THE BALKAN DISPUTE

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXVII, Issue 8339, 28 January 1913, Page 6

THE BALKAN DISPUTE

Turkey has by no means got rid of her troubles by the dramatically sudden change of administration effected at the end of last week. That, of course, was not tho immediate intention, the Young Turk party apparently preferring another reference to force rather than the inevitable humiliation of paying tho penalty of defeat, in which tho sorest point of all was the demanded cession of Adrianoplo. It looks, however, very much as if the latest move is, a jump from the fryingpan into tho fife. The Great Powers are reported to bo unmoved. Their decision as to the ■conditions of ending tho war are unchanged. Tho Balkan allies aro as determined as ever to secure the fruits of their victories in the field. Indeed, they threaten to raise their terms by insisting upon a higher indemnity in tho event of further procrastination at Constantinople. One of the arguments that have been advanced by Turkey against the cession of Adrianople is that tho allied forces have not taken that position, and hence cannot claim it. Bulgaria’s reply is that although this prize has not actually fallen to tho Balkan troops, Adrianople is nevertheless practically theirs. An authority put the case from the allies’ point of view to the “Westminster Gazette’s” war correspondent at Sofia early last month in this way: “Prom the time the investment began wo never had any idea of storming Adrianople. It was sure to fall into our hands sooner or later; and there was no reason why wo should make heavy sacrifices to obtain it. If wo had assaulted the place wo should have taken it. whatever it had cost us; cart we know that the cost would have amounted to at least twenty or thirty thousand men. ' If the armistice haa not .been,signed we should have gone on precisely as we were doing. The investment would have been maintained by our weaker troops, and wo should have drawn all our main army to Chatalclja, but not to fight' there. It was .never a part of our plan to take Constantinople and keep it for ourselves. It would have sapped the strength and the wealth of our country to maintain it. It would have been too big a morsel for us to digest. Furthermore, whatever our wishes had been, wo should not have been allowed to keep it. As soon as the Turkish retreat was checked at ffio Chataldja lines, therefore, and they had gained time to bring up their strongest reserves and place a huge army behind their defences there, wo saw that a victory at Chataldja would give us nothing to compensate us for the enormous cost—it would have cosv us, perhaps, thirty or forty thousand men to force the linos; and to waste these lives for nothing but . e s Tl bty glory would have been criminal folly. If, therefore, we have to go on fighting again we shall make no attempt U> force the Chataldja lines. Wo shall sit down there, quietly, as wo have done around Adrianople, holding tho iurkisli Army by our presence. Sooner or later they will find that they have to attack ns; and that would lose them their favourable position, the shelter of their defences, and so on. The aspect of tho war would alter at once, and then ue might find it necessary to go on to Constantinople, regardless of the Powers 01 of anybody else. During the wait at Chataldja it is proposed that wo should send a force down to attack Gallipoli, and, acting in conjunction with the Greek fleet, storm the Dardanelles, both from the sea and on the land side. This, probably would be sulix ent to make Turkey accept cur terms, or at least to appeal '■}' another armistice; and by : .i;s time it is' only reasonable to ui> pose that Adrianople must have iaj->-ii. Turkey would have been banished from Macedonia, therefore, and that is all that we set out to do. And so we come back to the first point in the discussions—Adrianople is ours. W hat is there left for Turkey to do about itr Wo shnll'then bo in a position to say, ‘We have done what we wanted. We have nothing more to fight for. If you want peace you can have it—by accepting our terms.’ ”

That is a fairly candid, and certainly most interesting, summary of .how the Balkan allies view the situation. to this the announcement of the “fNorth German Gazette” that the Powers wih maintain an attitude of neutrality and we get some idea of the task the neu Turkish Government has in prospect. The progress of the war up to the present gives no reason to believe that Turkey can possibly avert further disaster to her already badly repulsed forces. To yield Adrianoplo would, of course, be a great national loss and a most bitter humiliation, but the alternative may be a summons to defend even Constantinople itself. The Powers might intervene at the eleventh hour to provent such an extremity, notwithstanding their present declaration or ueutrality, or they might not. In the meantime the hurrying of British, French, Italian, and Russian warships to the storm centre proves preparation for eventualities.