BRITISH DIVORCE LAW

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXVII, Issue 8340, 29 January 1913, Page 6

BRITISH DIVORCE LAW

The announcement that has been made on behalf of the British Government that there is no immediate prospect of legislation to amend the divorce law is not at all surprising. Important as this question is, and urgent though some measure of reform is no doubt considered by a l fc arge section of the community, it would bo altogether too much to ask the Government to add such a contentious measure to its already over-weigh ted programme. At the same time, the subject can only be deferred for a time. The gross inequalities of the existing law and its administration, both as between the sexes and the varying social status of the people, call insistently for readjustment. The exhaustive report of the Royal Commission on Divorce, presented quite recently after investigations extending over a period of three years, makes it quite clear that legislation can only be delayed at the expense of justice. The conclusions of the Commission were referred to at length in these columns not long ago, so that we need not traverse that ground again. Briefly, the recommendations were that differentiation as to sex should be abolished in respect of the grounds of divorce, that those grounds should bo extended somewhat, and that the machinery should be simplified to remove the reproach that the power to secure release from an unfortunate union depends considerably on the length of the aggrieved person’s purse. There is no suggestion that divorce ought to be made “easy” or “cheap.” That is not the point. The sacredness of the marriage tie and its enormous significance as a factor in a healthy national life make it imperative that the question of amending the divorce law should be approached with the utmost caution. No Government having its hands so full as ore those of the British Government of to-day can reasonably be expected to grapple with such a far-reaching social question just now. Later on, when the Home Rule Bill is passed (or its fate decided for the time being), when the franchise difficulty has been overcome (as we

have no doubt it will bo satisfactorily), and other measures now at the top of the order paper are cleared off, this and other domestic matters of consequence will receive duo attention. The existing divorce law is more than half a century old. It is without a doubt lagging far behind the great body of public opinion, particularly in the very serious disqualifications it imposes upon women. There must be a largo number of unhappy unions of which a modern divorce law—and a very conservative law at that —would facilitate dissolution with the host results to those immediately concerned and to the community of 'which they form a part. A loose divorce law is, of course, not at all to be desired, since it depreciates the sanctity and solemnity of tho marriage covenant and tends to a light conception of morals. On tho other hand, a system so antiquated, and in many respects, so manifestly unjust, as that now in operation in Britain can hardly be expected to stimulate a healthy ethical standard. 111-assorted marriages lead to separations with or without legal assistance, and such separations more often than not are followed by tho forming of fresh attachments. Where reasonable grounds for divorce can be established the aggrieved party to the marriage contract has the moral right to be freed, and ought also to have the legal, right. To withhold this is certainly not to elevate the moral state of society. We are, however, entirely with those who would advance upon legislation of this character with the most extreme caution. That is why we urge that the British Government is not in a position to proceed with tho subject at present. Nevertheless, all the arguments in favour of caution in framing new legislation are also arguments why such amendments to the law as are necessary in the interests of justice and commonsense should be made as soon as tho circumstances are propitious.