THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUSSIAN PRIVATEERING.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 5456, 21 September 1878, Page 3 (Supplement)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUSSIAN PRIVATEERING.

(From the Pall Mall Gazelle.) A very interesting contribution to the history of the privateering movement in Russia has been made by a Russian post-captain at Odessa. In an address to a local committee for the formation of a “ Volunteer fleet, 1 ' Captain Zeleny gave an account of the naval measures adopted by the Russian Government in 1863 with the object of frightening England out of her intervention in favor of the Roles. They consisted in the fitting out of six screw frigates under the command of Admiral Lessefski, now Minister of Marine, and six other small ships under the command of Admiral Popoff. The destination of Admiral Lessofski's squadron was known only to the admiral and the captains under his orders (including Captain Zeleny). “ The ships were new and thoroughly repaired ; the officers and men young, healthy, full of strength, and determined to justify the confidence of the Emperor. All the rest was nothing to us ; we were all electrified by the thought of future exploits, and no one oared a copeck for his life ; the more especially since, from the captain to the last seaman, all were unmarried.” “The principal object o.f the expedition,” said Captain Zeleny, “ was similar to that of the future cruisers of the volunteer navy—namely, to avoid meeting the; enemy’s ships, but to inflict on him blows in his most tender and sensible parts, by paralysing his trade and falling upon his merchant ships and distant colonies. For this purpose the whole of the Atlantic Ocean was, as it were, divided among us ; and each vessel composing the squadron had its own region fixed beforehand, in which its operations were to be conducted in conformity with instructions very minutely prepared, but at the same time with due regard to international law and the rights of humanity.” Under those instructions the Russian cruisers wore ordered, on the declaration of war, to stop; and overhaul all merchant vessels, and, after examining their papers, to submit to the decision of a committee of officers whether or not the vessel was a lawful prize. In. the event ,of the prize being declared lawful, the papers relating to the ship and cargo were to be preserved ; small packages of value, as well as ship’s stores and coals, were to be carried on board the cruiser, if she had room tor the same, and recorded in a book specially provided by the Government. The prize itself, after the whole of its crew had been taken on board the Cruiser, was to have been sunk, not burned, as the latter process might have attracted the attention of a ship of war belonging to the enemy. “Wo were likewise authorised,” states Captain Zeleny, to take our prize," when possible, into the nearest neutral port for sale, or for the purpose of keeping her there until the end of the war ; but I do not think that this would have been done very often, as it would have involved great loss of time, and might have put an enemy's cruiser on Our track ; and this is just what we had to avoid, having only one ally —the boundless ocean. After finishing with one vessel, we had to- deal with the next in the same manner, and so on ad infinitum, or until the . end of the war; If the number of prisoners became inconveniently great, we were instructed to transfer them to the first neutral vessel, supplying them with provisions sufficient for their maintenance until they reached the nearest port.” A similar course was prescribed to a squadron in the Pacific, composed of five vessels, under the command of Admiral Popoff. As regards the means of victualling and coaling the two squadrons, Captain Zeleny declines to make known the arrangements that were made; but he certifies • that they were perfect and would have proved quite effectual. He divulges, however, some parts of the instructions under which be left Cronstadt in the Almaz frigate on July 18, 1863. “The squadron,” according to those instructions, was first “ to proceed to New York, the ships keeping together or sailing singly, according to circumstances. On leaving the Belt we may meet with an English or French squadron stronger than our own, which on seeing us would change its course and follow us with the object of attacking us on the first news of a rupture, I shall then signal * Separate,’ whenever circumstances may favor such a signal, such as the approach of night or foggy weather. On separating, the ships must continue their course to New Tork, obtaining - from the merchant vessels and American mail steamers which they may meet information in respect to the state of political affairs ; and should they ascertain that war had been declared they would of course proceed as quickly as possible, not to New York, but to their appointed stations in the Atlantic. Secondly, in the event of the commander of a foreign squadron requesting me to return, or should he make any similar proposal humiliating to the ‘ honor of our flag,’ I shall signal, in conformity with the orders given to mo personally by the Emperor, ‘ Prepare for action,’ and_ our squadron will proceed on its course. It is the pleasure of his Majesty the Emperor that under circumstances of similar difficulty the first shot should not be fired on our side; 'and, therefore, our vessels are not to go into action except on my signal to that effect, which shall be made after the first shot shall have been fired by our new foes. The commanders must in' such' circumstances explain to their crews all the gravity of such an insult, and that no other answer can be given than a most obstinate battle—the result of which would prove to" Russia, in the words of his Majesty the Emperor, .that both on land and on the sea Russian sailors know no limit to their devotion for the preservation of the dignity of Russia and the honor of our flag.” Captain Zeleay told the meeting that oa reach*

ing New York the squadron found a state of peace still existing between England and Russia ; and ho was at no loss to explain the cause of such a great disappointment to the gallant admiral in command of the five frigates “thoroughly repaired” and manned by bachelor officers and seamen. The fact is, as we now hear on such good authority, the exploits of the Alabama had filled the British Government with fear and apprehension. The possible consequences of the cruising of five Russian frigates in the Atlantic, and five more in the Pacific, were too much for the nerves of Lord John Russell and the Lords of the British Admiralty. They found the prospect a very dismal one. The practical English merchant totalled up the pos-ible losses, and decided that war would be a bad job, and that Ic jeu ne vattt pas la chandcllc, After such a decision the newspapers quickly changed their warlike tone; anti-war meetings were held, addresses from all sorts of corporations were sent to the Government, urging that the honor of England was in no way affected—that there was no reason for interfering in the internal affairs of Russia, and so forth. The warlike ardor of the British Government began to cool down, and soon disappeared altogether. The French following the example of the English, likewise soon calmed down, having suddenlyremembered that they also had a large commeriat navy.” The two admirals and the ten captains had done their duty. Russia had succeeded in repelling foreign intervention in favor of the Poles; and it was therefore only natural that, within a month after his arrival in New York, Admiral Lessofski should receive a despatch from Prince Gortohakoff thanking (in the name of the Emperor) the admiral, the captains, the officers, and the crews, for “the rapid and totally unexpected arrival of the squadron on the coast of America, in consequence of which the position of affairs was totally changed, and our adversaries had ceased to trouble themselves about the Polish insurrection, and had begun to look upon its suppression as a (Russian) domestic affair.”

The moral of this wonderful story is that Russia can be again preserved from foreign intervention by the same process as that which was adopted with such signal success in 1863. We doubt whether Prince Gortchakoff was quite sincere in his 'official appreciation of the services rendered by the ten Russian cruisers in 1863 ; for he has ever since traded, so to speak, on the clever despatches with which he replied to the notes of several Powers of Europe at that period, although knowing the whole of the time that Lord John Russell had not the faints-t idea of going to war with Russia for the sake of the Poles. The editor of the Moscow Oazetie has likewise built up his reputation, on the support which he gave to the Government on that occasion, and he will therefore be quite as little pleased to find that Great Britain was frightened into acquiescence with the Russian atrocities in Poland, not by the pen, but by the courage and devotion of such officers as Aomirals Lessofski and Popoff and Captain Zeleyn.