THE RUSSIANS IN ASIA MINOR.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 5156, 1 October 1877, Page 3

THE RUSSIANS IN ASIA MINOR.

The well-informed and able writer, who has been dealing with the varying aspects of the Eastern Question in the Edinburgh Review for the last two years, suppose* that the events of the last three months “must have demonstrated to all but the most credulous and fanatical of mankind, that the Russian Government has been pursuing a deep-laid and deliberate plan of aggression against the Ottoman Empire, and that this plan has been in operation not only for months but years.” There must be some imperial object in this war, for nothing but the'attainment of such an object could repay Russia “ for her laborious and discreditable intrigues, for her large financial saorifies, for a huge military effort, burdensome to the whole population of the Empire, and for the peril to which she exposes her relations with the other Powers of Europe.” What then is this object ? The writer names three as being the moat obvious and attainable. 1. To shake off the obligations of the Treaty of Paris, concluded in 1856 between Russia and all the great Powers of Europe, and to substitute for.it a separate treaty with Turkey, conferring on the Emperor of Russia in express terms the protectorate of the Christian population of Turkey. . 2. The recovery of the maritime supremacy of Russia in the Black Sea by the surrender or destruction of the Turki-h fleet, and by opening the passage of the Straits to men-ot-war; ’

3. The conquest of Armenia, including the port of Batoum, and the occupation by Russia of the central plateau of Asia M nor. « As for the first of these points,” says the reviewer, “ it is enough to observe that it would amount to the concession of the Menschikoff demands of 1853, and to the surrender of all that was declared at that time by Great Britain, in accord with all the other Powers of Europe, to be impossible.” Whatever may have happened since 1853, the objections to such a surrender are just as powerful now as they were then. With regard to opening the Dardanelles to ships of war, one thing is certain, that if the Straits are opened at all they must not be opened to Russians ships of war only. “ If the Russian fleet ever acquires the right of sailing from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, the fleets of all foreign nations must acquire the right of ingress from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, and not only the legal right, recorded in a treaty, but physical securities that the passage, shall never be closed or interfered with.” Ah far as England is concerned, the Black Sea would then become her natural theatre of hostilities against Russia, and her. interests would be’ only so far affected that she would have to bear the expense of maintaining a Black Sea squadron, capable at all times of securing the passage. _ But we could not, the writer urges, treat with equal indifference the surrender to Ru-sia of the Turkish fleet, supposing that to be demanded in the place of a war indemnity. Russia, possessed of the Turkish fleet, would become superior to England as a naval Power, and such a result could hardly be submitted to by a Power “ which on far slighter grounds took possession of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, lest it should fall into the hands of Napoleon.” The rest of the paper is occupied with the discussion of the probable designs of Russia upon Armenia and Aria Minor. It is pointed out that through a long course of years the Rusrian Government lavished blood and treasure without stint on the conquest of Georgia aryl the Caucasus ; and yet, “ taken by themselves, the conquest of the Caucasus and the annexation of Georgia are perfectly worthless, and even onerous acquisitions. Their political and military vrlue consist in that to which they lead. They lead to the virtual conquest of that portion of Asia Minor which must be regarded as one of the central positions of the globe.” The possession of Erzerourn would give Russia the key to the tableland of Asia Minor; and with that in her hands, “ she ■would hold the real outworks of Constanti-

nople as effectually as if’sKe were at Sizopolis or Scutari. - ’ I Constantinople is admirably adapted to be a seat of empire, resting on ■ the strait which separates two continents, and uniting the adjacent provinces under her 1 supreme authority. But the long annals of this illustrious city demonstrate that when the provinces fall under a foreign invader the capital itself is prostrate.. It is, we fear, an entirely wild and baseless speculation that Constantinople could ever become a free and neutral city, under the joint protectorate of all the Powers. At the first disturbance—and disturbances can always be kindled in Stamboul as easily as fires —a pretext, wouid be given to interfere for the preservation of order, and Constantinople would not long preserve that independence which Frankfort, Hamburg, and Cracrow have recently lost. Constantinople, in other words, is admirably adapted to be a seat of empire when that empire embraces and commands the adjacent territories ; but if those adjacent territories: are not commanded by the Power occupying the city, no worse situation can be imagined. It is open to attack by sea and land. Its supplies may be out off ; and the means of providing for its own defence, requiring a fleet and an array and ample stores of war, would be altogether wanting.