WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND RUSSIA.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 5020, 26 April 1877, Page 3

WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND RUSSIA.

The telegram in another column leads to the conclusion that war hag been declared between Turkey and Russia; therefore a few particulars as to the relative strength of the contending Powers, aud opinions as to the probable results of the contest, as given in the latest publications, may be of iuterest.

The military force of Turkey is divided into ■ —The regular active army, of about 150,000 men, called “ Nizamthe reserve, or “ Bedif the contingents of auxiliaries, and the irregulars. At the end of 1876 there were more than 300,000 men actually under arms. The navy in 1875 consisted of about 165 vessels (of which 72 were steamers and 20 ironclads). The revenue' and national debt, two very important factors in the problem “ who will win,” may, be gathered from the following:— Estimated revenue, 1875-6 ... £21,711,505 Estimated expenditure, 1875-76... 26,299,180 Foreign debt, 1878 185,000,000 Interior consolidated debt, about 33,000,000 Floating debt, 1874, about ... 7,500,000 Total debt, 1874, about ... 225,000,000 The nominal strength of the Russian army

is about 1,300,000 on the war footing, and 765,000 on the peace footing ; to the latter must be added 190,000 Cossacks on military service. The navy consists of the Baltic fleet, that of the Black Sea, and of flotillas on the Aral and Caspain Seas, and in Siberia, comprising about 175 steam vessels (of which 29 are ironclad, carrying 1530 guns, besides others in construction), and 12 sailing vessels, chiefly transports. Public revenue, 1875 ••• £7.8,000,239 Public expenditure, 1875 ... 75,010,333 Amount of public debt, 1874 ... 248,548,100

Upon paper, and doubtless as a matter of fact, the Russians are very much the stronger, and despite the mysterious hints, even broad assertions as to the impecunious condition of Russia, there is no doubt that she has never entered into a war better prepared that on the present occasion. We might say that ever since the Frauco-Prussian war Russia has been steadily preparing. The arsenals and dockyards have been excessively busy, and especially has this been the case during the past few months. If Turkish diplomacy has baffled and shamed the ingenuity of the Great Powers, the time has not been lost so far as Russia is concerned, for troops have been massed, reserves armed and drilled, and provisions stored as close to the frontier as was desirable. However, notwithstanding the superiority in numbers, and the vastness of the resources of the Russians, it must not be imagined that there is an easy task before them, or that the hopes of the Czar for a speedy return are at all likely to be realised. It will not be a war of races, a war of religions, but probably upon it depends the question as to whether Turkey as a nation shall be blotted out of the map of Christian Europe. The unaccountably strong fortresses of Turkey require,but defending skilfully to render very possible a repetition of the tote of Sviatoslav and his army, who were decimated some thousand years ago in attempting to enter the Byzantine Empire. A contemporary also reminds us of the fiasco in 1854 when Russia brought 80,000 troops against the 15,000 Turks who lay under Nuisaa Pasha behind the entrenchments ; and, after a desperate assault lasting over five weeks, had to retire with a loss of 12,000 men.

A recent article in the Army and Navy Gazette says:—“ Colonel Evelyn Wood considers that a careful review of the circumstances tends to create a belief that the Russians will meet with no insuperable difficulties in their march to the neighborhood of Constantinople, but that there they will be brought to a standstill by the lines planned for the defence of the capital—that is to say, if these lines are constructed in time. He asserts, however, thst as yet not a spadeful of earth has been removed. In our opinion, his views of the probable success of the invaders are somewhat too sanguine. But let us examine his facts v ’and speculations. He asserts that the Russian army at Kischeneff numbers 271,600 infantry, 15,330 cavalry, and 245 guns. This may be the authorised establishment of the corps assembled ; but from the information which we have gathered from various sources, we are disposed to believe that, though such a force exists on paper, its efficient strength did not, up to a week ago, exceed 200,000 of all ranks, including non-combatants. We do not, however, deny that, though large bodies of troops must be left in the Caucasus, in Poland, and as garrisons of the Black Sea fortresses, it would be quite possible to mass on the Pruth an army as strong as that which Colonel Vincent asserts is there assembled. Enormous deductions must be made. In the first place, in the march to the Danube a large number will be removed by sickness, for the waste of a Russian array is notoriously great. In the second place, the left flank, at all events, must be guarded, for the Roumanian army would have quite enough to do to protect the right flank. The Dobrudschen forms a salient point from which a sihall body of men could inflict considerable damage on the Russian communications, and especially that portion of the railway which runs from Galatz for several miles parallel and close to the Danube. Mr. Vincent says the Turks have no pontoons or other means of crossing the river ; but it is inconceivable that there should not be fishing boats, and materials for making rafts, or flying bridges. 'lt is very possible that the Turks would be unable to pass over a large army. But a large army would not be needed to cut the communications. Even half-a-dozen men could, during a few hours of the night, temporarily interrupt the railway traffic, and a hundred horsemen would hamper the passage of provision trains moving by road. Besides, there are seven Turkish gunboats in the Danube, and there is no reason to doubt than an enterprising naval officer could, in spite of torpedoes and batteries, run up with a flotilla of other gunboats and small steamers. Colonel Vincent says that the gunboats now in the river would he soon destroyed by the Russian artillery, siuce there are absolutely no creeks in which vessels could be sheltered from guns placed on the northern banks. It is not, however, to be imagined that the gunboats would remain stationary to be fired at, and the northern bank is in many places so marshy that guns could not be placed in position, even if we were to grant that the Russians could spare a sufficient number of batteries to line the entire length of the river. If the' Turkish gunboats be properly handled, we believe that they will play an important part, both in obstructing the passage of the Danube by the Russians, and in facilitating the crossing of small bodies of Turks destined _ to operate against the invaders’ communications. Everything, indeed, will be against the Russians when they seek to pass into Bulgaria, for the southern is higher than the northern bank, and there is an utter lack of lateral communications on the latter. Nevertheless we should ignore all the teachings of history if we believed that the Russians would not eventually cross the river. Before, however, that operation can be attempted, it will be necessary, first, to move a large army through Roumania, and this process, we imagine, will be more difficult than Mr. Vincent anticipates. He says that the railway which runs from Odessa via Kischeneff, Jaffy, and Bucharest, to Giurgevo, will be able to mo ■ e the invading army, keep it supplied with food, stores, and reinforcements, and carry hack the sick and wounded. He considers that the narrowing of the gauge at Jassy is a fact of no importance, for the Roumanian rolling-stock is abundant, good, and specially contracted for the transport of. troops ; moreover, the space between the wheels of the Russian carriages could be soon and easily narrowed. This operation, would, however, diminish greatly the means of moving men and stores as far as Jassy. We have read that the Roumanian rolling-stock, too, is by no means abundant and good, Making, however, every concession to Colonel Vincent, we feel convinced from the experience of the Prussians in 1870-71, that a single railway would be taxed beyond its capabilities, were it required to transport fighting men as well as stores and sick. We agree with Mr. Vincent in thinking that the direction of the railway indicates the points of passage, and that, probably, the latter will be attempted at points opposite to Rustchuk, Turkestan, and Silistria, These fortresses are, we are told by Mr. Vincent, in a very inefficient state, and weakly garrisoned, but it is probable that during the last few weeks these defects have . been partially remedied. It must be also borne in mind that in Turkish fortresses not only is there a numerous artillery militia, but that every adult male may be viewed as a fighting man. The towns in question -would, no doubt, bo ultimately taken, but the sieges of Turkish fortresses are generally costly and slow, and their resistance would not only delay an advance, but help to diminish the strength of the invaders. As to the subsequent operations, it is obvious that the passage of the Balkan could not bo attempted till both Varna and Schumla had been either taken or blockaded. We shall, therefore, be astonished if the Russians find themselves in a position to cross the Balkan before the commencement of the second campaign. As to the passes, they are, some of them, traversed by indifferent roads, are easy to defend, and would undoubtedly be strongly fortified. But here, again, we believe that the Russians, if victorious in the open field, would ' eventually succeed in accomplishing a passage.

We, however, ground our belief on the prolonged, if not eventually successful, resistance of the Turks, of the difficulties of supplying and finding transport for even 100,000 men in the Balkan peninsula, and the fact that the Turks possess, and are likely to retain, the mastery of the Black Sea. As long as they are superior in naval power, any chance of a coup de main against, or even a rapid advance to, Constantinople is in our opinion out of the question. After all, however, the chief reliance of the Sultan must be on his army, and if that is badly handled, it is tolerably certain that Adrianople will once again be occupied by the legions of the Czar.”