New Zealand Times (PUBLISHED DAILY.) THURSDAY, AUGUST 24.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXI, Issue 4812, 24 August 1876, Page 4

New Zealand Times (PUBLISHED DAILY.) THURSDAY, AUGUST 24.

The attitude assumed and the doctrines propounded by Sir G. Grey and his unreasoning supporters would bo alarming were they not ludicrous. The language of the resolutions telegraphed to Mr. Tones and that of Sir G. Grey’s manifesto find no countenance in the theory or the practice of representative government. But the question at once occurs, have wo a . representative government ? That question is conclusively answered by the Constitution Act. Its title is “An Act to Grant a Representative Constitution to

the . Colony of New' Zealand.” The language held by these Auckland resolutions of Tuesday, and by Sir G. Grey, is totally at variance with the doctrines of such a system of government. M. Guizot, in his standard work on representative government, observes :—“lt is required to discover all the elements of legitimate power that are disseminated throughout society, and to organise them into an actual power; that is to, say, into one focus, and to realise public reason and public morality, and to call them to the occupation of power. What we call Representation is nothing else than a means to arive at this result ; it is not an arithmetical machine employed to collect individual wills, but a natural process by which public reason, which alone has a right to govern society, may be extracted from the bosom of society itself. No reason has in fact a right to say beforehand for itself that it is the reason of the community. The electors do not say at the outset to their deputies, ‘ Such is our will : let that be your law.’ They enjoin upon them nothing precise, they simply confer upon them the mission of examining and deciding according to their reason. They must necessarily trust in the enlightenment of those whom they elect.” And yet, what are these Auckland wise acres doing but exactly attempting to impose their own sweet but stupid wills upon their representative 1 Then Sir George Grey talks.of “submitting the question of the Constitution to the public,” and “empowering the people of New Zealand to choose the form of the new constitution;” again, that “ an objectionable form of constitution is forced upon the people of New Zealand to which their assent has never been asked.” Truly, persona who talk so may fairly be suspected of a design of ruining the Constitution, even while the cant of the Constitution is on their lips. But is the theory of representation thus laid down by the great French writer really the principle of English representation? Let us see. The Commons of England and the “people” of New Zealand are alike, in contemplation of law, present in Parliament by their representatives. The Act I, James Ist, c. 1, thus defines Parliament This High Court of Parliament where all the whole Body of the Realm and every particular member thereof, either in person or by representation (by their own free elections), are by the laws of this realm deemed to bopersonallypresent.” Again, Dr. Hearn, in his book on the Government of England, says : —“A representative in Parliament is not sent there to register his own or his constituents’ local prejudices, or selfish objects. He must hear before he decides. The theory of the Constitution as it is expressed in the writs of summons requires him to form his opinion of ‘Common Council,’ that is to say, after he has associated with other representatives, and after he has received all the information which the Crown is able to supply. He may find in altered circumstances, or on more accurate knowledge, good reason to modify, or even to reverse the opinions which he expressed to his constituents.” Thus, then, by the law and Constitution of England, the whole body of the people of the land are by their representatives personally present in Parliament; and by the same law and Constitution a representative is not sent to register his own or his constituents’ prejudices. He is to hear before he decides. ... If his judgment when thus matured militates with any preconceived opinions, these opinions are to give way, and his judgment is to prevail. These are the undoubted doctrines of English representation. Will anyone say that the Imperial Parliament gave one kind of representation to us, and kept a different sort to itself ? The primary principle of representation is that the member once elected and seated in his place in Parliament, is for many reasons much better qualified to judge and to decide on public affairs than his constituents. The people need checks and limitations no less than the King or Queen. If a monarchic absolutism is liable to infirmities, democratic absolutism is liable to other and not less dangerous infirmities. When the law assigns both to the Sovereign One and to tho Sovereign Many a specific power of expression, the object is the same in both cases. This obect is to secure tho wellweighed and deliberate opinion of the utterer. Thus, when under a representative government a few persons are selected to act and speak on behalf of a large number, manyadvantagos result. Instead of a tumultuous crowd like that of Auckland, wo have an orderly and comparatively unexcited deliberative assembly. Then follows a sobering effect upon the individuals composing the mass ; responsibility being less divided is acutely felt; the member feels that a reason will be required for his conduct, and that reason will be criticised. In all respects a representative assembly is more careful than a mob. All this is merely saying at more length that representation is organisation, and that the organ is fitted to discharge its function. But perhaps it may be objected that all this is quite true on ordinary occasions, but when the foundations of the Constitution are touched it has no application. Here, again, we fear such an objector will find nothing to give him countenance in the English Constitution. The English Parliament is not only a legislative but also a constituent assembly. And certainly here again tho Imperial Parliament has shown that it did not mean to withhold from us a power which itself possessed. This is proved by the Act of 31st July, 1868, by which power is given to the General Assembly to repeal the Constitution Act in an essential point. Let Mr. Tonks be well assured that neither by the law nor the Constitution is he called upon to give up either his seat or his deliberate opinions to the arrogant dictation of his constituents. On the contrary, it is his bounden duty to retain his seat even under the aspersions of malevolence, and in the teeth of popular obloquy to give effect by his vote to those opinions which he may have formed. It was precisely that he and others might bo in the best position to form these opinions that they were sent here, and the law requires that they shall not, like poltroons, surrender them to people who are not and cannot be so well informed about the matter as their members are.

As for Sir G. Grey we fear his case is hopeless. His rhodomontade would be mischievous if it were not, in the view of all sober men, ludicrous. When wo say that we are truly grieved to see him making shipwreck of his well-won prestige, we express the feeling of numbers of persons who remember his honorable connection with the early history of the colony. Wo fear he is hopeless.