ENGLAND AND CHINA

New Zealand Times, Volume XXX, Issue 4591, 7 December 1875, Page 2 (Supplement)

ENGLAND AND CHINA

(From The Times, August 28.) It is possible, though as yet we are glad to say there is no more than a remote possibility to be discussed, that the difficulty with Burmah may be overshadowed by a far graveldifficulty with China. That portion of our controversy with the Court of Mandalay which related to the attack on Colonel Browne’s expedition and Mr. Margary’ murder has been settled by the Burmese monarch’s assurances that he had nothing whatever to do with the matter ; and, though we may bo inclined to suspect that these assurances at the best are rather true in the letter than in the spirit, we can claim no right to go beyond them. Butin dealing with China we must and can assume a different tone. The Manwiue was perpetrated upon Chinese territory, by Chinese soldiers, and, there is strong reason to believe, at the instigation, if not under the conduct, of Chinese officials. For a crime so committed the Government of Pekin is both morally and formally responsible, even though it might be able to show that it had no actual knowledge of the circumstances. Accordingly, the Foreign Office lost no time in instructing Mr. Wade to demand reparation from the ministers of the infant Emperor. If the influence of the Prince of Rung were still predominant at the Chinese capital, it is possible that our minister would have been met, at all events, with profuse promises, and that, although any real intention of making reparation for the hostile acts committed on the Yunnan frontier would not probably have been entertained, there would have been some tribute paid to the claims of international comity. The present Regency at Pekin, however, appears to have entered upon a decidedlyreactionary policy, audMr.Wade’sdemaudshave given the Chinese ministers an opportunity, which, perhaps, they are glad to seize, of showing their countrymen that they are no longer in a state of moral subjection to the foreigners. Rumors have been circulated both in India and this country that Mr. Wade has not only been “thwarted” but “insulted,” at Pekin, audit has even been stated that be has telegraphed to the Foreign Office for instructions, and has demanded the protection of British troops. These latter statements are “inexact;” but, though the eticences of the diplomatic service are to be respected, we may be permitted to infer that Mr. Wade has, in fact, expressed both dissatisfaction and apprehension at the attitude of dogged and arrogant resistence assumed by the Chinese Government. It is highly probable, if this he so, that he has suggested to the authorities at home the importance of being prepared. Even in these days of the telegraph, the railway, and the steamship, it would not be easy to assemble without some previous concert and organisation a naval force at a week’s notice on the coast of China, still less to throw a garrison into Shanghai or any other of the important open ports where European interests may need instant defence. Perhaps the first fruit of Mr. Wade’s warnings is the concentration of the foreign squadrons at Ohefoo, which a telegram from Shanghai announces this morning. It is not likely that Mr. Wade, who knows the Chinese character thoroughly, and who fully appreciates the dangers to English life, English property, and English trade that would be involved in an outbreak of Celestial fanaticism, will incur any unnecessary risks. At the same time, in dealing with the Chinese, it must always be remembered that weakness is the most perilous of all policies. If Mr. Wade were to relax the rigor of his demands for reparation on the score of the Manwiue disaster, with the hope of averting some dreaded explosion of popular rage, he would do more to precipitate the catastrophe than if he exacted successfully the punishment of a hundred criminals. While, therefore, prudence is indispensable in the conduct of the negotiations which are at present in the hands of Mr. Wade, courage is even of greater importance ; and it is certain that only a judicious union of both will pilot us through the difficulty in which, by no fault of our own, we have become entangled. Of course, if the Chinese are determined to try their fortunes in war once more, they can easily force a quarrel upon us ; but we are disposed to think that for the moment they are rather inclining towards a martial assertion of that superiority in the world which is the most deeply rooted of their [convictions than absolutely determined upon it.