THE CZAR’S PLEDGES.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 5256, 28 January 1878, Page 3

THE CZAR’S PLEDGES.

(From the World.) The explanation most likely to be given of an expression which has of late years been added to our store of ironical phraseology,— “ Making war for an idea," —even by those persons who are supposed to be particularly well informed, would be that it was coined by the hypocrisy of Napoleon 111. for the purpose of persuading the world that ho was with perfect disinterestedness succouring Italy, whereas in truth he had already bargained for the acquisition of Savoy and Nice. It is quite true that a stipulation of this kind formed part of the original agreement with Victor Emmanuel; but when the Emperor found the difficulties of the Italian campaign far greater than he had expected ; when, instead of “ freeing Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic,” he was obliged to leave the formidable Quadrilateral in the hands of the Austrians—he endeavored, in some small degree, to lessen the wrath of Count Covour and the Piedmontese by consenting to forego the

promised reward of Ilia co-operation. Count Walewski was at that time the French Minister for Foreign Affairs ; and personal considerations, as well as his naturally conservative temperament, strongly inclined him to use every effort to procure th faithful execution of the treaty of Villafranca, especially in so far as it favored the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the other princes. When it subsequently appeared that another policy would ultimately prevail, lie resigned office, and was succeeded by M. Thouvenel. The phrase, “ Making war for an idea,” is to be found for the first time in an energetic appeal which Count Walewski caused to be addressed to the Italians by the official .ifoniteiir in the autumn of 1859, calling upon them to accept that programme of Villafranca, according to which, as we have said, France would have been precluded from demanding Savoy and Nice, or any other indemnity what ever, for the conspicuous service she had rendered to the cause of Italian emancipation.

Something of an analogous confusion appears to exist in the public mind at the present moment with respect to the Emperor Alexander’s declarations limiting the scope of Russian aims in the Turkish war, and a passage in Lord Beacousfield’s recent speech at the Guildhall was unfortunately calculated to encourage the preval'.iug illusion. It should not, however, be forgotten that the professions of disinterestedness, doubtless with perfect sincerity, made to Lord Augustus Loftus at Livadta by bis Majesty, were in view of a settlement of the Eastern Question being secured, without recourse to arms, by the diplomatic action of the Great Powers. In other words, the selfdenying conditions that Russia was willing to impose upon herself made up the consideration which she offered in exchange for such vigorous and combined effort on the part of her allies as would bring about the desired amelioration of the Government of Bulgaria and other Christian provinces and render war unnecessary. When Lord Salisbury’s negotiations at the Constantinople Conference, which assembled immediately after the Czar’s conversation with Lord Augustus Loftus, bad resulted iu failure, and when the later Protocol had proved equally infructuons, the promises raa.de at Livadia became virtually obsolete.

Very different is the force, whatever may be the real value, of the engagements into which Prince Gortchakoff entered, in reply to Lord • Derby’s despatch, describing the conditions of English neutrality. It is clear that we have here a fair exchange of considerations offered and accepted ; and her Majesty s Government, by remaining neutral, are entitled to claim fulfilment of the "Russian promises. In order that our rights in this respect may be as in contestable as possible, it would be as well if our Government were to bear in mind that their language ought to be in conformity with their declared policy ; and the tone adopted by Mr. Layard at Constantinople may render some people anxious as to how far this has been the case. Nevertheless, the engagements taken by Prince Gortchakoff were of such a character that we anticipate no intention, nor even suspect a latent desire, to evade them. In the first place, the Eussian Government is, by their terms, in no way precluded from demanding a cession of territory from the Porte ; and the Czar might, according to the general expectation, put forth his claim to Armenia without in the least exposing himself to the charge of breaking his word. It is almost forgotten that the imperious Nicholas never thought of annexing Bulgaria ; but, in the event of his confidential overture to Sir Hamilton Seymour having been accepted, would have proposed the substitution of autonomous governments for Turkish rule in European provinces of the empire. We need not wonder, then, if the Emperor Alexander is content with the same plausible and unassuming programme; and although he waived undoubted belligerent rights against Egypt, out of deference to us, it may be questioned whether the temptation to attack the Khedive has ever been very strong, seeing how little Eus ia is able to effect by sea. Similar considerations are suggested by the promise not to annex Constantinople. Although eager spirits in the barracks or in the political clubs of Moscow may have treated this as the real object of the war, no Eussian statesman has looked upon Constantinople as likely at present to fab Into Eussian possession ;and thosewhohave most carefully studied the Imperial policy, past and present, upon this question, are of opinion that the views of the Czar and his advisers have been and are limited to preventing the establishment on the Bosphorus ot any Power endowed with greater vitality than the Ottoman Empire. The reversion of Constantinople they believe to be theirs ; but they are prepared patiently to bide their time, provided no new combination be interposed to frustrate their deferred expectation. It is, however, the distinct engagement to submit,’ before they become definitive, any new regulations as to the passage of the Bosphorus and the Dard inelles to the deliberation and sanction ot the Great Powers, which will be held to be of the greatest practical importance. By this declaration Eussia is hindered from adopting the favorite suggestion of her diplomacy, and coming to a direct under- ■ standing with the Porte, so far at least as the passage of the Straits is concerned. This is not the place to discuss the question whether the present restriction has or has not been invested with exaggerated value by our traditional policy. Many will maintain that long years must elapse before Eussia, poor and tradeless, can hope to become formidable on the sea, and some of the best heads at St. Petersburg are of opinion that it is only in the Pacific that Eussia is ever likely to become a great maritime Power ; but there is no probability that, in the near future, England will release the Czar from his promise, and it may bo useful, before our Government are further committed, to ascertain its value. Now everything seems to tend to the conclusion that there is not one of the Great Powers, except Great Britain, that really cares about this question—not Germany, nor Italy, nor France, nor even Austria. We might indeed go further, and assert, without doing more than echo an almost universal suspicion, that of these Powers, such as are not simply indifferent on the subject are actual accomplices in the attack on Turkey. On the other hand, it remains to be seen whether any English statesman will think it politic in us to assume the position of direct, isolated, and permanent antagonism to Eussia, as it may be thought we should do if we set ourselves alone to close the Straits against the Eussian navy. This being the case—the decision of Europe being a foregone conclusion to yield the Eliasian demands —those amongst us who consider that British interests of the highest moment are involved in the rigid maintenance ot the old restrictions will probably be led reluctantly to conclude that we have been somewhat pompously selling our neutrality “ for a gross ot green spectacles.”