NEW RULES FOR THE BAR.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXX, Issue 4530, 27 September 1875, Page 2

NEW RULES FOR THE BAR.

His Honor the Chief Justice has just done one official act in connection with the legal profession, for which, in our opinion, he well merits the thanks of that profession and of the public, and for which we now heartily tender him ours. He has arranged, evidently with much care and judgment, a curriculum of the studies for the examination for admission of barristers of the Supreme Court. He has not only done this, but he has at the same time remedied another absurd practice of which we several times complained ; we refer to tho practice which has prevailed of not giving the notice required by law of the subjeots, the books, and the times of the examination. This absurdity, which was very justly complained of as a hardship, has now disappeared along with some other laxities of practice which kept it in countenance. The curriculum fixed by the Chief Justice is now to be seen in the bailiffs room at the Supreme' Court; it specifies portions of certain Latin and Greek classics, four books of Euclid, algebra to quadratic equations, a very, fair standard of ancient and modern history, as well as the English and French or German languages. These constitute the general knowledge portion of the examination. Besides this, there is, of course the special legal part of the curriculum, the several departments of which are arranged under the heads of Equity, Common law, Constitutional law, &c. The whole forms, we think, a very respectable general and special educational standard for. the higher branch of the profession, but by no means too high. With one exception, we have no fault to find with such books as are specified. The exception we refer to is Alison's History of Europe, which is in our opinion, in various ways, about as unsuitable a book as could be named. _ Its vast bulk alone is a fatal objection, for we hesitate not to say that no young man could honestly make it up. And if he did, his labor would be to a great extent lost, for the book, however amusing to cursory is totally unfitted for purposes of education. It will nevertheless go far to cure a very palpable evil which has grown up with the crop of mischievous absurdities arising out of the existing amalgamation of the branches of the profession. We refer to the practice, more particularly prevalent of course in Dunedin, of permitting clerks who have entered into solicitors' articles for five year3,_ by passing a so-called barrister's examination, in many cases nominally, and at beat only relatively, higher than that for solicitors, to get out of their articles at the end of three instead of five years. This was doubly evading the intention of the Law Practitioners Act; it evaded it in allowing a sham examination to be substituted for a real one, and it evadod it in allowing young men whose time was spent in the drudgery and routine of solicitor's practice, to acquire the status of barristers, whereas the Act intended that the pupils of barristers should spend their time in studying the theory of the law. Thus, as ever happens, one evil supported and kept in countenance another evil. This vicious system the Chief Justice has, by establishing the present standard, pretty effectually snuffed out. No doubt, many young.menwho looked forward to avail themsolvos of the old will feel the change as a hardship, and not without reason. But such, hardships are inevitable in every transition from one regime to another ; but their complaint must justly be laid at the door, not of the reforming Chief Justice, but at that of the persons whose reprehensible laxity inaugurated, and perpetuated, the former vicious system. The passing into the profession as a full-fledged barrister at the close of three years of service at salary will not now be the very simple feat which it formerly was : it cannot now be accomplished by a mero arrangement with a good-natured solicitor. And very just and right it should be so. But the consideration of this step in the right direction suggests another question. What advantage, besides tho mere consideration of time, is to uccrue to thoso gentlemen who, at the cost of much intellectual labor and perhaps also money, succeed in raising themselves up to the level of the higher standard now set up 1 Is it, we ask, fair or in any way right or consistent that the lower branch of the profession should have all the privileges of the higher? Is it right or reasonable or just that solicitors should stand in tho Supreme Court, for instance, on exactly the same footing as barristers, ? Hitherto they have been allowed that privilege, and if they are to continue to enjoy it, it will'be, we think, and wo say it without hesitation or reserve, at once unreasonable inconsistent and unjust. If the intention of tho present change is to rear up a Bar worthy of the name, it will, unless a further step in the direction indicated be taken, be effectually neutralised. Solicitors, from their constant personal intercourse with the public and their superior tr<ido knowledge, have an immense advantage over barristers. In tho competition for clients and business a man educated as a barrister has no chance whatever against one'educated as a solicitor. Now, if the latter gentlemen are to continue able as now to walk into the Supremo Court on all occasions with their clients' business, all tho educational standards in the universe will be utterly futile. The attorneys will simply monopolise the prjfession as before, and tho barristers will be left out in the cold. The public know nothing of any distinction in tho case—they know the genus " lawyer" but not the species of it," and it is quite impossible to make them conceive it. _ If, then, the intention be, as we believe it is, to make tho present reform an effectual one, something more must bo done. We do not mean that a complete division of the profession should be at onco established, but a step towards it might, we think, easily be taken. In our opinion men who are solicitors only should not be permitted to hold briefs in tho Supreme Court, either in banco or at nisi prins ; —in fact,

unless some such further: step be taken, the setting up a standard is quite idle. Thin, however, is a matter which wili properly form a consideration for the Judges when assembled at the Court of Appeal. It is, like other matters, inextricably implicated with the existing union of the two branches of the profession ; but now that a good beginning is made we trust that it will be carried out. to such conclusions as logic and justice alike dictate.