THE ENGLISH AND SPANISH NAVIES.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXX, Issue 4512, 6 September 1875, Page 3

THE ENGLISH AND SPANISH NAVIES.

(From St, James's Magazine.) From the sixteenth to the end of the eighteen century the contest between England and Spain can (scarcely he said to have ceased. The influence of the House of Bourbon combined the French and Spanish fleets against us many times, though always with one result. In the long struggle, not only did the empire of the sea pass into the hands of England, but colonics in every quarter of the globe. The commencement of the last century gave us Gibraltar, and it closed with the acquisition of Malta. To the nineteenth-century Englishman Spain is simply an incomprehensible country, which pays no interest on her bonds. But even now, low though sho has sunk in the scale of nations, she is far from insignificant at sea. A nation which has practically defied the United States cannot be classed with small powers, however weak may be her forces on land; however torn by civil war. We suppose there can be no dispute about the fact that the United States did "cave in" on the 'Virginius question on account of their utter inability to cope with the Spanish fleet. Seven iron-clads, including three of the first-class, constitute the armada which the United States refused to face. As if to show how great are the responsibilities of England, and in what unexpected places the services of our navy may suddenly be called upon, we may direct attention to the affair of Cartagena in the autumn of 1873. The Intransigente rising in that town placed three powerful ironclads, with some wooden frigates, and the strongest fortress in Spain, in the possession of a number of desperadoes differing little from pirates. To establish the immortal principles of the Commune,

these vessels proceeded to visit various places along the coast (mostly unforti6ed), and made " requisitions" for money and provisions. That they should never have been allowed to leave Cartagena on their errand of plunder is obvious. The capture of the Almauza and Vittoria, and their retention at Gibraltar was the least Ave could do to repair this error. On that occasion, as our readers will doubtless remember, our Mediterranean squadron was cleared for action, and sharp was the disappointment of officers and men when Galvez "thought better of it," and refused to fire. We mention the incident simply as showing how in a moment a complication may arise demanding the presence of the fleet. We have said that there was a vessel in the Italian navy to which it would be necessary to allude particularly. Among the ironclad squadron which flocked to Cartagena at the outbreak of the insurrection was the Italian—and English readers should lay well to heart the fact that an Italian ship, the Venezia, carried the heaviest guns of all. If our position at sea is to be maintained, such a thing must not be repeated. A heavy account will be demanded of any English Ministry, whether Conservative or Liberal, which permits any disaster to befall a single English ship through an insufficient armament. We are not anticipating any differences with Italy. On the contrary, an "understanding" of a cordial character with that power and with Austria, combined with the adoption of a firm tone and great vigilance at Constantinople would, we are convinced, be attended wish the happiest results. The reconciliation of two powers which has just been celebrated by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Italy at "Venice, is one of the few recent royal meetings calculated to give much confidence to those who wish to see not only peace but freedom prevail in Europe. Nevertheless, the country which is still first amongst naval powers cannot afford to be surpassed even by one ship on one station.