THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH WORSHIP OF SUCCESS.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 5290, 9 March 1878, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH WORSHIP OF SUCCESS.

(From the Spectator.)

Mr. Goldwin Smith, iu his recent essay upon the resemblance between the positions of tho Southern slaveowners and the Ottoman Turks, remarked that tho same people in England had defended both, and would, ho fancied, abandon the Turks when beaten, with tho rapidity with which they had abandoned the Confederates when defeated. The remark, though a little bitter, is perfectly justified by the facts of the Confederate case, and indeed, by much of the history of English opinion. Of all races in the world, the English, in spite of their tenacity and thor indifference to general opinion—an indifference quite as" great as Cato’s—seem to have the least persevering sympathy _ for lost political causes. A strong minority must have loved the Protectorate, bub the ino,ment it had disappeared all overt sympathy for it was over, and for two hundred years no one ventured to say a word :in defence of the Great Protector, whoso ■descendants, moreover, never resumed his name. There was danger to the throne for a moment from tho old army, but none from the body of the people. The Jacobites, who lingered so long iu Scotland, were never a popular party here, and their traditions and Jitoraturo as an English party are so . utterly . extinct that the common people believe all tho Jacobites were Scotch, and save so far as they have read Scott’s novels, know absolutely nothing about them. After the Italian war the English Tories absolutely forgot tho petty princes of Italy; and. in 1866 English society, till then almost entirely Austrian in its sympathies,, suddenly wheeled round, 1 and for years held' the composite, southern ompiro to bo almost beneath contempt. , The feeling; for Denmark so died away that no single reference has ever been riiado in Parlia, mont by a politician of tho first-class to the position of North Schleswig! Ab;out the Confederates the' change was marvellous. Up to the time ' of General Sherman’s march, into space, five-sixths! of English income-taxpayers were on the side of the Confederates., f3o powerful were their sympathisers.that they almost plunged us into war, they advanced: six : millions to the Government of Richmond, and they shook tho confidence of the most determined Liberals;';tiU.;at<;;last, hardly any one would believe that the war would have any result; but the jnde T , pendence of the South. -Nobody but 1 the “sentimentalists” held on, and they had intervals! 6f great depression. Six months after Sherman : had reappeared behind 1 General Lee there was' not a'Confederate in England, mot a, man who would.allow that he had ever believed the defeat of the North a certainty, and the continued irritation of the North with English.feeling was treated as an irrational display of temper. It seemed iis if Englishmen believed only in success, and this impression, universal on the,‘Contin'ent, ’ is deepened by some smaller evidences. English opinion rarely adheres to an unsuccessful hero. Its foreign idols are forgotten in a few years; It: scorned the' Ulysses of France the moment he' ran away. It. adored Napoleon 111. while he was on the throne, and despised him as soon as he was taken prisoner. It is wholly at this moment in favor of the Republican party in France, and would believe France fitted only for a tyranny if another coup d’etat re-established the second Empire. And, as we have said, if the Sultan loses his dominions in Europe, there will probably not be a Tory newspaper, or a Tory orator, or a clubman who one year after will acknowledge that he exulted when the Turks won; who will regret the Turks, or who will remember that he believed the independence of Turkey essential to the interests of India. Erzeroum will he as forgotten as Oosakbff, the loss of which was said, in a,great debate in which Charles Fox took part, to be fatal to British prestige, and the very name of which has for half a century been absolutely forgotten. The new masters of European Turkey, whoever they may be, will be judged without the slightest reference to the Turks, and the remnant of Turkish dominion seated at Broussa will be studied like any other semi-bar-baric kingdom. There is something in this worship of Success, this readiness to abandon and even forget a lost cause, which is scarcely consistent with the persistency and conservatism inherent in the English character ; and it is worth while to see if it can be explained by any theory more reasonable than the one usually advanced, the reverence for power. The Englishman does not worship power, as a rule. On the contrary, ho rather dreads and dislikes power. He fought the first Napoleon for twenty years because he was so powerful ; he hated the American Republic because it seemed dangerously strong; he strongly dislikes Bismarck because ho can move such armies ; and ho loathes Russia mainly, because he thinks the Colossus too big for the good of the world. We believe that reverence for power enters very little into Ilia worship of success, which arises from other and somewhat mixed motives, the main one being this. With the single exception of Italy, an exception which it would take a volume to explain, the average Englishman does not care very greatly about any foreign Power, or any form of government established in any foreign country. He does not detest despotisms until they are cruel, or republics until they are disorderly, or mixed monarchies until they are obviously too weak to work. There is in his mind a governing idea that one main test of any now organisation or old organisation, for the matter of that —is the work it can do; and if it cannot do any work, if it fails in its first objects, or the objects he thinks first, he casts it out of his mind, and waits, looking about for the next weapon. The Princes of Italy could not keep down popular revolt, which was all they were fit for, and ho forgot them. The Confederate States could not break up tho Union, which in his judgment was their raison d'etre, and the moment that was clear he wanted to hear nothing more about them. Napoleonism could neither maintain itself nor keep France from subjugation by foreigners, and as these were the first ends of that system, Napoleonism died out of his mind. Turkey exists in tho ordinary British mind in order that Russia may bo kept back. By a series of occurrences, some of them accidental, Turkey has been compelled to show all by herself whether she is fit to perform this function. As yet the result is not quite clear, but if it becomes clear and Turkey is totally defeated, Turkey’s raison d’etre in tho British mind will have vanished, and she may go, without lingering regrets. The Englishman does not value Turkey, or any other Power, or any form of government for itself, but for what he thinks it can secure, for its meaning in his own mind; and the moment it does not secure what he desires or loses its meaning, he gives it up ail once, and usually for over. This may be said to be pure selfishness, but it is not so, though, no doubt, selfishness may enter very deeply

into it. It is lather practicalness, tho love of efficiency natural to a very powerful, though very borne kind of nature. Sometimes the quality displays itself without any selfishness at all. There was no selfishness whatever in forgetting Denmark, any more than in the strong sympathy originally felt for her. Her defeat brought England ho advantage, but rather considerable harm ; but still Englishmen forgot Denmark, because it. was of no use x'emomboring her. The independence of the small States could not be defended there, and tho Englishman, though as disposed as ever to wish well ,to small States, turned his regard away to other scenes. He had no energy to waste on the impossible. It was just the same with Napoleonism. The fall of Napoleonism brought .England no good, but rather harm, for Englishmen thought Napoleon a very good friend ; but they idid not regret it; far less weep over,it, for in tho fall it was revealed to them that their admiration had boon, mistaken, !that the strong Government which, as they thought; maintained order without doing mischief to France could not maintain; order: as against; invasion, 1 and had done to France an enormous and, as it might, prove, 1 an irreparable mischief. The feeling for Napoleonism; therefore, in kpite of English Interests, died instantly ; away, and has not yet revived, even when the struggle is seen 1 -to be. between Napoleonism’ and the Republic. ’ Moreover, though the English forgot the lost cause, they often do it without admiring the winning .one. , They forgot the Confederates without liking the North. They forgot-,the Princes of Germany,''without loving Bismarck, and; they),will forge,t, the Turk,,, without in. the least appreciating, his successor. Their defect mf. sentiment for it is a defect; . and bne which greatly deforms:;, the outward Uaspect l of < 1 the ; national character, arises not from baseness,'Hut from I narrow-minded practicalness, akin to that ,Bf 1 the artisan' who, breaking his'tool, selects'ariothbir from his (iox„ without a!'regfbt, :, '.except'Tor:: the waste 'of meansV,, U.; u . )■'.