WARRANTING A HORSE.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 5400, 18 July 1878, Page 3

WARRANTING A HORSE.

(From the Field.) The decision of the Court in the recent case: of Anthony v. Halated deserves the attention; of horseowners, ns teaching a practical lesson in the construction of written warranties. The plaintiff bought a horse of the defendant, and on payment of the price obtained a receipt and warranty in this form : "Received from o.' Anthony, Esq., the sum of £6O, for a black horse, rising five years. Quiet to ride and drive, and warranted sound up to this date, or subject to the opinion of a veterinary surgeon.” The horse was not quiet, so Mr. Anthony brought his action for breach of, warranty in the Hereford County Court, The Judge ruled that the warranty extended to quietness as well as soundness, and the jury found a verdict for the- plaintiff. ' Last week the Common Fleas division ordered a new trial, the Judges holding that the County Court Judge had misconstrued the receipt,.and that the allocation of che words showed the warranty to apply only to soundness. This construction of the document in question is in accordance with decisions given on former, occasions when the identical point was in dispute. In Dickenson v. Gapp, tried in 1821, the warranty upon the breach of which the action was brought ran thus: “ Received £IOO for a bay gelding got by Ohesshire Cheese ; warranted sound.” The plaintiff proved that the horse was not by Chesshire Cheese ; but Chief Justice Dallas held that the warranty was confined to soundness,- and nonsuited the - plaintiff. In Budd v. Fairinauer, the receipt of the sale of a colt contained the following words :—“ For a grey four-years-old colt, warranted sound in every respect.” The colt turned out to be only three years old ; but it was held that the soundness only was warranted, and the plaintiff was nonsuited. These decisions show clearly how written documents cf the above kind will be construed in courts of law, and it cannot be contended that any violence is done to the language in which they are expressed ; if the words mean anything, they mean just what the courts held them to mean, and nothing else. It may be urged that the three plaintiffs in the above abtions would not have bought if the horses had not been stated respectively to be quiet, by a particular sire, and of a certain age. The maxim, expressum facit cessare taciturn, will explain why these statements were disregarded. Whatever conditions the word “warranted” did not apply to could not be reckoned as integral parts of the contract of sale.' In the above cases the sellers represented that the horses were quiet, of a certain breed, and of a particular age, but they warranted they were sound. .In order to hold a man liable, if his representation turn out incorrect, it is necessary to show that he knew it was false at the time he made it. In selling horses it often happens that the owner has no personal knowledge of certain facts beyond what he was told when be bought; and if he sells on the same representation os he received, be is not liable, provided of course he has not discovered the truth in the meantime. On the other hand, a seller is liable if any part of a warranty turn out to be untrue, whether ha knew of the defect or not, or even if ho had no means of knowing. If a man choose to warrant* quiet in harness a horse he has never driven, he must take the consequences of his imprudence. . It is at all times difficult to distinguish warranty from representation. The rule of law is that every affirmation at the time of sale is a warranty, if it appears to have been so intended ; but in the cases we have noticed this intention has been plainly omitted. And if he sells on the same representation as he received, he is not liable, provided, of course, ho.has not discovered the real truth in the meantime. On the other band, if any part of a warranty turn out to be false, the horse is returnable to the vendor.