THE LAW OF LIBEL.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 5010, 14 April 1877, Page 2 (Supplement)

THE LAW OF LIBEL.

Another phase of the law of libel has recently been brought into prominence in England, and the following extracts, while explaining the case, will also show the feelings of the English Press on the subject: {Daily Telegraph, Feb. 7.) A case of more than usual interest was decided on Saturday by the Court of Appeal, sitting at Westminster. The Lord Chief Justice and Lords Justices Hellish, Baggallay, and Brarawell were upon the bench, and the decision was that of the Full Court, each of the learned Judges'giving in detail the particular reasons by which ho had been guided to his conclusion. The original action was brought by Dr. Purcell, Medical Officer to the Board of Guardians at Altrincham, in the county of Chester, against Mr. Sowler, proprietor of a Manchester newspaper. It seems that at a mooting of the Altrincham Board certain of the gentlemen present had made, whether rightly or wrongly, some very strong remarks upon Dr. Purcell’s conduct, imputing to him neglect of his duties, maladministration, cruelty, inhumanity, and various other grievous offences. Dr. Purcell was precluded by law from bringing any action either against the Board of Guardians jointly, or against the individual members of it, who had so called his character in question. They were his employers, and consequently had a right to speak of Ids conduct in the discharge of his duties as they might think lit. Unfortunately, however, a reporter of the Manchester Courier was present at the meeting, and the paper with which he was connected published a full report of the proceedings, ia which the obaoaovw

charges appeared in detail, and at full length. Dr. Purcell, acting under the advice of his solicitor, brought an action against that newspaper, on the ground that it had published a libel upon him. Solicitors, special pleaders, counsel, and other eminent legal luminaries were employed, and the cause was duly put down to be heard and determined upon circuit. When, however, the case was called on, a compromise was agreed to, and a verdict for forty shillings was taken by consent, subject to the point of law, subsequently raised, whether the report was privileged, or whether the proceedings before the Board of Guardians were of sufficient public interest to justify a full and complete account of them. This subtle legal question came on in due course before the Court of Common Pleas. Mr. Justice Bx-ett, Mr. Justice Archibald, and Mr. Justice Bindley heard the'arguments of counsel on both sides, and ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that the proceedings of the Board of Guardians are in no way matter of public interest and concern, and that, consequently, a newspaper is not justified in publishing a report of them. From this judgment the defendant, the proprietor of the Manchester Courier, appealed, and the Court of Appeal has decided against him, affirming the ruling of the inferior Court, although upon different grounds from those on which the original decision was given. The Court of Common Pleas, as we have said, came to the conclusion that what was stated at a Board of Guardians is not matter of public interest, and that, consequently, a newspaper is not justified in publishing a full report of it. The Court of Appeal, with that love of subtle distinction which is the chief characteristic of lawyers, has ruled that what takes place at a Board of Guardians is matter of public interest, but that a newspaper is not on that account privileged to publish a full report of it. The consequence is that the original verdict for forty shillings stands good, and that the plaintiff, Dr. Purcell, will recover his damages and the costs

With all submission to so high a tribunal, we venture to think that this decision is much to be regretted. It is obviously for the interest of the public that a full and complete report should be given of all public or gwcm'-public meetings It would now, however, seem, if we are to follow the decision of the Court of Appeal, that, with the exception of Parliament and the proceedings in courts of law to which the public are admitted as a matter of right, because they are by their very nature public, no newspaper has any right to ’viblish what takes place at gwasi-public meetings, and that if it does so it must run the risk

We can only say that if this is indeed the law it is high time that the law was altered. Libel is an offence which, when wilfully committed, ought to be severely punished ; but a newspaper in publishing reports of what takes place at a public or quasi public meeting, is in reality discharging a public duty All that can be said is that, if the decision of the Court of Appeal is to remain law, a serious restriction will henceforth be placed upon the legitimate functions of journalism, and that intelligence which is of the highest interest and imgortance to the public will have in future to be suppressed. {Liverpool Bally Post, Feb, C.) Those who suppose that the Press is practically uncontrolled in the exercise of its reporting functions, and free almost to the verge of licence, should read the case decided by the Court of Appeal on Saturday. The facts are simple enough, but they raise a point of considerable public importance The present undefined state of the law on the subject of libel is not altogether creditable . . . Of course, no haul and fast line can be laid down; but the extreme caution which the Judges show in these cases is not altogether edifying, and suggests the suspicion that they are not particularly clear upon the subject themselves. . . . This case of the Manchester Courier shows how anxious must often be an editor’s task in making up his mind what the risks of the libel law will permit, and what the public good requires, When such anxieties are an incessant and unavoidable part of a man’s business; when the requirements and interest of the community demand a largo publicity; and when the journalist who is called on to meet this demand is exercising to the best of his discretion a function, the efficient performance of which everyone knows to be absolutely essential to modern life, it is sheer puerility to treat him as one who merely shares the general liberty of British citizens to publish anything they choose at their own risk. If anyone is the pledged servant of the public, it is he. If any one gives guarantees of good faith and prudence, he does. The law ought frankly to recognise the utility and difficulty of his labors, and to give him the utmost allowance consistent with the preservation of private character from malicious or flagrantly careless aspersion. Hence we are glad to find Mr. Baron Bramwell acknowledging that public opinion governs the world ; that public opinion is mainly guided by the Press ; and that publicity and the freedom of the Press are therefore all-important. Having owned so much, it was rather unfortunate that the learned Judge was obliged to say that the law was against a newspaper which had behaved honestly and justly, as the Manchester Courier had done. {Daily News, Feb. 6.) We do not question the decision, but wo maybe permitted to doubt the wisdom of some, if not all, of these reasons. It would be dangerous, and indeed absurd, surely to adopt the apparent view of the Common Pleas, that only matters concerning the Empire are privileged. It would be strange indeed if some Judges were right in their contention that the right of the public to be present determines the question, for that test might be fatal to faithful reports of proceedings in Parliament. But is it any more satisfactory to hold with the Lord Chief Justice and Sir George Bramwell that the true test is whether or not the statements in question are ex parte ? Surely it might easily happen that one-sided statements were of cardinal importance to the public, and that it behoved them to be put in possession of such statements with all speed. How could many inquiries into the conduct of officials be set on foot if no cx parte statements could be privileged ? Our present object, however, is not to criticise the expediency of the law, or the reasons for it, but to direct attention to its uncertainty—uncertainty so great that, oven with the best intention in the world, an honest man, with every desire to do right, might be often at a loss how to act, and might err, and be punished. The sooner the House of Lords considers and puts an end to these doubts the better.