THE SITUATION IN THE EAST.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 5222, 17 December 1877, Page 3

THE SITUATION IN THE EAST.

■ - . (From the correspondent of Melbourne Argus.) London, October 26’. The recent victory of the Russians in Asia, and the prospect of being able to operate in overwhelming force in Europe, have revived the hopes of their partizans. It is not improbable that some great stroke will yet be delivered in Bulgaria before the winter sets in, and the news this morning of a successful foray by General Gourka, on the road between Plevna and Sophia, is most likely the precursor of important events in this quarter. The Russians have received all their expected reinforcements, and must now muster something like 300,000 men in Bulgaria, which is the most powerful army ever sent forth by Russia outside of her own territory, exceeding perhaps the whole force with which she defended the Crimea against the combined powers of England and France. The Turks cannot possibly have an equal number of men in the field, even if we reckon all their Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians, who have hitherto been perfectly useless for any other work than pillage and massacre. The strategy of the Russians, under the auspices of Geneial, Todleben, is likely to be different from that which has hitherto been pursued. There will be no assaults in the open against redoubts. Taught by the experience of their past reverses, the Russians will confine themselves to movements en masse, sitting down before such places as Plevna, which will be besieged according to all the forms of scientific warfare. The adoption of these tactics bodes no good to the Turkish cause. The Turkish armies are not equal, either in numbers or in efficiency, to those of the enemy, nor have their generals exhibited any of that dash and energy which might he expected to supply the place of the superior armaments of Russia. : In one essential arm, viz., the Turks are almost wholly deficient. Their artillery, also, though well served and good of its kind, is inferior in strength to that of the Russians. On the whole, therefore, the prospect is a gloomy one for 'Turkey. We may be prepared to hear of great disasters in Bulgaria, even in spite of the coming winter, which will perhaps be a greater disadvantage for the Turks than for their opponents. It is quite true that there has been a great amount of suffering and disease in the Russian camp, that the Russian commissariat is bad, and the Russian transport service still worse. It is true that to maintain an army of 300,000 men in Bulgaria will tax most severely the resources of Russia. On the other hand, the Turks must suffer from the difficulties of obtaining supplies almost as much as the Russians, while a large portion of their troops, including the Egyptian contingent, which has already proved its inferiority in the field, will feel the effects of the terrible winter in the Balkan peninsula even more than the hardy legionaries of the Czar. I know that in high official quarters in lingland the impression is that Turkey will not be able to hold her own much longer, and it is expected that some catastrophe will occur even before the winter sets in. The recent declaration of Prince Gortschakoff, that Russia is determined to continue the war until its objects have been fully obtained, has been interpreted to mean that the Russians have been encouraged by their recent successes in Asia to go on with their enterprise as originally planned. In other words, they will not be content without exacting from Turkey such terms as will entirely reinstate Russia in her old position of protector of the Eastern Christians, besides givingher substantial advantage in the shape of increased territory in Armenia, and the free navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Prince Gortschakoff, it is true, speaks only of “improving the condition of the Christians in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina ;” but no one of course believes, or has believed, that the Russian ambition is limited to this disinterested object. If this were all that is wanted, namely, the amelioration of the condition of the Christians, I believe it could be attained at once without any more fighting. Turkey would not be unwilling to make peace on the condition of granting to her Christian subjects the amplest liberty of self-government consistent with the maintenance of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the Porte. As to the question of guarantees, it might be settled without any difficulty if the English Government had the courage to become security for Turkey. That appears to me to be the simplest solution which is practicable. England could undertake to superintend the government of the provinces, even to administer the government with her own officers, of whom she has an ample supply in India and elsewhere, accustomed to the management of Orientals. Both Mussulmans and Christiana would trust Englishmen to an extent which they certainly would not trust Russians or any other people, nor could it be suspected that England has any designs of her own, either political or religious, in undertaking the trust. As for the Russians, they have never shown any capacity for ruling nations alien to their own. The Caucasus and Poland are standing evidences of their failure. They either meddle with the religion of the conquered people, or they stand apart from them, as in Turkistan, out of sheer inability to understand their ways. Whether Russians, however, would accept such a plan as I have suggested is, of course, extremely doubtful. If she will not do so, it will be a proof to the world of the hollowness of her pretence of undertaking this war solely for the benefit of the Christiana in Turkey. Of course she has her own ends to serve, and those ends do not necessarily imply the improvement of the condition of the Turkish Christians.

In any case it cannot be long before England is once more brought face to face with the problem which hitherto her Government has been too much disposed to shirk. Under the influence of the late Turkish victories, or rather the Russian defeats, the British public seem to have slumbered in the comfortable idea that all further trouble in connection with the Eastern Question was at an end. Wo are only now, however, at the threshold of the Eastern Question, which must be solved either in accordance with the views of England or in opposition to them. Witli the first great Russian victory in Bulgaria we shall return to the

position of anxiety and uneasiness which we held when General Gourka made his raid across the Balkans. Should the Russians succeed in either taking Plevna or in beating back the army of Sulieman Pasha, they will be able to resume their original purpose of crossing the Balkans and dictating a peace at Adrianople or even at Constantinople. We shall then perhaps slowly awake to the necessity of once more strengthening the Mediterranean garrisons. As to any help from Austria or Germany, it is now obvious that it is out of the question. Bismarck is certainly inclined tolet Russia go on to the bitter end, calculating that, at the worst, she will be so exhausted by her Turkish campaign as to be impotent for any mischief for another generation to come. Audrassy is clearly under the dominion of the stronger spirit, and will do whatever Bismarck may advise. Besides, recent events are calculated rather to set Austria at her ease in regard to Russia than to awaken her fears. It has been proved that Russia is not very formidable as n military power after all, and the further she advances into Turkey the more completely will she be at the mercy of Austria, who holds such a magnificent position on her flank and rear. For these reasons, connected with her own interests, Austria is not likely to join in any premature attempt at intervention. Indeed, there is no idea of intervening at present on the part of any power. All the rumors to the contrary notwithstanding, I know on tile best authority that the British Ministry have no thought at present of mediation, believing it to be impracticable. They would he prepar d, should there be any great reaction in public opinion at Home, to take active measures to protect British interests in the East, even to the extent of allying themselves with the Turks for the clefeuce of Constantinople ; but under the influence of divided counsels the Cabinet at present will do nothing. Lord Salisbury aud his friends are known to be pro-Russian in their sympathies, and I believe they would rather let Constantinople go than commit themselves to any policy which would involve a collision with Russia. Lord Beaconsfield is for a more enterprising and spirited policy, but he is getting old and infirm, aud cannot take so much part in public business as he used to do. Lord Derby steers a middle course between the two parties of his friends, and would prefer writing vigorous despatches which lead to nothing. As for public opinion, I am more than ever convinced that its tendency is strongly anti-Russian, not because of any love for the Turks in the abstract, still less of any sympathy with their government, but partly because of the feeling of admiration which the gallant defence of the Turks has aroused, and partly because of the conviction of the serious danger to British interests through a too great preponderance of Russian influence in the East. A spark may set a light to the train, and breed such an enthusiasm in favor of the Turkish cause as may lead to war. That contingency is certainly nearer than it was a month ago, when it seemed probable that the Turks would be able to make good their stand against Russia at least until next year. It is now beginning to be admitted that the miracles wrought by the Turkish arms cannot be repeated, that in the end superior numbers and greater resources must prevail, that Russia will have Turkey at her mercy, probably even before the winter comes.