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New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 5077, 2 July 1877, Page 2

The papers to hand by the Suez mail contains no information concerning the Rußso-Turldth war. Indeed, owing l to the very full telegrams in the San Francisco papers, our correspondent's letter from there, telegraphed on the arrival of the last mail via America in Auckland, contained a detailed account of all matters

in connection with the struggle between the Ottoman and the Slav, bringing its dates fully a fortnight later than any received by the mail via Suez, We have, however, in the letters of the special correspondents of the Melbourne Argus several valuable evidences of the political situation caused by the war in England and throughout Europe, and the opinion is everywhere confirmed that, despite the assurances of Russia to the contrary she, and she alone, is responsible for hostilities, and would never have rested contented without their occurrence. Perhaps the clearest account of the Russian intrigues to bring about war under any circumstance, is forwarded by the Berlin correspondent of the Melbourne

Argus. He states positively that, though the now celebrated protocol did not authorise the Russians to control the action" of the Turkish authorities, and to place a Russian Government over the Turkish Government in the Christian provinces of Turkey, yet the Turks were practically forced by this international document to accord to their Rayah subjects a degree of independence which could not but promote the Russian interest. Notwithstanding this unpleasant feature, Edhem Pasha, the Grand Vizier, informed Mr. Jocelyn, the British Charge d’Affairs at Constantinople, of his willingness to accept the protocol, and also to accord to Montenegro the rectification of her frontier recommended by the Power*. The welcome announcement was received with the greatest applause, and peace appeared -certain ; but the fates willed it otherwise. The promptness of

Edhbm Pasha in endorsing the protocol encouraged the Russians to ask for more. Instead of being satisfied with the mere rectification of the Montenegrin frontier suggested by the Powers, they now caused the Montenegrin* to ask for the cession of a territory equal to half their land. The correspondent goes on further—" It is difficult to say what the Turkish Cabinet would have done under the pressure brought to bear upon them at that critical moment had they been left to decide free from popular control, but the news of the Montenegrin demand getting wind at Constantinople, public opinion was violently inflamed by the extravagant proposition, and so made it impossible for Ministers to yield. Despite the sentinels placed in fiont of the Ministerial build-

ings, placards threatening death to the illustrious Imautns, if yielding to the odious Montenegrins, were daily posted up on the walls. Anonymous letters to the same effect reached the Sultan. After a day or two, the popular voice had to be listened to. Safvbt Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared to the Montenegrin delegates waiting his reply at Constantinople, that the Turkish Government, finding people and Parliament opposed to further concessions, had no alternative but to decline the claim preferred. Then it became apparent that the Montenegrins, or, to speak more correctly, the Russian wire-pullers at St. Petersburg, were not prepared to make the Turkish refusal the pretext for arupture. Far from leaving Constantinople, as they had threatened to do in case of refusal, they remained at the Turkish capital six days longer, and ovenfor Kisohineff, to consult the generals m. diplomatists assembled in the Russian cl ' , ,-' l o ru . There is no doubt

hat the war pa*iy J®.' andlfito talk big ut the RugaiM^oPfea^^'":. far, he could not withdraw without loss of dignity now that the petition of his Montenegrin allies had been rejected. It was also urged that if a defeat were sustained in the field of foreign politics it would be extremely difficult for the Government to repress the Constitutional aspirations of the educated classes. Last, but not least, it was contended that the army would feel humiliated by a cowardly retreat, and that it was more preferable to lose a campaign than to demoralise the troops.” Even after this the Emperor of Russia hesitated himself, but finally, though he informed the Great Powers that he did not mean to declare war while at Kischineff, he issued his address to the army, and the war began.