SUPREME COURT.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 4985, 15 March 1877, Page 3

SUPREME COURT.

IN BANCO. Wednesday, March 14.

(Before their Honors the Chief Justice and Mr, Justice Richmond.) BENIPBITT AT THE BAB.

Mr. Barton, before the cause list was proceeded with, addressed the Court on a matter of practice, in which he said it was desirable that some rule should be' laid down, viz., the seniority of the Bar. There was no rule laid down here as to who was to lead in a cause. He believed he was himself the senior member of the Bar. The rule observed in Victoria, where he had practised before he came here, was that seniority dated from the date of call or admission into the profession in England or else-' where. To avoid difficulty where certain junior counsel had more business than others who were their seniors the former were' elevated to the rank of Queen's counsel. He sub-" mitted that whether or not it was considered l ' that the Bar here had arrived at such a Btage as would render it desirable for a similar course to be adopted here, at all events some general rule should be laid down. There was no law association here which could take action in the matter, and barristers had therefore to look to the Judges, as, so to speak, the Benchers of the only Inn of Court they had. He did not ask their Honors to lay down any rule just now, but hoped it would be taken iuto consideration, as difficulties did arise as to who should lead, who should revise others' i pleadings, who should attend at others cham- j bers, and such like matters.

Mr. Travers said he altogether disputed that Mr. Barton was the senior member of the Bar. He pointed out that it would not be desirable or fair to fix seniority here according to date of call or admission elsewhere. If that were so, a man who had practised at the Bar of New Zealand for twenty-five years might be displaced by a man who happened to be admitted in England or Trinidad, or some other place, just before him. Mr. Barton said he had no objection to rank as junior to Mr. Travers. All he desired was that some rule should be laid down to avoid difficulties which undoubtedly did arise in practice here owing to their being no rule as to seniority.

The ■ Court suggested that the barristers should put their views on the Bubject into writing, when they could be more fully considered. GRATF V. TODD. On the application of Mr. Travers (for Mr. Bell), this case was ordered to stand over. BELK V. IMMIGRANTS AID CORPORATION. Mr. Quick said he had an application to make for a motion of dismissal in this case. He had the consent of the other side to the application, and he would now ask whether the Court would take the matter in Court or in Chambers. The Court intimating that they would hear Mr. Quick now, Mr. Quick applied that unless the next step in the action were taken, viz., delivery of issues within a week, the action be dismissed with costs. The learned counssl quoted rule 408 in support of his application. Mr. Hutchison, on the other side, made no objection to the application, which was granted accordingly. J. D. CANNING V. HENARE JIATUA.

The plaintiff in this case, Mr. John Davies Canning, of the firm of Canning and Kussell, sheep'farmers in Hawke'B Bay, sought to recover the sum of £I2OO and interest from the Maori Chief Henare Matua. The plaintiff sued as indorsee, of a promissory note. A demurrer was raised to the action, on the ground that the declaration failed to show a sufficiency of indorsement so as to entitle plaintiff to sue -as indorsee, and that there was nothing to identify John Davies Canning as being the plaintiff. , Mr. Travers appeared in support of the demurrer, and Mr. Chapman in support of the declaration. The Court reserved judgment. POLL V. TONKS. Mr. Travers applied that the rule nisi obtained in this case for a new trial be made absolute. Mr. Barton appeared to show cause against the rule. The jury in this case (tried last session) found that the defendant's horse was improperly fastened, whereby an accident occurred by which plaintiff was injured. The jury found for plaintiff, with damages, £270. It was now soxight to set aside the verdict on the ground of misdirection by the Judge, and that the verdict was against the weight of evidence. .

At the trial the Judge directed the jury that if a person leaves a horse fastened, even by a good and substantial bridle, to a post in a highway, without any person in charge, and the horse gets away and does such injury as a horse maybe expected to do, such as racing about and thereby causing even good tempered and reasonably driven horses to shy, turn round suddenly, and do injury to anybody, the person ! so leaving his horse fastened and unattended would be responsible; and further, that even if the faßtenings were such as a prudent-man would use, still'he would be liable ; and if the fastenings were insufficient, and an accident occurred 1 in consequence, he would certainly be liable for what ensued. Mr, Justice Eichmond gave the judgment of the Court against the rule, thus upholding the verdict of the jury at the trial. The Court held that there had been no misdirection, but that the jury found on facts which were very properly left to them, and that their verdict waß not against the weight of evidence. The Chief Justice concurred.

: The rule was discharged accordingly, with costs.

The Court then adjourned until next (this) morning, at 11 o'clock. At the rising of the Court Mr. Barton asked the Court to hear a matter in Chambers. It was an ex parte application, made under these circumstances: —A large sum of raonej was about to change hands next morning, and he was instructed to make application to stop it. The Court granted the application. The names of the parties concerned were not stated.