THE POLICY OF GERMANY.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 5324, 20 April 1878, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE POLICY OF GERMANY.

, (From the Glasgow Mail,. February, 28.) r ' The, anxiety >vith which Prince Bismarck s declaration to the German Parliament .was awaited may have predisposed most persons to expect too much from the most plain-speaking .of statesmen. There will be ,to some extent in consequence a sense of disappointment, even though it may-be accompanied by a sense of relief. The oracle has spoken, and the utterance is somewhat too oracular to satisfy, the, unoasiness of Europe. Prince Bismarck has delayed bis statement as long as he cpuld, and even now he allows !it. to be seen that if l bis own wish could have been gratified ha would have preserved a longer silence. What he does say follows the lines laid down in some remarks made at ah earlier stage of the Eastern crisis. Was there anything at stake in the struggle between Russia and Turkey which affected the interests of “a Pomeranian peasant Prince Bismarck could not. see that there was, and therefore he could hot see any need, for his interference. Since then Russia has beaten down the power of the Sultan. Turkey lies prostrate at its feet. Austria and Great Britain have, been demonstrating .by despatches, , by,V warnings, -by naval expeditions, , and . military preparations, their opinion that a crisis of importance to them has been reached; and Greece ■ has even allowed itself ■to be hurried .into action too hasty to be prudent or successful;; , But G ermahy remains where it was ; and' Prince Bismarck intimates that* this is not only what ought to be, but also what ought to continue during the near future, bristling as it does with the possible dangers and the certain difficulties of rival interests meeting in Conference. Germany, under his guidance, will be kept out of any conflict which other Powers may be inclined to rush into or likely to drift into. What Russia has done, and what it proposes to do, calls for no opposition, because it really, after all, does not seriously threaten auy, German interest.- There is a. further reason for preserving this pacific attitude towards the victorious Power. The two countries—their Governments at least—have been bound'to! each other for years by the bonds of “ a sincere aud mutually profitable alliance;” and much more than has yet : occurred would bo needed to induce the German Government to break that alliance.- No overtures have been made to it from any quarter to that effect. It would, in fact, be a new departure on the part of Germany, sure to be resented by the most powerful classes : in Russia, were the -former to come forward now to deprive the victors of what they think they have a right to claim. Others may do so if they choose—that is for them to consider. What Germany has especially to bear in mind: is that auy change -in its past and present policy would lesson the security the empire enjoys at present.. Its. relations with all the Powers of Europe are . thoseof peace and friendship.' They could not . be altered for the better; they -might be for the worse. And here Prince , Bismarck re-, minds his fellow countrymen that an empire situated in the midst of Europe had better be cautious at such a time as this. “ No doubt they were strong, they had a large army at their disposal; but only if their own independence, their own interests were at stake, should he advise the Emperor to unsheathe the sword.!’ There -are references in the speech to- ; the terms of .peace and the policy of Austria, which deserve to be weighed, but the! main drift pf..i,thaa been fairly stated in the foregoing summary. ■ ! Germany, ini a word, has a good neighbor in Russia ;.they . have always i beeen on friendly terms j Russia’s demands now will do Germany no harm ; why then should the-latter contest them, at the risk of destroying the peaceful conditions ~of, life now enjoyed with neigh-' bprs on ; ’all. sides., , Prince Bismarck’s frankness is well known; .It vis a' quality which serves him in- as good stead as reticence t and,. evasion do to diplomatists of an .'ordinary, type, On the present occasion we may, as well take his statements just as they stand,, because the interests of.,the German, Empire < do- actually confirm the policy he lays down: as the best, and that which guides.-its- action , at this juncture. We may cherish spine reserve as to whether Russian,gains,at the-mputh of the Danube and the ' exit’from the ! Black Sea would be in reality regarded, by him with so much indifference as he assumes. , But the position which he, ascribes, tp the country he rules is one of non-interference;,based upon strength rather than weakness, and is flattering to the national pride quite as ranch as he would make it reassuring to, friends and neighbors. Germany may not grudge to Russia the fruits of a vyar which has coat so much in life and money; ’ahd 'will ,in both respects leave painful results for years to come. Nor need Germany set itself against Austria-going to war to weaken Russia still - more, ■ and to weaken itself also, whatever might be the direct result of the contest. The same may be said of Great, Britain, with -which, it is said,Germany “has, ho, one interest,-excepting, the pacific rivalry of trade,, which could' bring her-into opposition." . No - doubt .Prince Bismarck, as a good- friend to: all .’his neighbors, and as a man of peace himself, would regret-very much if his friends; went !to war among themselves.;, He would look l on with regret, but he, would- do no more than look bn. At the same time it is evident that the mere onlooker, on:-;snob, occasions has- the choice of interposing -when he, chooses, and; that-is,a great advantage, and entitles-him to respect from all parties, Germany will -stand aloof from the European quarrel, if there is to be one ; and inasmuch as. every one' is well . ! aware of its armed strength, it will be a very gratifying and'successful policy for it to keep the, peace towards-all,, being armed meanwhile at every Tfle,umpire would, of course,'’ have something to say to the final allotment of the prize., On the other hand, if, no difficulty occurs' to mar the negotiation's for a Confer-'" ence, we are to conclude from Prince Bis■marok’s > spbech- ‘that' Germany u will - go into council- with ’ a readiness:: to-, grant most of what Russia- asks, for, ,but. .with,,ho intention 1 of Supporting its demands against -the 'warlike ! opposition' 1 of other Powers. Practically ; then Great Britain - and Austria —so far as they can,trust, this political manifesto—may re'ckdhoh haying- the Germain Government !neither! for- nor -against-them if they,(Singly or together, ibsist on Russia rest pecting their objections to her programme. •There is'one Power which does not receive much notice from Prifice tßismarok','in' bis speech, but which is, wo may be sure, always present in his .calculations. ---.That Power is France The policy of peace and reticence, which / ‘commends itself ’so 1 strongly to';! the* German Premier, haa been’ followed as oloselyby French statesmen. Nor- has this' fact been without its influence on - the pacific attitude of Prince Bismarck.; France, to - all appearance, is'as wells disposed- towards ‘Russia, though it maytnot bo-bound by ties like!those of the’, triple <-alliance.; ' It -> might have, been even' tempted to lehd'very effectual aid to Russia' hadiPfinoe'Bismarofc; interfered to sayb .the -TuHc-from the 'onslaught of tho Czar. ' If Gey.many remains Tieutral,’so does Fraijoe—in that someraay sbektfnd thmk-they a very re%-! soriable!explanation of fl(e pacificindependence' vyhjp^' thC'highsst *, authority; \o Germany as its' sS'festVolioy.' Twdqan play at that game; and, France , vvoffid,. dis-. 'bf".umpire' wUh’,ian,jiinpar; tialjty '4‘nd -a good will quite * equal to those of the empire which now 'holds Alsace and Lorraine. -