TODLEBEN ON MODERN SIEGES

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 5302, 23 March 1878, Page 1 (Supplement)

TODLEBEN ON MODERN SIEGES

A correspondent of the Vossiche Zeituny, writing from Tutchenitza on the 15th of December, communicates to that paper an account of an interesting conversation with General Todleben on the siege of Plevna. The correspondent describes the General as a calm, reflective-looking man, very different in appearance and manner from the hot-headed and thoughtless .Russian officers by whom he is surrounded, and speaking German fluently. “When I came here,” he said, “ I was continually tormented by anxiety lest Osman should make his sortie too soon, before the fortifications were strong enough. I was from the beginning opposed to the theory of taking his strong positions by storm. Tt was not 1, but hunger, that conquered him, though this was only rendered possible by surrounding him so firmly and effectively as was at length done bv our trenches. Plevna teaches the lesson that the modern system of defence is quite different from what it used to be, and possesses enormous advantages against an assailant. You have in the Vosges five or six Plevnas. lu order to be able to surround a natural position or an entrenched camp, and at the same time to continue to execute great stategetic plans, it is necessary for the assailant to bring twice as many soldiers into the field as are required by the defending army. To take such fortified positions by storm is, with modern firearms, impossible, or at least inopportune. One should never require more of an officer or soldier, however brave he may be, than it is possible for him to do ; but the demands made upon our officers and soldiers in the storming of Plevna exceeded the bounds of possibility. Even when such a strategic adventure succeeds, it is a mistake. Thoughtless men may say. Jet 10,000 troops fall, so long as we get the position ; but they do not consider that, if the position is lost, not only that 10,000 men fall, but 50,000 are demoralised. ... My. chief care was so to

arrange matters that, wherever Osman might attempt a sortie, a sufficient mass of troops should at once be concentrated to oppose him. With this object I had a double rovy of trenches and redoubts made round Plevna, so that, while the first was being attacked at any point, the concentration might be made behind the second." The correspondent having asked the General whether ho thought that, under fa'vorable circumstances, Osman might have saved part of his army, Todleben replied, “ No; Osman made the sortie with 25,000 nien, the whole foroo under his command except some 5000 or 8000 reserves. If he had at-

tacked us with only half that force, it might have been said that the cause of his defeat was the numerical superiority of his enemy. Osman knew this, and attempted a brilliant and daring attack with his whole army ; but success was hopeless. In my opinion, Osman made a grand strategical mistake in not attempting his sortie sooner ; and I never could understand why he did not at once evacuate Plevna after the capture of the positions at Teliche. liven so late as six weeks ago he would have had a chance of saving part, if not the whole, of his army ; but he let the opportunity pass, and we labored incessantly to close him in more and more firmly. When such a position as Plevna cannot be relieved from without, the besieged army should endeavor at once to withdraw from it, as the besiegers can strengthen their circle of fortifications every day until the garrison is forced by hunger to capitulate.”