MY OPINION.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 5152, 27 September 1877, Page 2

MY OPINION.

TO THE EDITOR OP THE NEW ZEALAND TIMES. Sir, —Questions of order seem to be just now in the ascendant, or are at all events being raised, not without fierceness of discussion. Allow an old practitioner, no longer in the House, to contribute what knowledge he acquired there. I allude in particular to the proposed discharge of the Native Lands Bill from the Order Paper. Of course my information is confined to what I read in Hansard ; but that ought to suffice. Mr. Stout’s position appears to be, that an order of the day having been once read cannot be discharged at all. The idea is certainly original ; but in questions of order, we used to consider precedent ; what was old rather than what is new. About that I say no more, the point having been effectually disposed of by the Speaker, who is master of his work. Mr. Gisborne’s argument on the same side is ingenious, but it rests upon imperception of the essential difference between the withdrawal of a motion and the discharge of an order. Withdrawal is not put to the vote at all ; for if it were a majority of voices would carry or reject it. It is granted, and only by leave unanimous. Now then, and here lies the point—if an amendment shall have been moved, the Speaker knows that there is at least one member who objects to a withdrawal that would baulk bis expressed intention, and therefore finds it his duty to ascertain formally whether or not such member be willing to change his intention, —to consent to a general withdrawal, by previous withdrawal of the amendment. Mr. Gisborne’s error consists in supposing that there is some talismanic force in the amendment, that it is itself the instantta I cracts, instead of being a mere expres- ‘ siou of individual dissent, where unani-

jaous consent is • required. But the discharge of an order is decided by a majority of voices, therefore the amendment rule, implying unanimity, no longer applies. In other words, if a majority of the House desire to get rid of a question altogether, they have the means of effecting the object without being hampered by any subsidiary question of amendment. The, forms of the House are framed with a view to giving (ultimately) free expression to the will of the majority, not for the purpose of baulking it. Mr. Travers carries us on to a somewhat nicer question. He says The motion to discharge an order of the day is unquestionably an amendment, and the mode in which it is usually put is this : That all the words after ‘That’ in the motion be left out, in order to insert those which will be necessary to discharge the order of the day.” I say that he is conscious of the fallacy of his own argument. Mark what he does. He seeks to prove that the motion to discharge is an amendment, by making it appear that it has to be “ put ” in the form appropriated to amendments—“ That all the words after the word ‘that’ be omitted,” &c. But he qualifies his proposition by the use of the word “usually”—a word likely to escape notice, but which there means not necessarily —thereby destroying the absoluteness of his own proof. Why, I ask, must_ the motion to discharge be necessarily put in that complicated form ? That form was invented for the purpose of giving expression to every variety of amendment that can be devised (and it is the only means) so long as a majority desires to entertain any question of amendment, and no longer. When once a majority desiie to supersede the whole question, amendments and all, the raison d'etre of that complicated form no longer exists. A motion to discharge the order is no more am amendment than a simple negative of the question would be an amendment; no more an amendment than supercession of the whole question, by adjournment would be. The more correct and logical mode of putting the question, “ That an order be discharged,” is independently, as a motion of adjournment would be put, and not by leaving out all the words after the word “ that.” The principles of parliamentary law are easily mastered, and will always guide to a right conclusion. But word-catching, especially among gentlemen of the legal profession, seems now to have come into vogue. “ Order” is treated in the Old Bailey fashion, as if the first object were to find “ a flaw in the indictment.”- —I am, &c., Hugh Carlrton. Bay of Islands, Sept. 13.