MR. SHAW LEFEVRE ON THE NAVIES OF EUROPE.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 5026, 3 May 1877, Page 3

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE ON THE NAVIES OF EUROPE.

(Ftom the Economist.) \

Mr. Shaw Lefevre has contributed to-tho'' current number of Macmillan’s Magazine; a very interesting on the relative 1 naval power of ; the different states of Europe,-which: ought to prevent, if anything, will prevent; the, speedy: recurrence of one of. those' tl scares ” which seize upon us from time to- time, and at which it is hardly possible to wonder, whenj as on the, last occasion, it. is the FirstLorctof the Admiralty Who originates the rsbare; He shows us that not only is EnglaadoratleasLas. strong relatively to the other navil Powers »f 3 Europe as she-was-in- 1793,- when—our tui-bed relations’ with France flrslrt began,'bulf that as regards any probable hostile combination among them she is considerably ‘stronger,. As nothing is ' really more damacing';to good > finanoepor, for that matter, to good sound administration either, than the spasmodic ’and irregular bursts ‘ of onesided activity in naval architecture which always follow these, scares, we will give our readers some brief summary of 1 Mr. Lefevre’s paper, in' the ffiope that tha wider knowledge of it may'tend to, discourage/ that spirit of panic’whioh interrupts from time to time the wise progress of naval administration and of financial economy. Mr. Eetevre begins by showing that in 179% our naval power, as compared with that of the 'chief antagonist whom -we had then to dread —France—-was in the”; following proportion. Of i ships of the line ,we had 115 Jvgainet France’s 76. But the French ships of the line were. more heavily armed than ooifc, so' that in number of guns our relative superiority was only as 8718 to 6002, and measuring by weight of broadsides, we find our strength was only as 88,957 to 73,967. Moreover, at that; time a combination not at all unlikely; and l ' which was realised before long—namely !in 1796—was a combination between France and Spain and Holland.-- Now Spain had-then a considerablo naval power, with as many ships of the line as Prance, and of no very inferior armament, while Holland, too,had a very considerable naval force, with 49 ships of the line. Yet when France, Spain, and Holland were engaged against England, in spite of > the' considerable superiority of their naval forces combined;' we defeated ;them ’ all -sin little ihore than a year.’ .This seems to show.that if England can secure a superiority, oryeven an equality, to any probable combination 6f hostile Powers in' modern times, it would not be at all rash to entertain some confidence that we should again be able to defeat them. ’ It is, however, no doubt, a great deal more difficult to weigh navies against each other than it was when the number of effective ships of the line possessed by any country was a very respectable measure of that country’s naval strength. Nevertheless, it is of course essential io attempt some estimate of the kind, and Mr. Lefevre, guided by a very careful French writer, has attempted it, certainly with no appearance of undue bias in favor of Great Britain, The first-class vessels, then, of our new period ' —which are supposed to have as much superiority over all of less armament and less thickly plated as the old Une-of-battle ships had over frigates, or lesser vessels—are classed as those plated with armor of more than six inches of thickness, and armed with guns of from 12 to 35 tons. Of such vessels it appears we have twenty built and six building, while France has twelve built and ten building; Germany five built and one building, Turkey six built and one building, Austria four built and one building, and Russia only three built and none building. Now, as Mr. Lefevre justly says, for some time to come, the most improbable of all combinations is one which: would uuite Germany and France against ns. ; Hence,’if wo were fighting with Germany against France, ; Powers: would have 25 first-

class vessels ready and seven building, •gainst 12 built and.lo building in France ; While if we ■ were allied ’ with France Germany,'qdr superiority in first-class vessels would be enormous. * But even this does not really represent, the full strength of our position ; for it - is 'not merely the number of first-class vessels but their strength, the relative number of sea-going vessels, as compared pvith those. fitted only for purposes of defeupe,, atid various other considerations of very considerable complexity. Which have to be taken into-account; and not 'only soj but the naval strength in second-class ships must also be carefullyestimated. Now, Mr. Lefevre’s French Authority, M. Marchal, has made a very careful analysis of all these varying elements of Strength, and bis conclusion is that the relative naval strength of the various Powers, including not only ships built, but also ships building, is in the following proportions:— England, 1112; France, 853; Germany, 374; Italy, 234; Turkey,. 215; Russia, 153; Austria, 134. If this estimate be near the mark, jt seems that France and Germany, if they were united against us, would be slightly superior to us in naval strength; but not nearly as much superior as France, Spain, and Holland were in 1796. But then no contingency is so unlikely as that France and Germany should be united’against us. And if ,we. had but Germany on our side we should be' ai fair match' for all the rest, of the navies f of Europe united j and still more, - of course,' if France was on our side, in which case we should have a mighty superiority to all the other navies of Europe when united. > i Mr. Lefevre adds some most important considerations which /would greatly increase our id vantages .over; other naval Powers, independently of the question of the relative strength of the ships and guns pitted against each other. The whole Secret of,naval power now is' steam. IVithout steam—which means without coal—these great marine monsters cannot be managed at' all, to say nothing of the machinery of their guns, most of which, again, depends upon steam for the supply of the hydraulic power chiefly used. Now the Power which is richest in-coaling stations will be richest in the chief' appliances of maritime war, other things being equal. But England has depots of her own in every part of the'world, while the'other Powers, of Europe havwvery few such depots. Again,' .the strategic value - of Our fortified ports, subh as - Gibraltar, "Haifa/ : Aden, ; Hongkong; the Cape, &c., 'has been -vastly increased, since we should use them as inexhaustible depots of , covl, whence, we should send out vessels of the Devastation type,' while the other Powers would be’"dependent.‘on; coal drawn from a distance.” This applies particularly to. Gib-raltar;-which may'now be madeto seal up the ’fleets of other nations againsf-ingress into the Mediterranean; or, egressyfrom'it—which impossible'when' Our ships were dependent on Wind for sailing power. Indeed, Mr. Lefevre shows that hostile ’ fleets more than once passed the. Straits.of Gibraltar without our having the ’ wind which 'would alone have •enabled our fleet.!to', dispute’'the passage. Finally, our reserves in coal and iron gives us tke command of the' cartjijjgJJrade. of„,the, it with swift armed vessels, and of thepower of interrupting what is not so protected;in a’wayin"whichTtio other Power of Europe could .pretend to com.pete with’us. " ' ' j Such is Mr,-Lefevre’s 'estimate' of pur rela-' tive naval, ,and- we think £hat. it is reasonable" enough, ' and . sufficiently* careful i,basedl ion The > estimates - of- other ■ analysts, l as 1 well as his free from that liability* tb",naval panics which have, of "lajte years bedriso frequent’and so mischievous.