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New Zealand Times, Volume XXXI, Issue 4790, 29 July 1876, Page 2

We are glad to seo that the Juries Act Amendment Bill provides for the amendment of the Act of 1871, in respect of the acceptance by a Judge of a verdict of five-sixths- of a jury. The section of the Act of 1871 which it is proposed to amend is as follows : • “The verdict of not less than fivesixths of any jury empannelled to try any issue or inquire of or assess damages in any civil cause; shall bo taken and accepted as} and shall have all the consequences of a verdict of any such jury

under the existing laws relating to juries; providing that no verdict not arrived at unanimously shall be taken till the jury have retired for a period of at least six hours, and have intimated to the Judge presiding at the trial that they have considered their verdict, and that there is no probability of their being unanimous.” Now the intention of this clause is very obvious: to put it out of the power of an obstinate, prejudiced, or irrational juryman to cause a miscarriage of justice, by holding out against the opinion of his fellow jurymen. But at the sittings of the Court of Appeal in November last this clause was interpreted to mean that it is essential that a jury, as originally constituted, should intimate, after a lapse of six hours, that there is no probability of their being unanimous. The case in which this judgment was given attracted a good _ deal of attention at the time, and in commenting upon it we pointed out how peculiar a theory the judgment involved—that it really accepted and upheld one man’s judgment in opposition to that of his eleven fellowjurymen ; and it is rather remarkable that the termination of this very case demonstrated that, in spite of a law specially passed to defeat such a contingency, one obstinate juror did prevent a true verdict being rendered, and put the parties to the suit to a great deal of unnecessary expense. We are glad therefore to see that the Bill contains a provision for clearing up this difficulty. But the amendment of which Mr. Macparlane has given notice—that after the lapse of three hours the verdict of two-thirds of the jury shall become the verdict of the jury—demands a little attention. There can be no doubt that there have been many and serious miscarriages of justice occasioned by the stubbonness of minorities whose action has been affected by influences which ought never to be felt within the juryroora. Not that public morality is lower or the desire to see justice done between man and man is weaker here than in other communities. Human nature is the same all the world over, and in small communities it is scarcely possible to conceive of a case being brought before the Court in which the litigants are not connected with members of the jury in business relations, and are regarded either with favor or disfavor according to past dealings or by-gone associations. Hence, occasionally there are cases in which substantial justice is not done ; but this can scarcely be remedied by reducing the number of the majority required to consent to a verdict. Indeed, granting that the element of partiality does in the very smallest degree exhibit itself in our juryrooms, the necessity for a decided majority becomes the more apparent, and we would suggest to Mr. Macfaiilane that reduction from unanimity to a verdict by three-fourths would be more desirable than to a verdict by eight of the twelve. If three-fourths of a jury cannot agree to a particular course after a case has been sifted to the bottom by counsel, and the special points brought out by the Judge, it may very well be argued that more evidence is necessary, and at the same time the substitution of three-fourths for five-sixths will greatly reduce the probability of conflict of judgment.