SUPREME COURT.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 5116, 16 August 1877, Page 2

SUPREME COURT.

Wednesday, August 15. ADDRESS TO THE JUDGES FROM-THE BAR. Their Honors the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Richmond took their seats on the bench at eleven o’clock, in order to proceed with the case of Parata v. Bishop Hadfield, which had stood over for further argument from the last hearing. There was an unusually large attendance of members of the Bar in wig and gown, and the spectators felt quite sure that all these learned gentlemen were not engaged in the case before the Court, but that some unusual occurrence must have brought them together. k The mystery was soon explained, for on the case being called on Mr. Brandon rose and asked permission to address a few remarks to the Court, on behalf of the Bar, before the business of .the day was proceeded with. The requisite assent having been given, Mr. 1 Brandon read the following address : May it please your Honors, The members of the Bar practising in the Supreme Court at this place, with an obvious, exception, have requested me to state in open Court that they have noticed with regret that a gentleman practising at- the Bar here has made an application to Parliament containing charges against two of the Judges of this honorable Court. They desire that it should be known that this application has been made without previous consultation with any of them, that they are ignorant of its state-

ments, except from common rumor, and have no sympathy with such a proceeding. They make this statement, not only to show their respect for the Judges of this Court,—for no demonstration of the kind is needed,—-but m order to protect the public from being misled by silence on the part of the Bar under circumstances so unprecedented in their cha- - The Chief Justice replied as" follows: Mr. Brandon and Gentlemen of the Bar,— Per myself, I may say that I thank you for the expression. of sympathy, and the expression of that confidence which, if the Judges of this Court do not possess, they ought certainly to continue no longer in office ; at the same time, I think it was an expression which perhaps might have been anticipated. For you, as officers of this Court, are as bound to maintain the respect and dignity of the Court as are the Judges of the Court themselves; and any officer who omits or neglects to do so is, in my opinion, as culpable aa any Judge of this Court would be who so omitted or neglected his duty. , At the same time, I desire to say that, being aware from what has appeared in the public prints; I wish to say nothing to depreciate an inquiry into my pwn conduct. I am aware that it is the privilege of every British subject, if he has a well-grounded complaint against a Judge of the land, —such,a complaint as would justify him in asking for the _ removal of the Judge,—to apply to the Legislature for redress ; and I therefore desire to say nothing to deprecate the conduct erf any person who, having any such wellgrounded complaint, takes the proper constitutional course to get such redress. ' Mr. Justice Richmond said : I may say that I entirely concur with what his Honor the Chief Justice has just stated ; and I must confess that I cannot but feel glad to see that you regard the fair fame of the Judges of this Court as public property—as your property—and that in fact our good names are not our own, but belong to the country. ' I glory in our liability to have our conduct investigated at any time, and look upon that as a guarantee of the purity of the administration of justice in this Court. At the proper time, and in the proper place, I shall, for my own part, be ready to meet any accusation which may be brought against me. Meanwhile lam glad to see that you estimate—duly as X think —the value of the good relations subsisting between the Bench and the Bar ; and ! have often had occasion to see that without such good relations the functions of this Court cannot be properly performed. lam glad to see, gentlemen, that you appreciate the importance of a good understanding between the Bench and the Bar. : - The following • barristers, who remained standing during the remarks of , their Honors, then bowed and left the Court :—Messrs. Button, Chapman, Edwards, Fitz Gerald, Fitzherhert, Allan, Izard, Lewis, Moorhonse, OlUvier. Quick, Travers, Hart, Brandon, and Brandon, jun. • The business of the day was then proceeded with. W 1 PARATA V, BISHOP HADFIELD. Mr. Travers appeared : for the plaintiff, and Mr. Barton and Mr. Izard for the AttorneyGeneral, who is made a party to the suit. ■ Further argument on the demurrer obtained in the case'was resumed. , Mr., Travers contended that the Crown’s right could only be contested by a petition of right, the Grown consenting. This being a matter affecting the administration of charities, the Attdrpey-General had been made a party to the suit ; but that did not make the Crown a party. The Attorney-General was there" to protect the. Crown’s rights. He referred to the relations. -existing between the Government of" the United States and the free" Indian tribes, which was treated as thatof quasi nation and nation ; hut it was not so between the British Government and the Maoris, who were , all treated as British subjects. Parata was suing here as one subject suing another. The United States Government treated the Indians within their respective territories" as free and independent tribes, governed by their own laws and usages, under their own chiefs, and competent to act in a national character; and ■ exercise self-government,' and while residing within their ovra 'territories owing no allegiance to the municipal laws of the whites. He contended that Earata could not contest the title to, this land except in the manner stated by petition of right, to which the Crown must consent. Mr. Barton contended that Parata was not suing ihe Crown, but he and those he represented Were seeking as subjects to obtain possession of lands held by other subjects, and he was entitled tp_come into this Court to litigate the title to this property. " v At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court reserved judgment. : .