WHY ENGLAND HAS NO ALLIES.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 5184, 2 November 1877, Page 3

WHY ENGLAND HAS NO ALLIES.

(From the World ) • A great opportunity has been lost, and her Majesty’s Government have to admit a new failure. The time had arrived when it was important to Russia that Servia should be turned to account, and this could mot be done without Austria’s acquiescence. For months past, whenever the public was getting uneasy, Ministers have comforted us by saying that the interest of Austria in checking Russia was greater than that of England, and that the action which was inevitable on her part justified an indefinite lethargy on ours. Lord Beaeonsfield’s Cabinet had obviously everything to gain by influencing the Emperor’s Ministers at this juncture. The two great objects of English policy—an early peace, and one concluded upon terms consistent with the maintenance of the Turkish Empire—might have been attained by the co operation of Austria. Instead of this, a new concession has been made to the Czar. Hence arise the questions, Why have we no influence ? Why have we no allies ? .Various answers might be given—many plausible and several true. For to-day it is enough that wo should concern ourselves with one ; and wo do not propose to deal with those peculiar circumstances which affect the policy of Austria, and which have unfortunately been little understood. Whatever the cause—whether it be the inefficiency of our diplomatic service, or the ignorance of our statesmen, or merely the result of our insular position, which, removing ua from the dangers, leaves ua also insensible of the cares, of foreign States—certain it is that our Government persists in treating as stereotyped maxims of policy considerations which have long ceased to weigh with continental Cabinets. When an English ambassador appeals to the principles which wore looked upon as axiomatic at the time of the Crimean War, he may be met with assurance of civil acquiescence ; but as soon as he is gone, the Minister, for Foreign Affairs shrugs his shoulders, and perhaps exclaims, “ Ocs Anglais sont impayables.” Take the case of our allies of 1855. If the Italian Minister were to speak his mind,

would he not say, “ Count Cavour, when he joined your league, only did so to give Italy a locus standi in the councils o£ Europe ; and if he denounced Russia, observe that it was the Russia of the Emperor Nicholas, whose reactionary influence, wielding all the resources of Prussia and of Austria and of Germany, opposed an insuperable barrier to every Liberal movement in Europe. Since the new reign, we have no complaint to make of the Czar’s policy. Indeed, the offensive power of Russia was always enormously exaggerated, and she was really only formidable through her alliances. The unification of Germany has changed all that; and a Power has arisen which need not rear to encounter three Russias in arms. We have nothing to fear from Russia in the Mediterranean, and if you think we are going to identify ourselves with you, merely in order that your route to India may not cost you a little more, on account of naval insurance, you are very much mistaken.” Italy, as is well known, relies -upon Germany to succour her in certain contingencies, but the Italians are far too sagacious not to see that the German Empire is likely to develop itself in a way which might render an increase of Russia by no means unwelcome. Nevertheless Germany has been so useful to them in the past, and may become so necessary in the future, that their feelings towards her are much less sharply defined than those of Prance or even of Austria. In our inviolate island it is difficult to realise the consequences to neighboring States of such a domination as that which the new German Empire has succeeded in establishing. After eleven years’ humiliating experience, Austria is perhaps beginning to fashion her neck to the yoke ; but it is not so very long ago that the Emperor was obliged to abandon a scheme for fortifying the line of the Enns, because it was displeasing to Prince Bismarck. Since the war of 1871, the Prench have frequently been compelled to obey similar intimations from Berlin ; for Germany although, as we are constantly told, her intentions as regards Prance are pacific, as _ regards Austria not only pacific, but friendly—feels more at ease when the way lies open from her frontier to Paris and to Vienna without let or hindrance. If a municipality in Eastern Prance wishes to inaugurate a memorial to the fallen soldiers of 1870, in all probability the mayor, when he has just prepared his neat oration, will receive a telegram from the Minister of the Interior, appealing “ to his well-known devotedness to abstain from demonstrations which might lead to misconceptions, that he would be the first to deplore.” The Emperor of Austria was at one moment believed to be desirous of getting rid of his present Minister, but he had the satisfaction of learning, from the columns of Prince Bismarck's organ, “that the good understanding between the two Empires depended upon the maintenance in office of Count Andrassy ; ” and of course the hint has been taken. We say nothing of the supervision which is constantly exercised from Berlin over the language of ecclesiastics in France and in Belgium ; but the foreign influence is said to extend to questions of a character even more essentially domestic. One of those cosmopolitan financiers, who are numerous at Paris one, we believe, who occasionally favors London with his presence.—was lately in trouble, and the public were expecting a great trial, when suddenly all the proceedings were stayed, and the affair hushed up. Then it was recounted that he was of German origin, and that he owed his immunity to the intervention of his Government. The German Ambassador had gone to the Due Decazes and said, “ Here are two great financial scandals, in one of which Baron X., a'. Frenchman, is involved ; in the other Baron Y, a German. You are welcome to prosecute them both if you like ; but if the proceedings against Baron X. are dropped, while those against Baron Y. are pressed, we shall have to consider him as a victim of his nationality.” And if anyone should consider these stories unfounded, or at least exaggerated, if anyone should require an irrefutable proof of the fears which Germany excites, we would point to the official language of the Due Decazes before the last Assembly —the most humiliating declaration ever made by the Minister of an independent State—in which he endeavored to prove by extracts from his diplomatic reports that Germany would consent to allow a Conservative administration to be formed and a Conservative Parliament to be elected. We are pointing out the true state of affairs; we shall now attempt to show by what means the aims of English policy may be aocommodated to the altered state of the European commomyealth. The truth is that, as regards this Eastern Question/there is no Europe. The establishment of the German Empire has cost France £20,000,000 a year in interest upon debt, half as much more in increased armaments, and universal military service besides. It is idle to go to such, a Power and complain that the aggrandisement of Russia may, 15 or 20 years hence, cost us an addition of three or four millions to our naval estimates; vain to tell the French that in a distant future we fear for India, when their fears are immediate, instant, and for Paris. If we would have allies, we must appeal to them in the name of something more solid than dangers which, as regards themselves, they feel to be illusory, and apprehensions which they know to be obsolete.