PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9791, 15 October 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

As seemed certain at last writing, the British have struck again in Flanders, The enemy as Usual has given a false idea of the locality. But this time he has surpassed all previous fabrications. Hitherto he has been content to include much ground on each side of the advance, suggesting, of course, that numbers of places have been held by his heroic resistance, which were not attacked at all. But this time he seems to have transplanted the front of tho attack bodily to tho southward. The artillery, ho says, increased suddenly to drumfire from the Y’pres-Monin road to the Lys, after which now abbacies began on a wide sector. The natural inference is that these attacks were delivered beyond the Menin road and the Lys, a distance of about five miles. The British General says he attacked north-east of Ypros, which is not in the direction indicated, or rather suggested, by the enemy. The United Press Association is more definite, reporting the attack as beginning at the big Houthoulst Wood and continuing south (passing close in front of Passchondaole) for eight miles, a width which would give the southern point of the advancing due somewhere well to the east and south of Broodseinde.

The German way of putting it, which carries the sector of attack some miles south of this last point, will induce tiie Teutonic mind, seeing no mention in British reports of captures south of the Alenin road to conclude that the British have had a heavy check. There is, however, an alternative explanation. The British General, who invariably makes his preliminary oombardmont far broader than his infantry attack on purpose to puzzle the enemy to determine tho point to be attacked and preparing his resistance accordingly, may have ordered the drumfire on the sector defined by the enemy’s bulletin, to deceive him. The enemy would conclude that tho heavy infantry attack was going to be delivered south of the Alenin road, and would not remove any of his men to help in tho reception of the attack further north, only to find when the attack had fallen that he was too late. Against this alternative explanation of the enemy’s-bulletin—-which practically Is an admission that he was taken oy surprise—we have to consider that a great attack south of tho Alenin road ought not to have been regarded as likely, for in the British- strategy as it is now developing there it would be premature.

When tho British captured the Messines Ridge on June 7th some of tho military critics thought that the command given over the plain of Lille was complete. They pointed out that Lille and Tourcoing were so heavily menaced .that Lille, the only possible pivot for an enemy’s retreat from Franco and Belgium, was in immediate danger because tho troops on the plain were on ground quite untenable. But the British General’s subsequent tactics showed that he thought otherwise. Ho attacked not in the plain, blit along the continuation of the Wytsohaete-Alessines ridge, and extended his pressure to the _ Passchendaele ridge, which he is still attacking. It was a fair conclusion that he regarded these ridge® as necessary to the complete command of the Lille plain. An attack south of the Alenin road, from the Oostaverne-Warneton line, on tho enemy in the plain, would be out of the question, the General having indicated his determination to capture the ridges which prolong the Messincs ridge into the plain. On tho whole, we ought to regard the enemy’s bulletin as a fabrication, intended to convey tho idea of “We were attacked on a five-mile front as usual, and wo repulsed the enemy, who for once did not gain an inch.” Tno Teutonic mind would he told in due course that- “our defence under the eye of' the great Hindenhurg has improved in a surprising manner.”

The fact that tho French did not toko part in the advance seems to show that their line of attack is on the north flank of the big wood, the direct assault being reserved for the British battalions. The object, then, apparently is to get the attacking line well- forward in the plain north-west of the ridges, with its flanks in possession of the big wood on one side and of the Pas-chendaele ridge on the other, before starting the northern assault to sweep the enemy off the coast. Thus forward, it would be m a position to harass seriously the retreat of the enemy’s right wing from tho coast country. It would also be able to operate with effect against the whole line of his retreat pivoting on Lille. The only obstacle to that part of such programme is the enemy’s hold of the eastern corner of the plateau of the Ypres ridge above Gheluvelt. But with the rest of the ridges in his hands, the British General would have no more ■ difficulty m pushing the enemy off than a man has in brushing a fly off his sleeve. With these ridges in his hands and his line, thrown forward beyond the big Houthoulst Wood, the British General will have it in his power to deal a crushing blow at the retiring enemy on a front of between twenty and thirty miles.

There is no difficulty about such a width of attack, for the battle of

Arras was opened on a fiftv-milo front from nho neighbourhood of Lens right to St. Quentin —the greatest battle, M. Belloc said, in British military history—and the French advance which followed a week later covered a width of twonty-fivo miles. A\ e can then realise the strength which the British General has wherowitn >o strike, and we can guess what sort of a blow ho will strike from the position ho is now winning when the dash forward of his extreme left pushes tho enemy’s right off tho coast. • • • As to the gaining of this commanding position from which to strike such a blow at practically the whole front of the retreating enemy as far as Lille, with his task complicated by the driving in of his right wing fi'Oin the coast, we have an indication in Routes message, published this morning Cabling from headquarters, this always reliable correspondent reports jn these terms;— We have driven the Germans out of practically the whole depth of their defensive front over a width of several thousaiyi yards. The result is that the Gormans must now oppose us, more than on any previous occasion since tho first battle of Ypres, with flesh and blood instead of dug-outs, deop trenches, and concrete redoubts. This looks as if in this sector tho long, weary siege war is about to give place to open battle. The enemy said that Hindonburg left the Somme in order to get more elbow-room for open battle, and his newspapers declared that in open battle the German troops would bo superior to anything chat could be brought against them. The enemy is very near his wish for tho open, with the British army poised, to bo hurled upon him tho moment he moves. He may bo assured of elbow-room. But perhaps ho may want more foot-room.

Reuter tells us that the British barrage on this occasion was more terrible than ever, ■ and suggests that the enemy is short of ammunition lor his guns, which certainly were overmatched in the battle, as usual. Taken by itself, a collection of enemy orders, failing into our hands, inculcating the economy of ammunition, is nothing, because economy is insisted upon in every army in these days, when the transport requirements are so vast, and the weather plays havoc with Flemish roads. But the other signs establish an inferiority of artillery, at all events of the guns of position, which is not encouraging to Fritz on the eve of a retreat across the open _ with British and French veteran armies poised for a twenty or thirty mile blow.

It has been noted that the enemy •has developed a 0-3 gun for heavy work in the field. It has been described as a very accurate, powerful gun, of great mobility, and likely to be very formidable in open_warfare, for which it was specially designed. It may, however, be doubted whether this mobility has been put to such test as awaits in the mud of Flanders. At the same time we may be sure that the British output of guns has given us something quite capable of dealing with the new German arm. The presence of cavalry in very large armies shows that the Allies wore expecting open war, and we can safely conclude that they have prepared everything necessary.

If he has advantages of this nature, the enemy has also disadvantages. First his reserves are reduced to ins 1919 class and his hospital returns — if the information supplied to M. -Bello o by the British and French Headquarters is correct. Then his men are weary of the constant pounding of superior artillery, which never gives them a-ny rest. He has lost not less than a third of a million since the offensive opened on him at Arras, and he has in the last five battles proved his inability to counter in time to give him hope, and on each occasion his losses are very heavy. • Moreover, Ins expedient of using specially trained troops for attack has proved disastrous, for tho repeated failure of these, as well as of the various corps d’ehte— Guards, Brandenhurgers, Bavarians has very seriously discouraged tho bulk of his forces. That is the penalty ot the selective system, for, when the pick of the basket has failed, faie balance lies down.

These considerations are not fanciful. Their conclusion is confirmed by the famous German correspondent to-day. Herr Wegener, war correspondent ot the “Cologne Gazette,’’ draws a great picture of the vast British armies, tells how they fill all Belgium with an enormous armed camp, speaks with fine appreciation (we might almost say bated breath) of their efficiency, their equipment, their transport, and the masses of their air men. As for their weapons and their drumfire _ tactics, ‘‘what German soldiers endure is beyond description.” This of an army which is about to retreat over the open plains of Flanders, with superior British and French armies, more numerous, better seasoned, and hotter armed, poised ready to fall on their linos with crushing effect. As the day for the allegedly longed-for open warfare approaches, the enemy’s public is being prepared for something sinister.

The attack, after capturing important ground, was prevented by the bad weather and the consequent state of the ground from gaining all its objectives, the General deciding to make no further progress. The enemy’s infantry fought better than usual and his artillery work has been the most formidable our men have ever encountered. Hence the fighting was very hard. Nevertheless they advanced, taking many defended localities, fortified farms and woods and strongly concreted points. The most territory gained was north of Pbelcapelle, and a footing was held in the Passohendaele village, on the slopes of the Passohendaele ridge. It is important that the enemy admits these two penetrations. His method of reporting enables him to afford the admission, because it suggests that a vast extent of ground elsewhere (which was really not attacked at all) remained in his hands after desperate fighting. That the fighting was desperate on the whole line of attack all accounts agree. It looks like the last fierce struggle to avoid the humiliation and disaster of a retreat.

There ia an important development in the attack, in spite of the . check from the weather. The Navy is taking a hand, an official report announcing that British warships are shelling the enemy’s positions on the Belgian coast. This looks like the preliminary

to the advance of the extreme left ot the Allied line along the coast country to drive in the enemy’s right. If that Is the case, wo may look for a vigorous renewal of the assault, on the ridge and the wood country the moment the ground dries up sufficiently. On the French front tho enemy has made desperate attacks on the french lines on tho Aiene plateau and tne high ground in the Champagne sector. The purpose is The holds two sides of a salient. Il the lino on tho north and south part ot tho salient gives way before the British, it is of the last importance to him to hold the French back on the east and west part of the salient, tor the simultaneous retreat of both would be disastrous. It is now evident that when tho enemy retreats m Flanders, the- British General can launch thrusts at Lens, on the Scarpc, and on several points towards t>t. Quentin. Tito whole of the north and south salient will bo strained, and a general retreat may be forced throughout its length. In that case a general assault along the whole o tho cast and west line of the sahen fay tho French armies is probable, after the manner ot their successful assault in A P r (after the battle of Arras) from commanding positions that assault gave them, which they have smeo gradually extended by hard fighting, would ho a very serious thing indeed for tho enemy. Hence the renewal reported to-day of his desperate tempts to throw back tho who' o French lino as far as Verdun. These wore again repelled, and the enemy still faces his danger. If the enemy’s aortihorn lino gives under the hammer blows of the British, the French will be sure to strike a tremendous blow at the whole of his southern lino. If they succeed the whole of the German armies of the West will be in dire peril. The American troops, it this blow is given, will probably take a hand. They are said to be between 100,000 and 200,000.

Tbs. Russian news is all military, which is a good sign of political tranquility. The best news in the_ organising department is a hopeful interview given by the Chief of the Staff, who declares that the reorganisation of the army is proceeding in radical fashion with every prospect of a strong initiative in the spring, with an army in good discipline and good heart. That means that till the spring the enemy’s troops will he pinned down on the Russian front without the power of sending much reinforcement to the West, where reinforcement is badly wanted. The General added to his New York interviewer that the Government is determined to fight the war to the end. "We must triumph or our soul will die," he said. This tone is perhaps duo to the growing successes on the West front. It certainly balances the confusion of the Saturday messages about the various opinions iri favour of peace in the upper revolutionary circles.

Good military news is from the Riga and Galician sectors, where hard fighting is reported with advantage to our Allies, who have recovered lost positions on both those fronts, and from the Armonian-Fersian front, the latter reporting Turkish defeat south of Lake Urmia. It indicates some revival of the Russian situation there. The importance of it concerns Mesopotamia. Before the Russian collapse the major portion of the Puckish forces was drawn across in Armenia against the expected Russian advance from Trebizond to Erzingham. Those forces after the Russian collapse were able to send an important number of divisions for the proposed expedition under Falkenhayn for the recovery of Mesopotamia. If the Russian armies are restored the Turks will have once again to hold their Armenian front in force, reducing the pressure towards Mesopotamia.

What that pressure may be presently it is hard to say. General Maude’s recent victory at Ramadieh, on’ the Eu-pm-ates, showed that an invading force had reached that river from Aleppo. It had railway material with, it, which ligured in the booty. How that material had got so far—whether by motor transport over the desert from Damascus by Tadmor, or down_ the Euphrates (unnavigable at ordinary times as far as Hit, about .50 miles north of Ramadieh) during the late floods—has not Been explained. It looks as if the enemy had sent a force to seize a point on the delta, while he is malting a railway from the east (from Homs or Damascus). If so, the force has been captured, and General Maude’s horsemen will very soon know all about the railway. _ The hare possibility of shoving a railway across this country to maintain an offensive on the borders of the Mesopotamian delta is a little startling. It shows that Falkenhayn is wide awake.

What the Turks and General Maude are doing on the Tigris has been made a little clearer by tne publication ot how the Turns, retreating from Baghdad up the D.ala, escaped before tne Russians, coming from Persia, and General Maude, moving up the Diala, could join to crush them. Maude could send only a small force up tne Diala, and the Russians were _ not stro ig, chiefly cavalry. The Turkish commander (Halil Bey) stopped the Russians with a small rearguard m_ a pass east of Khamkin, of great dilnculty, easily held and ho stopped tte British 'with a 'flank guard, m the gorge of the Diala, 50 miles trom Baghdad, with precipitous mountains on either side. During these hold-up" got his main force and guns otci the Diala and got clear away, .the rear and flank guards getting after him quickly and cleverly. There has not been much movement in that direction since, and that Turkish army is somewhere half-way between Baghdad and Mosul.

The worst of the Russian military news is the landing of one or two divisions on the Islands ol Dago and Oesel, the latter lying most of the way across the Gulf of Riga. The atussian account says the landing was effected with great skill and speed, the success being due to the weakness ot the Russian naval patrol. The report adds that the enemy contemplates operations in the direction of Hapsal, a port a few miles north of Dago Island, 60 miles by rail from Reval. The port of Pernau, further south, if they could take it, would give the enemy' the end of the railway which connects with Reval, to which placv it turns aftei a south-easterly run from Pernau. This would bring them within 30 miles ot Valk, on the Aa. According to the report the landing at Hapsal would necessitate a change in the Russian front, which runs from Frederickstadt, on the Dvina, towards Venden, on the Aa, bending it back by Venden and Valk. The enemy, landing at

Hapsal, would be 120 miles from \'a]k, without a railway line to support him. Tho matter is therefore .lot very clear, and “one or two divisions” do not make much of a force. Moreover, if they do not get away soon from tho islands they will bo frozen in. Anyhow, the Bussian Government, according to the report, Has determined to drop all politics and concentrate on the defence of the country.

Tho naval mutiny, of which wo hare some details to-day, which show its serious character but modify the evil results originally reported, has caused tho resignation* ot Admiral Oapclle, and brought about a renewal of tho crisis in the Reichstag, with a ela-moup for the dismissal of the Chancellor. In the midst of the confusion voices are heard, notably Hindenburg’s, snapping abuse ol Britain, and threatening the ‘'sharp sword.” On tho whole, tile Teutonic mind finds itself in a sea of troubles. Not the least significant of tho outcries that reach tho outer world is tho volume of protest against tho “wedge” which President Wilson has thrust between, l-ho Kaiser and his people.