RUSSIA IN THE EAST.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIV, Issue 5760, 15 September 1879, Page 3

RUSSIA IN THE EAST.

(Sir Henry Kawlin-um on the Russian Occupation of Mery.) And here I might conclude this outline sketch of our proposed policy in Central Asia were it not that the argument seems imperfect without a brief notice of some of the draw* backs and objections which may be used on the other side. The first question that is likely to he asked is, What is the particular evil or danger to be apprehended from the presence of the Russians at Merv, or even at Herat, which can require to be counteracted by so enormously expensive a measure of defence ? The answer to this question would be to the following effect. Russia by advancing on Merv evidently means mischief. She would never embark on an enterprise of ho perilous a nature for mere purposes of trade or police. Political objects of high import could alone justify the movement. Those objects necessarily point to HenCt, which would lie at the mercy of a European power holding Merv, and from whence India would be seriously threatened. Herat possesses natural advantages of quite exceptional importance. It is the frontier town between Persia and India. It is connected by high roads with the capitals of all the surrounding countries, with Cabul through the hills, with Balkh aud BokhiCr£ through Mymeneh, with Khiva through Merv, with Meshed, with Yezd and Isfahan, with Seistau and Candahar, It enenjoys an admirable climate, and is situated in the midst of one of the most fertile and populous valleys in Asia. Above all, the city itself is surrounded by earthworks of the most colossal character, dating from pre-historic times, and which, with the adaptations and improvements of modern science, might be rendered quite impregnable to an Asiatic force.— [The city of HenCt occupies an area of nearly a mile square, and is surrounded by an earth-work, which measures about 250 feet in width at the base, and from 50 to 60 feet in height, and which is surmounted by a wall, 14 feet thick at the base, 9 feet thick at the top, and 18 feet high, exclusive of the parapet. There is also a wet ditch of 45 feet in width and 16 feet in depth ; and an ark or citadel of considerable strength. A most elaborate report on the defences of Hentt, extending over 30 pages, by Major Sanders, Bengal Engineers, who visited the place in 1838, after the Persian siege, is to be found in M'Gregor’s Central Asia, Part 11. p. 341.] —Russia in possession of Hen(t would have a gripe on the throat of India. She would, indeed, in virtue of the position, command the military, resources, both of Persia aud Afghanistan, and would thus oblige us at once to increase our frontier army by at least 20,000 fresh British troops. Viewing, then, the question as merely one of finance, it may be assumed that our advance above the passes aud occupation of Herrit would be the cheapest insurance against Russia that we could effect for the benefit of our great Indian estate. Let it be further remembered that all these considerations have been already discounted by our statesmen iu regard to the smaller question of a Persian occupation of Herit. We sent a considerable expedition to the Gulf in order to oblige Persia to raise the siege of Hen£t in 1838, and when Persian troops occupied the place in 1856, we actually went to war with the Shah for the purpose of compelling their withdrawal. If, then, such measures were justifiable in order to prevent the Western Afghan capital from falling into the hands of Persia, who was only to be feared as the minion or precursor of Russia, much more must they be required when the danger comes directly from Russia herself. I will not pretend to calculate the cost of sending an expedition to Her£t, Any estimate, based on the uncertain premises which are alone at present available would be fallacious ; but I may point out that the expenses of our defensive position, however great, must be far less than those encountered by Russia in constructing and maintaining her elaborate system of attack. Por when Russia is established at Merv, and has completed the communications of that post with the Caspian on one side and with the Oxus and Turkestan on the other, she will have at least 50,000 soldiers in Central Asia, and it is not too much to assume that the main object of bringing that large body of troops into the field, towards whose support the conquered Uzbeg States contribute little or nothing, would have been to enable her to threaten India.

I will only say »ne word in conclusion, that I counsel nothing rash or premature. If Russia remained encamped on the Caspian, we should not, of comae, leave the valley of ithe Indus. So long as she held aloof from Merv, we should hold aloof from Herdt; but if she deliberately threw down the gauntlet, she must expect it to be taken up. We could not, as the guardians of the interests of India, permit her, on the pretext of curbing the Turcomans or establishing a trade route through Asia, to take up a position unopposed on the Murghab, which would compromise the safety of Herdt. That city is both strategically and politically an indispensable bulwark of India, and we cannot and will not allow its future fate to be at the disposition of a foreign power. December, 1874.