PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9792, 16 October 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Further details of the operations in the Gulf of Riga show that these islands are not captured. In fact the island of Dago was only subjected to a demonstration. The landing was effected on Osel Island, the larger of the two, after some hard fighting between the enemy ships and the shore batteries; and the northern and eastern portions of the island were occupied. Tho Russians report that they are being pressed back in the southern-eastern and this agrees with the enemy report. To cover the landing the enemy used battleships, and he made at the same time a diversion by sending a squadron to attack tho smaller island (Dago) to the north. This diversion is called a demonstration by the Russians, though it landed a detachment after an artillery fight in which the enemy lost several light vessels, and wiped out the shore batteries. Tho detachment was unable to maintain itself and was forced to re-embark. While this was going on tho landing, on. Osel wa,s effected with the above result with the driving of the Russians into the south-east corner.

The dav after the landing (tho landing was on Saturday) the Russian ships took a hand, having apparently arrived too late for the battle of Saturday and the landing, and kept the space between Dago and Osel clear. Their immediate objective is probably to help the Russians who hold the south-east-ern corner. They succeeded in this so far as to prevent the heavy naval forces of the enmv co-operating with->.his land army. If" they can drive the naval forces off the fate of tbo troops landed on the island will bo sealed. These naval forces of the enemy had enabled large disembarkations to be effected on Saturday. The whole of the enemy’s naval force is given in' the Russian account as 8 Dreadnoughts, 12 Light cruisers, 40 Destroyers. 39 Mine-sweepers. Some of these were in the operation against Dago, some in the operation against the island Moe.m, mentioned to-day for the first time, some no doubt doing covering work, and the bulk protecting the landing. The Russian fleet has not been mentioned in the matter except that Kerenskv has urged it to do its duty, and that “our ships kent the enemy from entering the waters” between the two islands. Now what were these “our ships?” They may have been tbo smaller craft of the Russian Navy which have been the only representatives 0 f the Russian Fleet in the Gulf of Riga for some time past. Naturallv the first thing these would do under the circumstances would be to stop the enemy’s squadron from cooperating in tho invasion of Osel by

occupying tho intervening water. If. on the other hand, these arc Russian battleships. they would have entered tho Gulf of Riga from the Baltic by the channel between Dago and the mainland, and rounded Dago into the strait between Dago and Osel. Now only the big ships of the Fleet could have stopped the big ships of tho enemy from entering the strait to help the advancing invasion. The destroyers of the Riga patrol would have been brushed off very quickly. It follows that the Russian ships in the strait are battleships of the Baltic Fleet. It is to this force that Kerensky has cried urgently to do its duty. The island of Osel has by no moans, therefore, been captured and there may be a great naval battle before the question of its possession is settled.

It is possible that the enemy may have another Largo squadron making for the Gulf of Finland. Has he? Is h© intending t>o attack Reval on kwo sides, by land from some port on the main near the R-iga islands Hapsal was mentioned yesterday a dozen miles north of Dago—and by the Gulf of Finland? The answer to tho question is known to the Russian command, not to us in those far countries. Upon’ that information depends the number of ships detaohed by the Russian Admiral to restore matters at Osel. As no mention has been made of any direct attempt on the Gulf of Finland, and as the mutiny in tho German Navy restricts the number of ships that can be used for large expeditions, and as the need for keeping a strong force in tho North Sea still further restricts tho numbers, it is probable that tho big squadron, at Osel is the only one to be reckoned with by the Russian fleet. This conclusion, in fact, is confirmed apparently by .the large numbers of dosfcroyeiw and mine-sweepers with it. The Russian fleet, therefore, ought to be able, if the men are all right, to give a very good account of the eight battleships, tho twelve cruisers, and tho light craft That is the initial point of,-the whole of this episode.

Russian experts are quoted a-s saying that though they do not regard this as a serious menace to Petrogrod, they do not underrate the seriousness of the movement. They, of course, know more about the fighting capacity—or will—-of the Russian fleet. They know, therefore, more than anyone else of the initial point to bo regarded in the consideration of the matter. As far as we can see, however, the Russian Baltic Fleet ought to end the expedition very soon by driving off the enemy’s squadron and capturing the division, or two divisions, landed at Osel, before they can effect a landing on the mainland, for Which they must have fleet p-otec-tion—'the protection, in fact, of the fleet which “our ships” prevented from entering the strait between Osel and Dago to the north of Osel. Moreover, as Dago is only a few miles from Hapsal, on tho mainland (sixty miles by rail from Reval on ihe Gulf of Finland, 200 miles fiom Petrograd), and as tho attack on Dago jemo to nothing—no matter for what reason—the nearest port open for a landing on the mainland from Osel Island is Perwan, thirty miles distant. The object of landing there would He to outflank the defence, which has so far proved too stubborn for the enemy's forces moving from Riga on Pskoff. Once landed at Perwan and moved sixty ■miles south to the Aa river these new troops would bo in action against the defence, giving to the attack whatever value of numbers they possess. “One or two divisions,” as reported yesterday, would nob add much weight to the advance. But before that weight can get to Perwan, sixty miles from the Aa river, it has to cover thirty miles of water in presence of the Russian Baltic Fleet. That is if that fleet ■has not driven off the enemy’s cooperating ships and forbidden the invaders a landing until they come ■back—say, about the Greek Kalends.

The advance by Perwan on the Pskoff line seems an absurd idea, looked at in this way. Moreover, as these divisions (or one) could easily have been either at Riga or brought up from Libau, through Mitau, the question rises; Why land them at Osel or Dago? To ask these questions just now is bootless. The immediate question of interest is the question of the fleets. The land campaign is entirely unaffected for the moment. The moment belongs to the fleets. Will the Russians and Germans have a great battle? When that question has been answered it will be time to consider the chances of the land campaign. For the moment —if the staunchness of the Russian Baltic Fleet is certain—those German troops on the island of Osel are of no more importance than n their battalions were so many rows of limpets on the rocks looking towards Perwan.

' The most probable explanation of this apparently useless move is one suggested by the naval mutiny. Is it passible that the enemy, who has not man-power enough for any large expedition, has arranged this show that ho might use a number of carefully-select-ed ships with crews reinforced bv loyal men to make the world believe that after; alt the mutiny wes nothing, and moreover, has been quite stamped out —■and that please note, without any of that dreadful ruthlessness supposed to be the spirit of the grandest and most glorious, most never-to-be-sufficiently-adnared, revered and imitated service which is of the art military, tho mechanical preparation, etc., and so forth ? Magnificent—but not war; and the only possible explanation. . . . What! Begin an attack on Petrograd at nearly 300 miles in mid-October ! Tell —it to the horse marines—if they have hot mutinied.

The mutiny has been too much for the Admiral at the head, and apparently also for Dr Michaelis, and PanGermanism, which has had to pause in its career of stupid defiance of the whole world to find itself confronted once more not with the Independent Socialists, but that strange Reichstag majority whose substance is like the colour of the chameleon —always changing, one day solid ard firm, another zoneless a?id pulpy. Tlitherte the infallible remedy which always turned the substance into pulfi, has been to appoint a new Chancellor, not the Chancellor which the substance demands and the pulp accepts. The substance demands the Foreign Minister to be Chancellor. The Pan-Uer-mans know that as soon as M.chaehs is withdrawn the substance l will necome pulp, and they will offer it to the harmless nobleman who nowdoea their puppeting as Bavarian Prime Minister. These are the people who expect an outraged world to enter into treaties of peace with them, they will find that it will take more to bring that about than shaking a selected and propped-up branch of their rotten

navy in the face of the world. They will find, in short, that the substance of the outer world has not got the chameleon faculty which distinguishes their own wretched imitation of Jt’arliamcntary government. It is bad luck for these clumsy swashbucklers that the secret of the Mexican treachery of Zimmermann has been divulged. It turns out that the documents were found in Bernstortr’s luggage at Halifax, where the British officials overhauled his papers, as they had a perfect right to, and as ho knew very well, for ho had hidden them in cargo. This gave the full official imprint to the gross treachery which, without it, the TJnitcd States Government was loth to believe in. The responsibility for America’s intervention is thus sheeted home more than over to the Pan-German clique that, having plunged the world into war, is trying to get out with full time secured and opportunity for a renewal of their Satanic aggression.

This treachery turned on Japan, and was at once' repudiated, of courseJapan, should be flattered at the evidence of the high opinion held of her power in the world. Especially so as another proof is give® to-day by Russia. It turns out that when the Russian army failed through the idiocy of the Soldiers’ and Workers’ Council, which allowed the reptile propaganda to kill discipline by forging its name to its own. proclamations, the Revolutionary Government asked Japan to send an army. Japan diplomatically said that the difficulty of mobilising was far too great for the purpose. A transparent excuse, but just as effective as the blunt refusal of France and America to send munitions to people incapable of using them. Today we learn that the extremists are down and out in Petrograd; that the moderates have got complete command ; and we can gather that to be the reason why the Government has become stable, and that politics have been dropped to allow of the national concentration on the war. At this moment General Alexieff gives it as bis opinion that those Japanese troops will come, having overcome the mobilisation trouble. Ought he not to have added that the munitions will come from America and Franco ? Hardly; the bluntness of these two Governments did not give him the same opportunity as the Japanese finesse. Nevertheless, it is probable that the munitions will come before the Japanese armies, which, when the munitions come, will not be wanted to help the enormous man-power of Russia. Perhaps that is all what General Alexieff wanted to convey by bsis expression of opinion.

From the West front -we have details showing the terrible character of an advance in the mud of Flanders which deprives the line of continuity, and prevents the barrage being followed guickly enough to fall on the trenches eforo the machine-gunners and snipers get to work. The description Mr Gibbs gives of the advance of the Anzacs, which had to be stopped by the generals, is one of the most terrible pictures of -war we have yet bad. Also is it a great tribute to the magnificent heroism of the troops. Raids, and heavy artillery work on both sides along the whole front comprise the war work of the day.