_ tibe now position in tho rear, he will better manage the withdrawal of his southern line to the positions prepared for it. The French, on the-ir side told grimly on. hoping to give tho British handsome support when the en-omy gives way before their smashing bioiVs. The difference between the Allied strategy and the enemy’s may be put succinctly thus: They want to force’ bioth his lines to go at oncei • whereas ho is desperately anxious for “one at a time, gentlemen,” as the PVM't said when tho rooks were pecking ad his feathers. That the wed ther has settled fine we have to-day* on th© authority of our official correspondent, hut when tho ground will lie fit for further work no man can at this moment tell with any certainty. How hideously bad that ground vms during this last battle, as well -ats in tho battle “before it, when the Nivw Zealanders captured tho GravensiiaJel ridge, this correspondent reminds us. The heroism of the New Zealanders in both, and particularly in th«, second, in whicli the conditions were worse, he brings very vividly befo:fe us. That any troops should havei “stuck it” as ours did. under such circumstances is amazing. That tile troops who d‘U “stick it” wore Nev» Zealanders makes us all proud. And’ as for the individual stories and Die readiness and competency shown by officers and non* commissioned officers imtak.ng up the load when their seniors fell, that is a great proof of tho splendid discipline our forces have nttained, and the secret of their initiative, the_ quality which has taken them so far into tho confidence of tho General and the good opinion of thoir com rades of Chp British Army and theiir Allies of tho French. “Remombeir Gallipoli," said the brigadier to a call for reinforcements. Tho phrase will live for ever. Gallipoli! Where the ci-ily possible reinforcement was a haul of fish from the sea close behind th-a fighting. And they were fighting their* way up a hill in the face of artillery, machine-guns, and snipers; iu«t as at Gallipoli, only worse. That is why tha t great answer will live for ever. It was a truly Anzac reply. • • •

These machine-guns, cion Crete turrets, and uncut wire, suggest a reflection. In the first place, the command of the Passchendaele Bidg;e, which the chorus of correspondents hns heen assuring us was so complete after the capture of Broodseinde aud Gravenstafcl, so dreaded by the desperately resisting enemy, so powerful ias to have placed Passchendaele at this mercy of our guns —th it, command tuims out to have been overstated, if indeed it existed at all. In fact, it could not have existed. “Remember Gallipoli 1 1” proves that the enemy's defences vUere not commanded. In the second place, the artillery preparation was qui'.hs inadequate. Our men had to take untouched “pill boxes” behind uncut noire. The first deceived the public, but tl no brave soldiery of the attack knew ah' about it and' pressed on regardless <Q f the Flanders mud and bogs. The second requires explanation. At this period of the perfect organisation of advance tactics we have a right to knorr what happened. Tho probable explanation is that the thick atmosphere deprived the gunners of the essential aeroplane direction, and the observers of the power of estimating the effects Of the firing, while tho had weather made haste imperative for the attack. The explanation in that case is that we had a taste of the had luck which is always one of the possibilities of war. •• • ♦

In consequence we did not get all onr objectives, and wo had to mliike superhuman efforts to hold what we aid get, and to bring out our wounded From tho hideous ground we were fenced to abandon. And here the qualities of the soldiery came into play in superlative fashion, in which display our

boys were, we are proud to be able to say, on the authority we publish this morning, very conspicuous. Look at Uio readiness of the men volunteering tor stretcher-bearer duty! Look at the indignation that carried them away on ■seeing the Rod Cross men shot down deliberately! Look at the stern measures thov adopted with prompt courage and skill to protect their men and punish the dastardly enemy! Then wo see those gunners and drivers bringing up their guns and stores through the awful rand of swamp and shell-hole; to hold the conquered ground against all possible efforts of the determined, well-equipped, unbroken enemy. It was magnificent, and it was war—war of the very best.

We must be prepared for a. great casualty list, and we must be brave when it comes, as brave as the gallant men who neither faltered nor flinched. It was the hardest battle otir men have ever fought, and such battles leave their irnvireas deep in the hearts of cations; deeper now' than over before in history, for now it is a war of nations. The heart of our people must brave itself now with fortitude, resignation, and pride. Her brave men have done their duty. They have upheld a great tradition. They have fallen in a great cause. They nave deserved well, for they have been good and faithful servants.